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I. INTRODUCTION

The text and original meaning' of the Establishment Clause 2 as drafted by the
First Federal Congress was diminished in its importance when the United States
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Everson v. Board of Education of the
Township of Ewing in 1947.' Instead of looking to the record of the debates and
journals of the First Congress, the- Everson Court adopted the principles animating
the disestablishment struggle in Virginia, and less so the disestablishment
experiences in other newly formed states, to give substantive content to the
Establishment Clause.4 The dissenting justices in Everson would have taken the
The focus of originalism has evolved from the "original intent" of the drafters, to the
"original understanding" of those who gave their approval to the law in question, to the
"original meaning" of the final text that also considers the conduct of those who first
applied the Constitution. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive
Force of the Constitution'sSecret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1134-40 (2003). It
is not that original intent or original understanding are no longer relevant. Rather, they
remain major factors under the umbrella of original meaning.
2 The First Amendment reads as follows: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I (the Establishment
Clause appears in italics).
3 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
4Id. at 11-13.
No one locality and no one group throughout the Colonies can rightly be
given entire credit for having aroused the sentiment that culminated in adoption
of the Bill of Rights' provisions embracing religious liberty. But Virginia ...
provided a great stimulus and able leadership for the movement. The people
there, as elsewhere, reached the conviction that individual religious liberty could
be achieved best under a government which was stripped of all power to tax, to
support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions, or to interfere with the beliefs
of any religious individual or group.
Id. at 11. In order to capture the states' disestablishment history in a single phrase, the
Court drew upon Thomas Jefferson's letter of January 1802 wherein he had written the
Danbury Baptist Association in Connecticut that "the clause against establishment of
religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between Church and State."' Id.
at 16 (citation omitted). However, Jefferson's metaphor was not precise enough an image
to actually resolve the difficult church-state cases of the sort that were litigated after
Everson. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) ("The concept of a 'wall' of
separation is a useful figure of speech .... But the metaphor itself is not a wholly accurate
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matter even a step further by generally conflating the beliefs of James Madison of
Virginia with the meaning of the Establishment Clause.
The imputation of the disestablishment experience in Virginia to the adoption
of the Establishment Clause by the First Federal Congress is open to question as a
matter of history. Not only were these two experiences very different law-making
events, separated by four years, but the Virginia House of Delegates of 1784-1785
and the First Congress of 1789 were also elected by very different constituencies,
composed of quite different legislative officials, bore different responsibilities, and
harbored different ambitions and allegiances. The one common denominator in the
two events was the active involvement of James Madison, a highly capable
statesman with well-developed and strongly held views on church-government
relations. Even Madison, however, was not singularly focused on religious
freedom as Congress assembled itself in New York City in the spring of 1789. As
a member of the House of Representatives and someone who had the ear of
President George Washington, Madison was as much or more devoted to the
implementation of a federated government of robust powers to replace the
ineffectual Confederation Congress. When he did focus on religious freedom,
Madison had the good sense to take into account that the First Congress was an
description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists between church and
state."). As matters have developed from Everson going forward, the meaning the Court
would give to "the wall" metaphor was to be found in the ideas animating the Virginia and
other state disestablishments. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)
("[T]his Court has given the Amendment a 'broad interpretation ... in the light of its
history and the evils it was designed forever to suppress."' (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at
14-15)).
5 Everson, 330 U.S. at 33-43, 52, 57, 63 (Rutledge, J., dissenting):
No provision of the Constitution is more closely tied to or given content by
its generating history than the religious clause of the First Amendment. It is at
once the refined product and the terse summation of that history. The history
includes not only Madison's authorship and the proceedings before the First
Congress, but also the long and intensive struggle for religious freedom in
America, more especially in Virginia, of which the Amendment was the direct
culmination. In the documents of the times, particularly of Madison, who was
leader in the Virginia struggle before he became the Amendment's sponsor, but
also in the writings of Jefferson and others and in the issues which engendered
them is to be found irrefutable confirmation of the Amendment's sweeping
content.
Id. at 33-34 (citations omitted). Justice Rutledge went so far as to attach an appendix to the
Everson opinion, Madison's Memorial and RemonstranceAgainst Religious Assessments, a

petition written in June 1785 to oppose a special tax to pay the salaries of Christian clergy
in Virginia. Id. at 63. For a detailed account of the Virginia disestablishment and a
breakdown of the historical, theological, and prudential argumentation of Madison's
Memorial and Remonstrance, see Carl H. Esbeck, Protestant Dissent and the Virginia
Disestablishment, 1776-1786, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 51 (2009) [hereinafter Esbeck,
Virginia Disestablishment].
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altogether different audience than his earlier one in Virginia.6 He knew that the
task of agreeing on what powers to deny to the national government with respect to
religion, speech, press, and so on, was far simpler than the task of agreeing on
what powers to grant it. 7
Notwithstanding the criticism concerning Everson's lack of fidelity to the text
and original meaning of the Establishment Clause, the Everson Court is certainly
correct that formation of America's foundational principles concerning
disestablishment-and in time, church-government relations-took place more at
the state rather than at the national level. The reason is simple enough: because
there was no national religion to disestablish, the Court looked to the experiences
in the states. At the outset of the American Revolution, nine of the original thirteen
states had established churches, as did Vermont and the land controlled by
Massachusetts that would eventually become the State of Maine.8 Of these eleven,
eight of the disestablishments took place after the Constitutional Convention of
6

See PHILIP HAMBURGER,

SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 105 (2002) (noting
that Madison's amendment proposed to Congress in June of 1789 "was a far cry from
Madison's position in 1785 [in Virginia] that religion was 'wholly exempt' from the
cognizance of civil society." (citation omitted)).
Historian Thomas Curry captures the state of mind with respect to the First
Congress:

In endeavoring to determine the exact significance [the First] Congress and
the [ratifying] states attached to the opening segment of the First Amendment,
one must bear in mind the overall context of its enactment and ratification. Its
guarantees did not represent the triumph of one particular party or specific
viewpoint over a clear or entrenched opposition, but rather a consensus of
Congress and nation....
Americans in 1789 . . . agreed that the federal government had no power in
[religious] matters, but some individuals and groups wanted that fact stated
explicitly. Granted, not all the states would have concurred on a single definition
of religious liberty; but since they were denying power to Congress rather than
giving it, differences among them on that score did not bring them into
contention.
THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE
PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 193-94 (1986).
8 Carl

H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the
Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REv. 1385, 1457-59, 1490-91 (2004) [hereinafter
Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment].Neither Rhode Island nor Pennsylvania ever had a
tax-supported church, although Protestant Christianity was certainly favored in various

ways. Delaware and New Jersey had abandoned their establishments while still British
colonies. Id. at 1459-73.

The War of Independence had the effect' of delaying these disestablishments. With
some exceptions, dissenters during the war put aside the cause against established churches
to meet the common enemy. Once the war had passed, dissenters had a stronger case for
religious freedom, as they had fought alongside other patriots for liberty from Great Britain
and now sought liberty from religious imposition.
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1787: South Carolina (1790), Georgia (1798), Vermont (1807), Maryland (1810),
Connecticut (1818), New Hampshire (1819), Maine (1820), and Massachusetts
(1832-33).9 Accordingly, from 1776 to 1833, there were a total of eleven state
disestablishments, each with similarities as well as some differences to the churchgovernment resettlement in their sister states. Rather than by operation of the First
Amendment with its Establishment Clause, it was interior to each of these eleven
states where the church-government issues were first joined, as well as where the
winners and losers in the often hard-fought struggles for disestablishment were
eventually declared.
Following the Supreme Court's opinion in Everson, a reoccurring argument
among commentators has been that the text of the Establishment Clause, as well as
the original intent of the First Federal Congress, should reclaim some role-albeit
perhaps a role short of controlling-with respect to the modern substantive
meaning of the clause. While it has been over sixty years since Everson was
decided, historical arguments show little sign of abating. If anything, they are
being pressed with increased vigor. o Moreover, reliance on history, as well as the
text, is not exclusive to constitutional conservatives. Many liberals are just as eager
to array the historical record on their side. As often as not, the divide is over which
side has the better grasp of the history, as well as which historical events matter the
most.
The nature of these textual and original-meaning arguments concerning the
Supreme Court's modern application of the Establishment Clause can usefully be
organized around six lines of inquiry. Answers to these inquiries cannot resolve all
of the modern interpretative questions about church-government relations, but they
do narrow the range of issues that are fairly disputed as well as firmly close the
door to certain errant interpretations of the clause.
First, what does the 1787 Constitution, as drafted during the Philadelphia
Constitutional Convention,' tell us about religion and religious freedom? This
inquiry appears in Part II of this Article. The 1787 Constitution is silent on religion
qua religion, and is not expansive on the matter of religious freedom. I argue that
this near silence is not evidence of indifference toward religion, let alone hostility.
Rather, because the delegates envisioned a limited role for the original
Constitution, the document primarily focuses on who decides questions about
religion and law, not on providing substantive answers. At the outset, religious
freedom questions were left primarily in the hands of the several states. Leaving
this issue to the states further served the delegates' desire to avoid, where possible,
controversies that would hinder ratification.
Second, as the states debated ratification of the 1787 Constitution, how did
this alter the document's approach to religious freedom? This is addressed in Part
Id. at 1458, 1490-91.
10 See, e.g., DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH, STATE, AND ORIGINAL INTENT (2009);

ELLIS M. WEST, THE RELIGION CLAUSES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT: GUARANTEES OF

STATES' RIGHTS? (2011); Lee J. Strang, Introduction to Symposium: The (Re)Turn to
History in Religion Clause Law and Scholarship,81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1697 (2006).
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III. The Federalists insisted that it was clear under the Constitution that the national
government had no power over relations between church and government, for all
authority not delegated to the national government was denied to it. The
Antifederalists were of the same mind but wanted that assurance put in writing.
Accordingly, I argue that a widely held concern for denying national authority over
religion was one of the reasons that Federalists were compelled to promise that the
First Federal Congress would take up the matter of a bill of rights.
Third, what did the members of the First Congress, who drafted and debated
the Establishment Clause from June to September 1789, originally intend the text
to mean? Because three-quarters of the states had to ratify what eventually became
the First Amendment, we also need to explore the extent to which the state-by-state
ratification process contributed to the original understanding of the Establishment
Clause. These matters are taken up in Part IV. It is here that I argue against two
widely held theories said to capture the original meaning of the Establishment
Clause: (1) that government may support religion so long as it does so without
preferring some religions over others; and (2) that a House-Senate Conference
Committee's last-minute decision to introduce "respecting" into the text was
specifically designed to preserve state sovereignty over church-government
relations, and thus create a federalist Establishment Clause. The formei theory is
called "nonpreferentialism" and the latter I call "specific federalism."
Fourth, what is the plain meaning of the text of the Establishment Clause once
the House and Senate finally agreed to the wording on September 24-25, 1789?
Although the text alone cannot answer all of the interpretative debates, rules of
grammar as well as the plain meaning of the chosen words do delegitimize certain
over-readings of the Establishment Clause. These matters appear in Part V of this
Article. Here I argue against a theory that conflates the religion clauses to a single
meaning, contending that no-establishment and free exercise together protect only
liberty of conscience. I also point out that the plain text does not prohibit
legislation "respecting" religion, only legislation respecting "an establishment of'
religion. The narrower scope of the textual prohibition means that statutory
religious exemptions that merely accommodate voluntary religious observance are
generally permitted by the Establishment Clause. Exemptions do not advance
religion by leaving it alone.
Fifth, how might the 1787 Constitution's overall frame of government and
underlying political theory, as amended by the Bill of Rights, contribute to the
meaning of the Establishment Clause? I turn to these questions in Part VI. For
example, the Bill of Rights vested no new powers in the national government. It
did just the opposite; it limited national powers. Therefore, I argue that the
"negative" nature of the Bill of Rights necessarily means that the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses are incapable of being in tension with or cancelling out
one another. Rather, the two clauses are complementary, each in its own way
restraining the government and thereby working to. enlarge religious freedom. I
further argue that specific federalism is not just wrong, but that it has diverted
attention to federalism when the focus with respect to the meaning of the
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Establishment Clause should be on the scope of government's limited jurisdiction
over certain affairs relegated to the province of organized religion.
Sixth, to what extent do early applications of the Establishment Clause by
officials in all three branches of the federal government inform us as to its original
meaning? To the degree such actions are not in conflict with the plain text they
may shed light on the clause's original meaning. However, many of these actions
were uneven, and at times, contradictory. I briefly address this state of events in
Part VII.
To the extent that a hierarchy is useful, the fourth of these lines of inquirythe plain text-is thought to be the most important for judicial interpretive
purposes, followed by the third and fifth inquiries, respectively. The idea behind
prioritizing the plain text is that the courts should not fall back on either the
congressional debate or on rules of construction unless the text of the
Establishment Clause is ambiguous. In other words, a jurist who is an originalist is
first a textualist before she is an originalist. Unlike the historian who is
unrestrained in asking what happened and why, the jurist is confined to asking,
"What is the law?" Thus, the jurist is not at liberty to let the text of the
Constitution be superseded by later actions or inattention of public officials. This
ordering also gives due weight to those state legislators who, when asked to ratify
each proposed amendment during 1789-1790, were presented with a fixed text and
a take it or leave it proposition." With respect to the original meaning of the text,
one must remember that when considering the merits of each proposed
amendment, state legislators had little to go on but grammar and the ordinary
definition of the words at that time, situated within the framework of the new
government constituted by the 1787 Constitution.
Careful attention to the First Congress' debates over the wording of the
religion clauses, the theory of the United States Constitution, and the text of what
we now call the Establishment Clause, show that certain widely held mega-theories
of the clause are unlikely. So this Article explains what the Establishment Clause is
not. But the same text and debates will not tell us the original understanding of
religious "establishment" as used in the clause. Within certain parameters, the uses
of the word "establishment" during the founding were sufficiently multiple that we
cannot be certain of its intended definition. Or, more precisely, within a modest

" The state legislatures could ratify some of the proposed Articles of Amendment and
reject others, but, with respect to each individual article of amendment, a state had to
accept or reject the entire article as written. Indeed, in September 1789, Congress sent the
states twelve proposed Articles of Amendment. See S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 163
(1789), available at http://www.archive.org/stream/journalfirstsesOOsenagoog#page/n7
/mode/lup. The first two Articles of Amendment were not ratified, whereas the Articles
numbered Third through Twelfth were ratified by three-quarters of the states by the end of
December 1791. The ten ratified amendments were renumbered, and they took on the
popular name of the "Bill of Rights." See infra notes 347-348 and accompanying text. The
two rejected articles were about constitutional structure, not rights. One of these two
rejected proposals was later ratified in 1992 and is now the Twenty-Seventh Amendment.
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range, the word "establishment" meant different things to different figures at the
political center of the formative law-making process.
II1 RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM DURING
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787

There is a near absence of the mention of either religion qua religion or
religious freedom in the original Constitution of 1787. Since constitutions often
announce fundamental propositions on which a nation's government is being
founded, religion might well have been mentioned. It is worth asking why it was
not.
A. Religion and Religious Freedom in the 1787 Constitution
A nation's constitution usefully can do three things. First, it can organize the
government's branches, assign these offices their limited competencies, and
carefully diffuse authority among them to avoid concentrations of power. Second,
it can define the relationship between government, individual citizens, and groups,
including the vesting of certain rights. And, third, it can declare those first
principles around which the body politic is drawn together and the nation-state is
founded. However, a constitution need not do all these things nor do them in a
comprehensive way. Certainly the Constitution of 1787 sought primarily to
accomplish only the first of these objectives in a thorough manner. A Bill of Rights
was added two years later in response to the second of these three tasks. However,
the original Constitution's incompleteness with respect to the nation's founding
principles was in large part calculated. In significant measure, the gap reflects the
difficulty of achieving agreement on first principles. In the face of disagreement, a
common way to get contending parties to sign a single document is to avoid topics
on which there is no consensus. Religion was one of those topics.
The 1787 Constitution did take into account religious freedom-as distinct
from religion qua religion-but only in three places. First, the various oaths of
office set forth in the Constitution permit an affirmation in lieu of a prescribed
oath.12 This was doine to accommodate the then widely known scruples of Quakers,
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 8; id. art. VI, cl. 3. During
Connecticut's convention on the ratification of the 1787 Constitution, Oliver Wolcott
argued that the taking of the oath was "a direct appeal to that God who is the avenger of
12

perjury." It follows, argued Wolcott, that the oath was indirectly an "acknowledgment of
[God's] being and providence." 2 THE DEBATES INTHE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 202 (Jonathan Elliot ed., William S. Hein
& Co. 2d ed. 1996) (1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES]. Wolcott was a signer of the

Declaration of Independence and later governor of Connecticut. Cf Steve Sheppard, What
Oaths Meant to the Framers' Generation:A PreliminarySketch, 2009 CARDOzO L. REV.
DE Novo 273 (2002). Professor Sheppard argues that for one taking the oath it did not
necessarily signal. "a religious pledge or a God-fearing basis" for the oath. Id. at 281. In
other words, a nonreligious person could, in good conscience, take the oath. As added
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as well as other small Protestant sects, who could not swear or take an oath.13
Second, the Sunday Clausel 4 permits the president, contemplating a veto or
"pocket veto," to take advantage of the fully allotted ten days and yet honor the
Christian Sabbath by not having to attend to a veto when the ten-day deadline
happens to fall on a Sunday.' 5 Finally, of greater moment in 1787 than now, the
Religious Test Clause 6 relieves federal officials from the sort of religious
prerequisites then extant in most of the states.' 7
As is readily apparent, religious freedom is not safeguarded by the original
Constitution in any comprehensive way. But that is likely because the Constitution
(unlike the Bill of Rights) deals sparingly with individual rights; it even omits
those as basic as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, due process of law, and
protection of property. So the fact that religious freedom was not comprehensively
safeguarded puts it in good company. The Constitutional Convention's primary
task was to create a framework for who decides important political and moral
questions, not to decide them. Nevertheless, a smattering of rights are given special
mention, such as the availability of a jury trial for those accused of a crime,18

support for this position, Sheppard points out that the Oath Clause in Article VI, Clause 3,
is immediately followed by the Religious Test Clause. That said, Sheppard admits people
such as Oliver Wolcott are correct that the oath requirement is an indirect constitutional
reference to God. Id. at 282. Such references, of course, fall well short of a claim that God
is the foundation for the Constitution. Id.
' The prohibition on oath-taking is from a biblical passage in Matthew 5:33-37.
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("If any Bill shall not be returned by the President
within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same
shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their
Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.").
15 See David K. Huttar, The First Amendment and Sunday, ENGAGE, Oct. 2006, at
166, 169 (noting that the Sunday Clause is not an accommodation to the president's
Sabbath day, whatever the day of the week happens to be the Sabbath of the sitting
president; rather, the clause specifically singles out Sunday as the presumed Sabbath of the
president); Jaynie Randall, Sundays Excepted, 59 ALA. L. REv. 507, 507-11, 525 (2008)
(correctly arguing that the Sunday Clause provides no support for the claim that America
was founded as a Christian nation, but her explanation being the less-convincing rationale
that the extra Sunday was to afford the president full use of the counsel of his advisorswho might be hampered in their communication by state blue laws-as he deliberated over
whether to veto a bill).
16 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 ("[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States."); see also Note, An
OriginalistAnalysis of the No Religious Test Clause, 120 HARv. L. REV. 1649, 1649-60
(2007).
'7 In the period of 1787-1789, eleven of the original thirteen states had religious tests
for becoming a state official. LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 81 (Univ. of N.C. Press 1994) (1986). Accordingly, it would
seem that many Americans at that time did not oppose religious tests, but they wanted their
own state government to determine the matter when there was such a requirement.
18 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
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preservation of the writ of habeas corpus,' 9 and prohibition of bills of attainder 20
and ex post facto legislation. 2' The few rights singled out for special mention in the
1787 Constitution appear to have little by way of a common theme. There is no
obvious explanation as to why these were mentioned and others not.
Not only are there the mere three above-mentioned items on religious
freedom, but the original Constitution also has nothing to say about religion qua
religion excepting that the Constitution's Article VII dates the completed
Convention to September 17, 1787, "in the Year of our Lord." One may regard the
Western use of a calendar that begins with the birth of Jesus Christ as but a trifle
mention of religion. However, as historian William Lee Miller points out, such
trifles in the aggregate do contrast the American Revolution with, for example, the
anti-Christianity of the French Revolution. 2 2 The American founders were not
repudiating their Christian past or being hostile to it, hence, they absentmindedly
used the Christian calendar and unconsciously assumed Sunday would be the
president's Sabbath. Similarly, the Convention delegates worked six-day weeks
from late May to mid-September, with Sunday excepted.23 While the American
founders were intentional about breaking with their European past of a
confessional state, it is also well documented that they viewed the Protestant
religion as a friend to republicanism and as an aid to the expansion of liberty.24
B. Religion and Religious Freedom at the Convention
Although the debate by Convention delegates had little to say about religion,
it is not like God never got so much as a passing mention. For example, on May
14, 1787, as delegates awaited the arrival of a quorum, George Washington rose to
exhort the delegates by declaring: "If, to please the people, we offer what we
ourselves disapprove, how can we afterward defend our work? Let us raise a
standard to which the wise and the honest can repair; the event is in the hand of
God." 2 5 When the Convention was about to break up over the issue of popular
representation in both houses of Congress, as opposed to "one state, one vote" in
the upper house, Benjamin Franklin famously called for daily sessions of the
Convention to begin with prayer. His motion, while receiving a second, was heard

' 9Id. art.
20 Id. art.
21 Id. art.

I, § 9, cl. 2.
I, § 9, cl. 3; id art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
I, § 9, cl. 3 (national government); id art. I, § 10, cl. I (state governments).

22 WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE BUSINESS OF MAY NEXT: JAMES MADISON & THE
FOUNDING 113-14 (1992).
23 RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 367 (2009).
24 MILLER, supra note 22, at 114-15.
25 GEORGE BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 210 (1885). The quote is attributed to an account rendered by

Gouverneur Morris who was present on the occasion as a delegate from Pennsylvania.
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with the politeness due the venerable statesman, but garnered so little enthusiasm
that the matter was never brought to a vote.26
While such references were few, they were not addressed to the impersonal
God of Deism but rather to a nonspecific yet monotheistic God that is involved in
the world's current events. Nevertheless, the small number of such occasions and a
document nearly bare of religion qua religion has prompted a few enthusiasts of
modem secularism to dub the Philadelphia Convention's product the "Godless
Constitution." 2 7 Unlike most organic documents of the states in that day, the 1787
Constitution's Preamble did not mention God, nor was this or anything like it
apparently suggested by any of the delegates.2 8 Indeed, unlike the Declaration of
Independence (e.g., "that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain inalienable rights" and ending with a "firm Reliance on the
Protection of divine Providence"), there was little explicit in the Preamble or the
operative provisions of the 1787 Constitution about overarching presuppositionssecular or religious-on which the new consolidated government was being
founded.
C. The Constitution's Overall Theory

What is apparent from the 1787 document is that the frame of the new
government was a constitutional federalist republic of limited delegated powers.
The atom of sovereignty had been split, creating a new government of enumerated
powers with the states retaining residual sovereignty. It was also clear that the
republic was to be one under a written constitution that was supreme over state and
Franklin explained that with age he had come to realize that God rules in the affairs
of men. BEEMAN, supra note 23, at 178. Roger Sherman seconded Franklin's motion.
Alexander Hamilton suggested that the proposal would have been useful had it been the
practice from the beginning of the Convention, but to implement the practice now could
cause alarm among citizens under the mistaken belief that their work was floundering.
Hugh Williams said he opposed the motion because there was no funding to pay the clergy.
This was a bit of a dodge as there was any number of local clergy likely willing to provide
the service free. Edmund Randolph sought to help Franklin by moving to have a sermon
preached on the Fourth of July, and thereafter have prayers each morning. Franklin
seconded Randolph's motion, but this as well was never brought to a vote. See BEEMAN,
supra note 23, at 177-79; STEVEN WALDMAN, FOUNDING FAITH: PROVIDENCE, POLITICS,
AND THE BIRTH OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA 127-29 (2008).
27 See, e.g., ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION:
A MORAL DEFENSE OF THE SECULAR STATE 27 (2d ed. 2005).
28 See COLONIAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY (Donald S. Lutz ed., 1998). For example, consider the Fundamental Orders of
Connecticut, id at 210, 211, the Pennsylvania Charter of Liberties, id. at 290, 292, and the
Articles, Laws, and Orders, Divine, Politic, and Martial for the Colony in Virginia, id. at
314, 315. See also the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union Between the States,
id. at 377, which the Constitution of 1787 replaced. The Articles of Confederation closes
with "And Whereas it hath pleased the Great Governor of the World to incline the hearts of
the legislatures we respectively represent in congress." Id. at 384.
26
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other federal laws. James Madison's hope to extend a republic over a vast
geographic area was codified. A geographically large republic had never in history
succeeded. To achieve this vision, the document acknowledges throughout that,
given the flawed nature of the human character, power was not to be concentrated
in any one office or branch but instead balanced and checked by others. Hence, the
presumption that power breeds corruption caused the government to be separated
into three branches. One of those branches was composed of a bicameral
legislature, each house designed to yield a very different reflection of the people's
will. Another branch was composed of the executive, intended to carry out and
enforce the laws enacted by the legislature. The third branch was composed of an
independent judiciary. Finally, and certainly implicit in the document, was that
government opposition was not treasonable but just a differing point of view to be
tolerated in an ever-running debate to get things right.
Beyond these important features, the first principles on which the government
was founded are not altogether evident from the text alone. It is true that the
Preamble famously said that "We the people" were the ones who "do ordain and
establish" this new central government. But elsewhere in the operative provisions
of the Constitution the matter of U.S. citizenship and who gets to vote were left to
each state to decide, which is to say that giving definition to "the people" who are
doing all this "ordaining" and "establishing" is a power vested not in the central
government but in the several states. 2 9 This was no small matter for female citizens
denied the right to vote or slaves denied citizenship, voting rights, and even
something as fundamental as inclusion in the human race.
Historian Richard Beeman attributes the Preamble's silence on religion and
first principles other than republicanism to Edmund Randolph of Virginia, and his
role as chair of the Committee of Detail and initial drafter of a provisional
Constitution during the Convention's recess from July 27th to August 6th. The
Committee of Detail was delegated the task of assembling all the decisions the
Convention had made to date into a coherent document.30 Within the Committee,
to Randolph fell the task of putting pen to paper and producing a first draft. 3 ,
Concerning Randolph's view on the proper role of the Constitution as a whole, and
the Preamble in particular, Beeman says:
The other notable aspect of Randolph's approach to the task of
constitution writing was his insistence that a lengthy preamble similar to
that contained in the Declaration of Independence was not necessary. He
considered the Constitution to be a legal, rather than a philosophical,
document, and by his reasoning, "a preamble seems proper not for the
purpose of designing the ends of government and human polities."
Randolph believed that elaborate displays of theory, though perhaps
necessary in the drafting of the state constitutions, were inappropriate
See BEEMAN, supra note 23, at 255-56.
o See id. at 246-47.
31
Id at 270.
29
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to the task now at hand. For Randolph, the business of constitution
making was not an excursion back to fundamental principles or an
articulation of the natural rights of man. Rather, it was a matter of taking
those fundamental principles and natural rights already articulated in
the Revolutionary state constitutions and interweaving them with
the delegated powers written into a federal constitution. . . . Although
what we call the "preamble" . . . went through several different

transformations .. . in the end, the framers of the Constitution supported
Randolph's fundamental premise. 32
We learn then that the absence of an explicitly stated religious presupposition was
in character with the quietude concerning first principles generally.
We must figure three additional matters into the "Godless Constitution"
assertion. First, it is widely underappreciated how close the Philadelphia
Constitutional Convention came to failure. This first happened over the issue of
popular representation in both houses of Congress. At one point, the small states
refused to go forward unless the Convention gave each state an equal vote. This
impasse was resolved by the Great Compromise first urged by Connecticut, but
that was not accomplished until July 16th.33 Other issues, from navigation laws to
slavery, sharply divided the delegates, and ratification by the required nine states
nearly failed but for a late concession by Federalists that the First Federal Congress
would consider adding amendments that in time would become the Bill of Rights.34
With so many details respecting the mere frame of the new government to quarrel
about, why would the delegates drill down to first principles and multiply their
divisions? Some disputed things are best left unresolved and thus unstated.
Religion was one of them.s
Second, the near silence with respect to the character of the nation's first
principles does not necessarily mean indifference to presuppositions, including
religious ones, let alone a deliberate decision to reject a theistic worldview (i.e., the
"Godless Constitution"). 36 As the new central government was one of popular
sovereignty (i.e., a republic), many first principles were left in the hands of the
states-and, indeed, citizens individually-for future deliberation and, if a
majority should later think necessary, a fundamental principle's explicit addition to
the positive law. To the degree that the Convention delegates held religious
values,37 those religiously derived values (along with other values) would
32

d. at 271; see also id. at 278.
Id. at 218-20.
34 See infra notes 74-75, 96, 131, 137-142 and accompanying text.
33

3 JAMES H. HuTsoN, RELIGION AND THE FOUNDING OF THE AMERIcAN REPUBLIC

77

(1998).
Id. ("That religion was not otherwise addressed in the Constitution did not make it
an 'irreligious' document any more than the Articles of Confederation was an 'irreligious'
document.").
3 BEEMAN, supra note 23,.at 180-81 (noting that it is undisputed that most of the
delegates would have called themselves Christians, and that some were men of great piety,
36
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inexorably get reflected not in the written Constitution, but in elections, legislation,
monetary policy, rules on trade, foreign policy, national defense, and the general
habits and traditions of the people they represented. That means there was an
assumption that many of the underlying theories of governance might change over
time from the ground up (as the character of those who are voting citizens
changed), subject to the structure of the three-branch federalist republic that was
fixed in the frame of the written Constitution. And even the charter's structural
frame of checks and balances was subject to alteration. It provided not one but two
ways for a supermajority to amend the written Constitution.3 8 This was done, for
example, by the Seventeenth Amendment implementing the popular election of
U.S. senators with an attendant sharp diminution of power previously vested in the
states.
The Constitutional Convention of 1787 focused far less on lofty theory and
far more on the organizational structure of the new central government, as well as
on how it was to share sovereignty with the states. On that score, the Convention's
work is typically celebrated as brilliant: the Madisonian vision of an extended
republic was that power be widely diffused with potential factions balanced one
against the other. Individual liberties were thought best safeguarded indirectly by
this finely balanced diffusion of enumerated powers, thereby limiting the reach of
government, which in turn left ample social space for individuals to live in
freedom and enter into independent-sector associations with others. On the other
hand, the ratification struggle that ensued in some states, insofar as the 1787
Constitution lacked a Bill of Rights, was a deficiency that is thought, for the most
part,40 to have been richly corrected by the First Federal Congress submitting
amendments to the states that in time became the Bill of Rights. Religious
freedom, as distinct from religion qua religion, was doubly addressed in the
proposed Third Article of Amendments (later renumbered the First Amendment),
and thus religious freedom was obviously a matter thought to be of high order.
Third, the absence of religion qua religion in the Constitution also makes
sense when one appreciates that in 1787, church-government relations (as distinct
from religious conscience) were thought highly divisive, were widely regarded as a

but it was also an age where statesmen kept separate the temporal and spiritual aspects of
public life).
38 Either two-thirds of each house of Congress can propose amendments which must
then be ratified by three-fourths of the states, or a convention sought by two-thirds of the
states can propose amendments which must in turn be approved by three-fourths of the
states. U.S. CoNST. art. V.
3 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 330, 331 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., 1987) [hereinafter
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION].
40 The matter of slavery, however, had to await the Civil War (1861-1865) followed
by ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865. The matter of women's suffrage had
to await adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920.
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state-level matter, and varied considerably from state to state.41 One can easily
imagine the delegates thinking, "why take up establishmentarianism, let alone
confessional religion as such," when the delegates had more than enough to
disagree about when it came to the basic frame of the new government. A few
states had recently (or were in the process of) reexamining the church-state
question for their own citizens.42 Virginia had concluded a very public and bruising
struggle over disestablishment from 1784 to 1786.43 In most of New England,
however, the Congregational Church establishment was still secure at the parish
level in the early 1790s, albeit there was heated agitation by outnumbered
dissenters, mostly Baptists.4 It is no accident that much of the criticism regai-ding
the absence of any mention of God in the Constitution came from New England
with its Puritan view of America's exceptionalism as a "City on a Hill" and the
"New Israel."45 Other Christians regarded such thinking as civil religion, which is
to say, idolatry.4 6 This further illustrates why the framers were being wise, not
hostile toward religion, when they chose to avoid theistic references in the
Constitution.
There was considerable church-state variance up and down the Atlantic
seaboard, as the statesmen sent to the 1787 Constitutional Convention were aware
because they travelled widely (unlike most other Americans) and thus came into
frequent contact with the church-state arrangements in other states. Contending
with this religious pluralism was manageable internally within each state. Once the
1787 Constitution was ratified, however, the religious pluralism under state
authority would, as a social reality, become the aggregate pluralism of all thirteen
states. That multiplication would bring about a sudden and possibly divisive
increase in religious diversity. So it is easy to see how the delegates thought it best
to view religion qua religion to be too controversial to address explicitly in the
Constitution, a state rather than a federal responsibility, or both.

41

HUTSON, supra note 35, at 77 ("The Convention ... wanted the Constitution to be

what present-day legislators call a 'clean bill,' a measure stripped of as many provocative
provisions as possible to make it as broadly palatable as possible.").
42 Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment, supra note 8, at 1458 (measured by the
authority to impose a religious tax, North Carolina disestablished in 1776 and New York in
1777).
43 For an overview of the then recent disestablishment in Virginia, see Esbeck,
Virginia Disestablishment,supra note 5, at 65-92.
4 Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment,supra note 8, at 1432-47, 1498-1523.
45 Vincent Phillip Mufioz, The OriginalMeaning of the Establishment Clause and the
Impossibilityoflts Incorporation,8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 585, 617-18 (2006).
46 See Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment, supra note 8, at 1432-48; Esbeck,
Virginia Disestablishment,supra note 5, at 95 nn.180, 184 & 96 nn.186-88 (quoting from

various Presbyterian petitions arguing for disestablishment in Virginia).
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D. Historiansand the Business of Over-Reading the Constitution
Historian Frank Lambert has a variation on the quietude of the 1787
Constitution concerning church-government relations. In his view, the
Constitution's near silence was an intentional way of dealing with the relationship.
Silence was the delegates' way of endorsing the view that religion as such was not
within the authority of the government-at least, not within, the authority of the
new central government created by the 1787 Constitution. Silence, maintains
Lambert, was not an evasion of the question. Rather, silence was the means of
deciding that religion was, so far as the national government was concerned, a
matter for the free marketplace of ideas. The various churches were on their own to
compete for new converts and had to work to keep hold on their existing flocks.47
Historian William Lee Miller agrees that by virtue of the new Constitution
religion was "thrown out into the great sea of public discourse, to sink or swim
altogether on their own, without any safety net whatsoever in the nation's
fundamental law." 4 8 Steven Waldman also thinks the "absence of God from the
Constitution was proreligion . . . . The Constitution demanded a paradigm shift,

away from public responsibility [for religion] and toward private." 49 Lambert
hastens to add that the delegates did believe that a virtuous citizenry was necessary
to maintain a republic and that traditional religion contributed in teaching the
people the basic tenets of virtuous living.s0 But the Constitutional Convention, they
argue, broke with the past in its belief that religion needed the sustaining hand of
the central government. Rather, enlightened statesmen like Madison, as well as
religious dissenters in America, saw that when government actively worked to
sustain religion it had just the opposite effect: corruption of religious institutions
and decline.of religion's affection among the people. In sum, Lambert argues, the
Constitution's quietude on religion was not avoidance of the church-government
question but a conscious choice to side with the disestablishmentarian viewpoint.5 1
A serious problem with the perspective of Lambert, Miller, and Waldman is
that at no time during a Convention session did even a single delegate articulate
such a motive behind the inaction of the Convention. Moreover, it is not fanciful to
suppose that the matter was intentionally never brought up, whether in formal
sessions or during informal discussion groups. A half-year into his presidency, a
presbytery comprised of New Hampshire and Massachusetts Presbyterians wrote
to President George Washington worried that the country was in moral peril

47 See FRANK LAMBERT, THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN
AMERICA 250, 252 (2003).
48 MILLER, supra note 22, at 110.
49
WALDMAN, supra note 26, at 134.
50

supra note 47, at 248-49.
Id. at 250, 252; see also MILLER, supra note 22, at 112-16 (the Constitution was
not hostile to religion, nor was religion opposed to the republic).
LAMBERT,

51
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because the new nation's charter did not expressly rely upon God's providence.5 2
Washington wrote back giving his expectation that the American "publick
councils" would continue to look to God to guide the country, but then gently
suggested that the exhortation of "true piety" be not a temporal duty of the
government, but to "the guidance of the Ministers of the Gospel, this important
object is, perhaps, more properly committed."S3 However, Washington expressed
no such view two years before in Philadelphia. And it is curious, indeed, that no
delegate in Philadelphia gave public expression of Lambert's view at the
Convention, or in his 1787 private papers.
Lambert, Miller, and Waldman argue that the delegates were affirmatively
motivated to keep the federal government out of religion because it was a
voluntary matter. One can look at the same evidence and easily conclude that their
reasons were quite different. The delegates were motivated to not exercise federal
authority over religious matters for two reasons: it was a matter for the states, and
it was divisive such that it could contribute to a failure of the Convention or failure
of the states to ratify the Constitution. Lambert, Miller, and Waldman
underappreciate the extent to which the delegates' quietude was because the matter
of church-government relations was thought wholly within the jurisdiction of the
states. Hence, it did not matter what individual delegates thought about
establishmentarianism. Collective silence meant that the subject of churchgovernment affairs was not a question within the Convention's purview. The
subject best remained in the hands of the colonies turned states, where the
authority had been for 180 years. Many Americans would eventually embrace
Lambert's views, but the delegates did not do so in 1787.
The principal aim of the Constitutional Convention was getting an agreement
on those matters to which agreement was possible and most pressing: namely,
replace the Articles of Confederation with a more robust central power that could
regulate interstate and foreign commerce; acquire the means to generate national
revenue and pay war debts; administer an orderly expansion into western lands and
deal with Native Americans;. maintain a national defense with a navy and, if
necessary, quickly raise an army; and speak with one voice on international trade
and foreign relations. Accordingly, it made good sense that the matter of churchgovernment affairs and most matters of religious conscience be avoided, lest the
1787 Convention in Philadelphia fail or the Constitution's ratification become
bogged down in religious division.

52 Letter from the Presbytery of the Eastward, convened in Newberry-Port (New
England), to President George Washington (Oct. 28, 1789), (on file with the The Library of
Congress), available at http://memory.loc.gov/mss/mgw/mgw2/038/0930077.jpg (replace
the file 0930077.jpg after the last "/" of the above hyperlinks with 0940078.jpg and
0950079.jpg for the second and third pages of the letter, respectively); see also WALDMAN,

supra note 26, at 134-35.
5
Letter from President George Washington to the Presbytery of the Eastward,
convened in Newberry-Port (New England) (Nov. 2, 1789), (on file with the The Library of
Congress), availableat http://memory.loc.gov/mss/mgw/mgw2/038/0960080.jpg.
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E. The Religious Test Clause & FailedProposals

Although limited, the matter of religious freedom did generate specific
proposals during the Constitutional Convention. As mentioned above, the
Religious Test Clause (or Test Clause) limited the power of the national
government with respect to the choice of federally selected officials. It thereby
limited state power with respect to the choice of three types of state-selected
federal officials: senators, representatives, and electors comprising the Electoral
College. On August 20, 1787, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina proposed the
Test Clause, and it was referred to the Committee of Detail. 54 Not reported out
favorably by the Committee, Pinckney's own motion brought the clause before the
Convention.55 Roger Sherman of Connecticut argued that the limitation was
unnecessary because of "the prevailing liberality being a sufficient security against
such tests."56 Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania and Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney of South Carolina spoke in favor of the motion in unreported remarks.
When brought to a vote, only the delegation from North Carolina opposed the
clause, with Maryland divided. The delegates were seemingly unconvinced that
there was yet a "prevailing liberality" with respect to religious freedom.
The Religious Test Clause gave rise to an individual religious right, albeit
modest in scope. More importantly, the Test Clause showed that religious division
was something that the framers did not want to risk, for the Test Clause was more
than just an individual right. During Connecticut's convention to consider
ratification of the Constitution, Oliver Wolcott argued that the Test Clause acted as
an additional hedge against a national establishment of religion, 8 as a common
54 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 445-46 ("No religious test or qualification
shall ever be annexed to any oath of office, under the authority of the United States."); see
also BEEMAN, supra note 23, at 288-89; LEVY, supra note 17, at 80. When the Convention
first convened in late May 1787, Charles Pinckney is said to have presented to the
delegates a comprehensive plan for the Constitution. BEEMAN, supra note 23, at 93-98,
269-70. The scope and influence of the Pinckney Plan is disputed, with the weight of
authority rejecting it as revisionist. Id. at 93-98; LEVY, supra note 17, at 80 n.l. One
provision of the Pinckney Plan, as reported after the Convention by Pinckney, was much
stronger than his Religious Test Clause proposed in mid-August. Paralleling in some
respects the later First Amendment, Pinckney's proposal was represented by him to be:
"The legislature of the United States shall pass no law on the subject of religion." 5
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 131; see also LAMBERT, supra note 47, at 251; LEVY,
supra note 17, at 80 n.1.
5 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 498 (Pinckney altered the terms of his
initial proposal to read as follows: "[B]ut no religious test shall ever be required as a
qualification to any office or public trust under the authority of the United States.").
56

57

d
id.

supra note 12, at 202. Wolcott was a Federalist and
Congregationalist. See M. LOUISE GREENE & I.A. BUNrN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
58

2

ELLIOT'S DEBATES,

IN CONNECTICUT 171 (2004). He signed the Declaration of
Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and he later served as a governor of
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
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feature of establishmentarianism was to require all office holders to join the
national church. The clause also did important work as an antidivisive measure
because it kept candidates for federal office from being disqualified along religious
or denominational lines. The same is true of the sworn oath of office, which would
act as a religious test if these offices could not also be filled by oath-shunning
Quakers and Anabaptists. Thus, these two religious conscience clauses had about
them a feature of no-establishment as well, in the sense that the government
aspired to avoid having citizens divide over political questions along religious
lines.
The constitutional delegates had reason to believe that, at the federal level,
should there be an attempt to impose a religious test, achieving consensus on the
terms of such a test with reference to specific Christian doctrines would certainly
be difficult and likely impossible. 5 9 At the time of the Philadelphia Convention, a
geographically extended republic was still experimental and thought by many to be
unstable.6 0 The framers knew, for example, how sectarian division contributed to
the failure of the English Commonwealth (1649-1660), which divided over types
of Calvinism.6 1 It was believed that for an extended republic to take sides in
disputes over creeds and specific forms of liturgical observance was to
dangerously risk dividing the body politic, just at the moment in history when
political unity was most needed. Hence, eliminating a religious test for public
office at the national level helped to avoid stirring up the people, as well as to aid
religiously plural (albeit overwhelmingly Protestant) Americans to begin to
develop affection for their new government.
Also, in mid-August 1787, James Madison and Charles Pinckney together
proposed that Congress be given express power "to establish a university, in which
no preferences or distinctions should be allowed on account of religion." 62
Pinckney had earlier proposed such a power, but without the reference to religion.
The motion was referred to the Committee of Detail, and later came before the
CHARLES A. GOODRICH, LIVES OF THE SIGNERS TO THE DECLARATION
179-82 (1841), available at http://www.archive.org/stream/
INDEPENDENCE

Connecticut. REV.
OF

goodrichssignersOOcharrich#page/178/mode/2up (stating that Oliver Wolcott signed the
U.S. CONSTITUTION and served as a governor of Connecticut); see also DECLARATION. OF
INDEPENDENCE, available at http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declarationzoom
2.html (showing Oliver Wolcott's signature as the penultimate signature on the
Declaration of Independence).
59 Oliver Ellsworth, The Landholder,No. 7 (Dec. 7, 1787), reprintedin 4 FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION, supra note 39, at 639-41. Ellsworth was a delegate to the Connecticut
constitutional convention. He wrote several letters in favor of ratification of the
Constitution; No. 7 was a defense of the Religious Test Clause.
60 HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTIFEDERALISTS WERE FOR 15-16 (1981).
61 See SAMUEL RAWSON GARDINER, OLIVER CROMWELL 9-10,316-317 (2d ed. 1901)
available at http://www.archive.org/stream/olivercromwell0Ogardgoog#page/n332/mode/
2up (discussing how Cromwell's political leadership was resisted because of the spiritual
view he attempted to imposed on other Protestants).
62 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 544; see also BEEMAN, supra note 23, at
288-89; WALDMAN, supra note 26, at 129.
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Convention for consideration. James Wilson of Pennsylvania spoke favorably
about the motion in unrecorded remarks. Gouverneur Morris suggested that
Congress already had such an authority given its exclusive power over the federal
seat of government. No one spoke to the prohibition on a religious test for student
admission. The motion lost, with four states in favor and six states opposed." It is
suggestive of religion's major influence on civil society in the new nation that in
1787 all of the existing colleges were founded by Protestant churches. The
proposal's defeat perhaps indicated that the Madison/Pinckney idea could become
religiously divisive and thus was best avoided, or that higher education was not
thought to be a governmental responsibility, or both. Whatever the cause of the
proposal's defeat, it is hardly indicative of a people indifferent to religion and
religion's bearing on the character of higher education of the nation's most
promising youth.
When a closely negotiated document, as well as the records of the delegates'
debate at the Philadelphia Convention giving rise to that document, is silent or
nearly silent on a given subject matter of undeniable interest to many, it is slippery
ground to read much into that silence. One is likely to interject one's own presentday bias into the vacuum. There is little serious dispute that America benefitted
from people of faith and inherited some good ideas from Western Christianity. On
the other hand, America's government was never in any confessional sense a
Christian nation. Lastly, as the delegates were keenly aware, the signed
Constitution had no legal effect. 5 As stated in its Article VII, the Constitution
would have to be ratified by at least nine of the thirteen states. So the several states
would soon have their opportunity to impress their own original meaning onto the
text. It is those several debates that we now take up in Part III.
III. RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM DURING THE STATE RATIFICATION
OF THE 1787 CONSTITUTION

Once the document was signed by thirty-eight of the fifty-five delegates that
attended at least part of the Convention during the summer of 1787,66 the draft
Constitution was transmitted to the Confederation Congress meeting in New York
City. The draft was accompanied by a resolution of the delegates and a letter
5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 440.
6 Id. at 544; see also BEEMAN, supra note 23, at 288-89; WALDMAN, supra note 26,
at 129. This was not the first time the formation of a national university had been raised. To
these reasons for the proposal's defeat, historian Mark McGarvie notes that some presumed
that the proposed university would be founded on a secular basis. If the university was to
be nondenominational, that would raise a question of on what moral precepts the university
would base its teaching of the virtues needed to sustain a republic. MARK DOUGLAS
63

McGARVIE, ONE NATION UNDER LAW: AMERICA'S EARLY NATIONAL STRUGGLES TO
SEPARATE CHURCH AND STATE 61-62 (2004).
65 BEEMAN, supra note 23, at 370.

Id. at 359, 363 (explaining that of the forty-one delegates present on September 17,
1787, Edmund Randolph, George Mason, and Elbridge Gerry did not sign).
66
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6
signed by George Washington as president of the Constitutional Convention. ' The
resolution recommended that Congress should not itself consider the merits of the
Constitution but transmit the draft to each of the states for the calling of a state
convention formed for the sole purpose of debating the Constitution's ratification.
The Confederation Congress set September 26th to begin its discussion of how to
deal with the draft Constitution. 8 Meanwhile, newspapers printed copies of the
Constitution, and drafts circulated widely among the people and began to stir up
considerable interest. Ten or more of the delegates who had signed the
Constitution in Philadelphia traveled to New York City and were on hand as part
of their state's delegation to the Confederation Congress. Opponents also were
present at the Congress, such as Richard Henry Lee of Virginia.69 Additionally
present were former Convention delegates from New York who did not sign the
draft Constitution, Robert Yates and John Lansing, and they had well-formulated
70
reasons why the Congress should not even forward the draft to the states.
Debate ensued over three days: September 26-28, 1787. The signing
delegates, including James Madison, were now not only seasoned debaters with
respect to the terms of the draft Constitution and how its parts worked as an
integral governmental whole, but they also could make a. forceful case for the
country's need to replace the Articles of Confederation. Thus, late on September
28th, the Congress adopted a resolution to the effect that "said report [of the
Philadelphia Convention], together with the resolutions and letter [both signed by
Washington] accompanying the same be transmitted to - the several state
legislatures in order to be submitted to a convention of delegates chosen in each
state by the people." 7 1 This was a compromise. The Confederation Congress
eschewed any mention of the proposed Constitution's merits, even calling it a
"report" rather than a proposed Constitution.
Not a single state legislature refused to call for a special state convention as
suggested in the resolution. Rather, each legislature set an election date for the

Resolution signed by George Washington, President of the Convention, to the
Confederation Congress (Sept. 17, 1787), reprintedin 1 FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra
note 39, at 194-95. Gouverneur Morris, as a member of the Committee of Style, also
67

prepared a letter addressed to the Confederation Congress. It sought to defend the
Convention's reporting of a proposed Constitution that went well beyond just amending the
Articles of Confederation. Morris also sought to argue why the Articles had proven
insufficient, and thus the necessity for and virtues of the Convention's report of a more
consolidated and empowered central government. Id. at 195 (reproducing the letter); see
also BEEMAN, supra note 23, at 351-53.
68 BEEMAN, supra note 23, at 371.
69 Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Edmund Randolph, Govemor of Virginia (Oct.
16, 1787), in 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 503-05.
70 Letter from Robert Yates and John Lansing to Governor Clinton of New York
(undated), in 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 480-82 (reproducing a letter sent
when Yates and Lansing quit as delegates to the Constitutional Convention).
7' 1 FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 39, at 198; see also BEEMAN, supra note
23, at 372-73.
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selection of convention delegates, as well as set the beginning date for the ensuing
state convention. To the degree there was resistance, it was manifested by setting a
late start date for the state convention. On the whole, this was a good omen for
those favoring ratification because the legislature in each state would naturally be
hostile to giving up some of its sovereignty to the newly proposed government.
State conventions gave credence to the idea that the draft Constitution, should it be
ratified, issued forth from "the People" rather than being -a creature issuing forth
from the states.
Some of the earliest debates for and against the Constitution were during the
local campaigns by those seeking selection as delegates to their state convention.
The ratification contest over the Constitution's merits took place at three levels: (1)
the aforementioned delegate campaigns; (2) state by state in the ratification
conventions; and (3) by way of opinion pieces in newspapers and separately
distributed speeches and pamphlets, sometimes published in serial form when the
author's arguments were issued in installments. Many of the more thoughtful
opinion papers were reprinted and thus received multistate distribution. There were
also letters; many of them were written with the intent that they be made public.72
Those favoring ratification of the Constitution took for themselves the name
"Federalists," and thereby managed to hang the unattractive moniker
"Antifederalists" on those opposing-though "Antiratificationists" would have
been more accurate and fair.
Pennsylvania was the first to select its delegates and convene its state
convention. However, Delaware was first to bring the matter of ratification to a
vote at its convention, and all thirty delegates were unanimous in their support.7 3
Table 1 below shows the state-by-state march toward ratification. Whereas a
minimum of nine states were needed, the Constitution received-eleven affirmative
votes before the Confederation Congress called for national elections in the latter
half of 1788 to form the new government-and thus the Confederation's demise in
early 1789.
After five quick victories, including success in New Jersey, Georgia, and
Connecticut, 74 the momentum slowed with Massachusetts where the
Antifederalists regained their footing and began their counteroffensive in earnest.
Federalists in Massachusetts, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Virginia, and New
York were eventually able to achieve ratification only upon the state convention's
acceptance of recommended amendments to the Constitution. Antifederalists
pressed for ratification on condition that amendments were first agreed to, but the
72 See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND
ORIGINS 72-80 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) [hereinafter COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS]

(collecting newspapers, pamphlets, and letters addressing religious freedom during the
debate over ratification of the Constitution).
7 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 319; see also BEEMAN, supra note 23, at
382-83.
74 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 320-21 (New Jersey), 321-22
(Connecticut), 323-24 (Georgia); see also BEEMAN, supra note 23, at 383-85.
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Federalists were able to hold the list of amendments to recommendations only. 75
76
North Carolina voted not to ratify but nevertheless recommended amendments.
Table 1: Ratification of the 1787 Constitutionn

State

Date

Passed?

I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Delaware
Pennsylvania
New Jersey
Georgia
Connecticut
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Maryland
South Carolina
New Hampshire
Virginia
New York

December 7, 1787
December 12, 1787
December 18, 1787
January 2, 1788
January 4, 1788
February 6, 1788
March 24, 1788
April 26, 1788
May 23, 1788
June 21, 1788
June 25, 1788
July 25, 1788

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Amendments
Recommended?
No
No*
No
No
No
Yes*
Not at this time.
No*
Yes
Yes*
Yes*
Yes*

-

North Carolina

August 1, 1788

No

Yes*

Pennsylvania and Maryland considered amendments, but they were voted down. Among
the rejected amendments in both states were ones to protect religious freedom.
Massachusetts also considered recommending an amendment to protect religious freedom.
While other amendments were reported out, the one on religious freedom did not pass.
Finally, New Hampshire, Virginia, New York, and North Carolina had among their
recommended amendments ones protecting religious freedom.
*

During the ratification period there was a smattering of criticism of the
Religious Test Clause on the basis that it would permit non-Protestants to hold
federal office. On the other hand, there were principled defenses of the Test
BEEMAN, supra note 23, at 386-403.
1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 331-33; see also BEEMAN, supra note 23, at
403-05.
7 BEEMAN, supra note 23, at 375-405; The Convention Timeline, U.S. CONST.
ONLINE, http://www.usconstitution.net/consttime2.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2011). On
August 1, 1788, North Carolina proposed amendments, but it did not ratify the
Constitution. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 331-33. North Carolina would
eventually ratify on November 21, 1789. Id. at 333. Rhode Island proposed amendments on
June 16, 1790, after its eventual ratification of the Constitution, id. at 334-37, but those
amendments were too late to have any bearing on Congress' drafting of the Bill of Rights.
For the dates of ratification in New Jersey and South Carolina, see id. at 321, 325.
78 LAMBERT, supra note 47, at 253-54, 257-58; LEVY, supra note 17, at 86, 91-92;
MILLER, supra note 22, at 110-11; WALDMAN, supra note 26, at 133-34, 139. For
7

76

example, fear that the Religious Test Clause would permit office holding by "pagans and
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Clause based on the choice of one's religion being viewed as a matter of
conscience. The defenders also argued the near impossibility of the thirteen states
agreeing on a single creedal test, and that voters were free to cast their ballots in a
manner that imposed a religious test if that was their personal criteria for selecting
qualified officials. 7 9 Criticism of the absence of any mention of God in the
Preamble, and thus the near silence of the Constitution on religion qua religion, did
arise.80 But this issue likewise did not figure large in the contest. As the overall
struggle for ratification unfolded, these two objections were inconsequential
compared to the question of whether the newly consolidated government would
have any authority to restrict religious conscience or an implied power over
church-government relations.
The Antifederalists had a position on government's role on aid to religion qua
religion, but due to regional differences, it was both subtle and uneven.8 ' At the

Roman Catholics" was voiced in North Carolina. A letter by the governor summarizing the
ratification debate in New Hampshire noted that the Test Clause was criticized because it
would allow those not Protestant to hold office. See 3 LETTERS AND PAPERS OF MAJORGENERAL JoHN SULLIVAN 567-68 (Otis G. Hammond ed., 1939). The governor's letter
made clear that he disdained the delegate's religious prejudice. On the other hand, the
Baptist preacher Isaac Backus, a delegate to the Massachusetts convention, read into the
Test Clause a near prohibition on a national establishment of religion. LAMBERT, supra
note 47, at 257; MILLER, supra note 22, at 111; WALDMAN, supra note 26, at 134. These
are illustrative of the extremes, but they were not widespread.
7

LAMBERT, supra note 47, at 258.

80 Id. at 253-57; WALDMAN, supra note 26, at 133-34; Mufloz, supra note 45, at 617-

18. In 1789, well after ratification was secure, Benjamin Rush is reported to have said to
John Adams that "[mlany pious people wish the name of the Supreme Being had been
introduced somewhere in the new Constitution." DAVID FREEMAN HAWKE, BENJAMIN

RUSH: REVOLUTIONARY GADFLY 357 (1971). Rush was a Federalist and a strong supporter
of ratification. Id. at 347-57. Rush's post-ratification observation of the wishes of others,
that he does not name and fails to number, carries little weight beyond the face of it. The
wish for explicit mention of the Deity certainly did not generate a movement opposed to
ratification, nor did it diminish Rush's ardor for the new charter. See id. at 355 (noting the
open letter by Rush circulated in early 1788 repeating arguments in support of the
Constitution, but giving no mention to its lacking a reference to God). During most of the

ratification period, John Adams was serving as the American foreign minister to Great
Britain. Nonetheless, he wrote a letter to America for public circulation in support of
ratification. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 380-81 (2001). Adams privately stated

various reservations about the Constitution, but none had to do with its failure to mention
God. Id. at 379-80, 397-98.
81 STORING, supra note 60, at 22-23, 64. While favoring the protection of religious
conscience, many Antifederalists were establishmentarians. They reasoned in a circular
fashion that saw republican self-government as possible only if there is a virtuous citizenry,
that public virtue is largely learned by properly constituted religion, and that therefore
religion should be actively aided and supported by the government. The "properly
constituted religion" became the church, established by law, whereas dissenters, if loyal to
the state and otherwise acting within reason, could follow their conscience. As
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time of the ratification struggle (1787-1788), the Anglican Church in the southern
states had either been disestablished or was very weak.82 In New England,
however, the Congregational Church was still strong and at the parish level, taxsupported. There were no establishments remaining in the middle states.84 The
Antifederalists tacitly conceded that a national establishment was not possible
because of state-by-state religious differences.85 These sharp regional differences
tended to reinforce the Federalists' argument that the proposed Constitution
should-and did-leave the matter of church-government relations in the hands of
each state. For the Antifederalists, however, it was more that they harbored
uneasiness because of what the Constitution did not say; namely, the document did
not expressly deny implied national power over church-government relations. This
unease gave rise to the question of whether the implied powers of the proposed
national government really did grant authority to disturb either religious
conscience or the religious settlements in the states.
The overriding concern of the Antifederalists with respect to religion,
therefore, had to do with wanting to explicitly preserve jurisdiction over churchgovernment relations as a power vested in the states, as well as to disable any
implied national power to invade religious conscience. New England Federalists
agreed in principle, for they too did not want their Congregational Church parishlevel control disturbed by the national government. But they did not see any
language in the Constitution giving rise to a fear that the document vested power to
do so. Quite apart from the Federalist/Antifederalist divide, there was a palpable
unease among Americans more generally with respect to whether the Constitution

establishmentarians, they "saw no inconsistency between liberty of conscience and the
public support of the" established church. Id.
Disestablishmentarians agreed that republican self-government was only possible
with a virtuous citizenry, and that the primary teacher of the needed virtue was religion.
However, they broke with establishmentarians over the wisdom and need for government
financial aid to religion. Active government aid to religion, argued disestablishmentarians,
corrupted the church and caused conscientious citizens to reject a faith which has been coopted and now served the needs of the state rather than God.
82

Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment,supra note 8, at 1457-1501.

83 Id. at 1501-40. The law journals seem not to take note of a reason for the renewed
strength of the Congregational establishment in New England so soon after the War,
preferring instead to assume establishmentarianism was everywhere weak and it was just a
matter of time before it crumbled under the combined forces of reason and evangelical
dissent. Such weakness was certainly true in the South where the Church of England
establishment was the church of the defeated foe. But in New England the Congregational
clergy had not merely supported the Revolution, but they had been aggressive agitators for
the Great Cause Liberty against perceived British oppression. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 114-18 (revised ed. 1998). A
generation had to pass before the people began to look past the service paid by the
Congregational Church in aid of the Revolutionary War.
84

Esbeck, Dissent andDisestablishment,supra note 8, at 1457-1501.

8

Mufloz, supra note 45, at 617.
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implied powers that could impair religious conscience. 86 Dissenters, as well as
those who had previously been dissenters before their state disestablished, initially
regarded the proposed union as a potential threat to their religious freedom. The
general unease was only exacerbated by the absence of a bill of rights. It was this
growing unease that first threw the Federalists on the defensive in Massachusetts.
The Federalists thereby found themselves making a twofold argument. First,
the newly proposed government had no authority over the matter of religion. And,
second, a bill of rights was unnecessary to reaffirm this lack of national authority.
With respect to this second argument, if a fallback position was forced upon
them-as it was in Massachusetts, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Virginia, New
York, and North Carolina-the Federalists urged ratification now and promised the
addition of amendments including a bill of rights thereafter.
The principle that the 1787 Constitution created a government of enumerated
powers was first articulated by James Wilson, the highly able Constitutional
Convention delegate from Pennsylvania, in a speech given on October 6, 1787.
Wilson delivered his famous speech before a crowd outside the Pennsylvania State
House. It was so well reasoned that the speech was printed and distributed
throughout the states as Americans became immersed in the ratification debate.
Wilson argued that, because the proposed central government had no powers other
than those expressly delegated, it would be superfluous and even absurd to
expressly deny powers never delegated. Wilson also served as a delegate to the
Pennsylvania state ratification convention. He responded to an argument being
circulated to the effect that the draft Constitution failed to secure religious
conscience. Wilson replied: "I ask the honorable gentlemen, what part of this
system puts it in the power of Congress to attack those rights? When there is no
power to attack, it is idle to prepare the means of defense."
Delaware, New Jersey, and Georgia did not keep a record of the debate at
their ratification conventions.8 9 In Pennsylvania, Antifederalists proposed
amendments to the Constitution,90 and one proposed amendment addressed
religious liberty.91 Following the reasoning of James Wilson, the Federalist
majority successfully turned back all proposed amendments to the Constitution.92

86 WALDMAN, supra note 26, at 138-39. In current terminology, we would call these
Americans the independent swing voters.

1 FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 39, at 449; see also BEEMAN, supra note
23, at 379; STORING, supra note 60, at 65.
87
88

2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 455. To the superfluous aspect of the

Wilsonian argument a second was soon added, namely, it is risky to deny powers never

granted for that can be twisted into an argument that other powers not denied by an
amendment are impliedly granted. That argument led to what is now the Tenth
Amendment.
89 LEVY,

supra note 17, at 87.
90 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supranote 12, at 545-46.
9' COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 72, at 12 ("The rights of conscience shall be

held inviolable, and neither the legislative, executive, nor judicial powers of the United
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In Connecticut, we have only a partial record of the ratification debate. The
fragmentary record merely records two Federalists who each commented favorably
on the Religious Test Clause, 93 and there was one comment opining that, given a
prevalent spirit of liberty, it was unlikely that the United States would ever
establish one religion. 94
Massachusetts was where the Federalists' momentum ground to a halt. There
were 355 delegates and many came without their minds made up.95 Importantly,
Governor John Hancock and revolutionary hero Samuel Adams were
uncommitted. Elbridge Gerry was also present in Boston although he was not a
state delegate. Gerry was one of three delegates present in Philadelphia on
September 17th who had refused to sign the proposed Constitution. Thus, he was
quite familiar with the terms of the Constitution, including its vulnerabilities. As
the debate in Massachusetts dragged into a third week, two moves by the
Federalists were crucial to their ultimate success: they agreed to permit the
convention to recommend amendments along with ratification, and they convinced
John Hancock and Samuel Adams to support ratification if tied to the promised
amendments.96 Nine amendments were recommended.97 An amendment protective
of religious conscience did not pass.98
Massachusetts had a strong Congregational Church supported by a parishlevel religious tax (which they called a personal "assessment"). The dissenting
Baptists had twenty delegates at the convention, including the Reverend Isaac
Backus, a longtime vocal opponent of the mandatory assessment.99 The Baptists,
however, supported ratification of the Constitution and expressed no concern about
national church-government relations.10 0 That would not have happened if the
Baptists had thought that the Constitution offered yet a new threat to the religious
freedom of their churches. One can only infer that Congregationalists and Baptists
alike understood that the proposed Constitution vested no power in the United
States over church-government relations. Ratification followed by the narrow
margin of 187 to 168.'0

States shall have authority to alter, abrogate, or infringe any part of the constitutions of the
several states, which provide for the preservation of liberty in matters of religion.").
92 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 319-20.
LEVY, supra note 17, at 86.
94 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 202.
9 BEEMAN, supra note 23, at 386-89.
9

96 id.

1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 322-23.
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 72, at 12 ("[T]hat the said Constitution be
never construed to authorize Congress to infringe . . . the rights of conscience ....
99 Esbeck, Dissent andDisestablishment,supranote 8, at 1432-47.
9

98

1oo LEVY, supra note 17, at 87-88. Backus, leader of the Baptists in Massachusetts,
spoke in defense of the Religious Test Clause. In part, he saw the clause as preventing a
national establishment. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supranote 12, at 148-49, 180.
.o.
BEEMAN, supra note 23, at 390.
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As in Pennsylvania, there were amendments to the draft Constitution
proposed in Maryland that were all voted down. Also, as in Pennsylvania, the
Maryland proposals were not rejected because the delegate majority disagreed with
them. Rather, they were rejected because the dominant Federalists wanted to
unconditionally ratify the Constitution. 102 Juridically, a conditional ratification was
not a ratification of the Constitution but a rejection of it. One of the amendments
proposed in Maryland read as follows: "That there be no national religion
established by law; but that all persons be equally entitled to protection in their
religious liberty."' 0 3 The proposed amendment dealt separately with churchgovernment relations and individual religious liberty, as does the First Amendment
eventually made part of the Bill of Rights. Once again, this shows that people
thought about the matter of religious freedom as needing to address two distinct
relationships: individual religious conscience and church-government relations.
Maryland approved the Constitution without the proposed amendment.
Rhode Island's state convention was next to bring the matter of ratification to
a vote, and it was the first state to reject the Constitution. It would not be until May
29, 1790, that Rhode Island would yield to the inevitable and ratify, 04 making it
the last of the thirteen states to do so. By then, the Washington administration had
already been in office for more than a year. Defiant to the.end, on June 16, 1790,
Rhode Island recommended several amendments to the Constitution.105 This was,
of course, too late to influence the Bill of Rights which Congress had already
passed and President Washington had reported to the states for their consideration
in September 1789.106 One of Rhode Island's amendments protected religious
conscience and required that no one religion be preferred over others. 10 7 From its
founding by the fiery Roger Williams, Rhode Island had never had an
establishment. Indeed, the state took pride in its stand against any material support
for organized religion.10 8 Thus, Rhode Island was at the very least inattentive in
that its proposed amendment prohibited only the preferring of one religion over
others, rather than prohibiting any and all establishments, as consistent with Rhode
Island's history and current sentiments. Rhode Island's amendment copied that of
North Carolina and Virginia. Perhaps the copying explains Rhode Island's
LEVY, supra note 17, at 88.
2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 553; see also COMPLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS,
supra note 72, at 11.
104 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 333-35; see also BEEMAN, supra
note 23,
at 391-92.
1os 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 335-37.
106 See LEVY, supra note
17, at 92.
107 Rhode Island adopted the same religious freedom
language, 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 12, at 334, recommended by North Carolina on August 1, 1788, id. at 331; 4
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 244, which in turn had repeated the Virginia proposal
of June 26, 1788, 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 327; 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
102
103

note 12, at 659. See also COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 72, at 12-13.
108 1 WILLIAM G. McLOUGHLIN, NEw ENGLAND DISSENT, 1630-1833: THE BAPTISTS
AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 7-8 (1971).
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inattention; we do not know. In any event, it is most unlikely that Rhode Island
intended its selection of amendment text to be a backhanded way of vesting
Congress with the power to create multiple establishments where all religions are
supported equally.109
Next to ratify was South Carolina."l0 South Carolina recommended several
amendments. It then ratified on May 23, 1788. However, none of the amendments
had to do with religious establishment or conscience. During debate, a Reverend
Francis Cummins was quoted in a Charleston newspaper as disparaging "religious
establishments; or the states giving preference to any religious denomination."' "
At the time, South Carolina had a general Protestant establishment, but it was weak
and was formally disestablished in 1790.112
The New Hampshire convention first met in February 1788. Fearing defeat,
the Federalists obtained a recess until early June. No record was kept of the debate.
The New Hampshire convention again took up its work on June 2nd and ratified on
June 21, 1788." Because it was the ninth state to ratify, New Hampshire has the
distinction of being the state that took the Constitution from a mere proposal to the
109

LEVY, supra note 17, at 93.

1o 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note
1LEVY, supra note 17, at 88-89.

12, at 325.

112 Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment,supranote 8, at 1493-94.
" 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 325-26; see also BEEMAN,

supra note 23,
at 391, 395. However, a long letter by John Sullivan, the New Hampshire governor, to the
Reverend Jeremy Belknap of Massachusetts dated February 26, 1788, summarized the
early debate, which was decidedly against ratification. Sullivan supported ratification.
While religious freedom figured in the contest, the arguments about religion, as
summarized by Sullivan, are not always clear:
[S]ome good men . . . were short Sighted ... many who were Distressed & in
Debt; numbers who conceived that This System would compel men to be honest
against both their Inclination & their Interest[,] some who were blinded through

excess of Zeal for the Cause of Religion and others who by putting on the
masque of sanctity thought to win proselites-Thus arranged we entered the

Field of Action: And you cannot be surprized if I tell you that all the objections
made against the new plan & published in your State were handed out here by

Rote with such amendments, alterations, Embellishments and Disfigurements as
Ingenuity[,] folly[,] obstinacy[,] & false piety could Suggest ... but Sir lest you
should conceive that we have no talents at Invention in this state and that all our
objections were borrowed from Massachusetts I will now give you some
Specimens of New Hampshire Ingenuity[:] a pious Deacon Liked the plan or
rather would have liked it if it afforded any Security of our having the holy
Scriptures continued to us in our mother Tongue. The want of a religious test
was used here as well as with you but even if that was given up in all other cases
The president at Least ought to be compelled to Submit to it for otherwise says
one "a Turk, a Jew, a Roman Catholic, and what is worse than all a universalist
may be president of the united States."
3 LETTERS AND PAPERS OF MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN SULLIVAN, supra note 78, at 567-68.
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founding document of a new nation. New Hampshire did recommend amendments,
one of which addressed religious freedom. The amendment read: "Congress shall
make no laws touching religion, or to infringe the rights of conscience."l1 4 Once
again we see the separate treatment of church-government relations and individual
conscience. We also see for the first time the phrasing "Congress shall make no
laws," which later found its way into the First Amendment. The Congregational
Church was firmly established in New Hampshire, and the establishment continued
until 1819."'
The issue of religious freedom was already well-trod ground in Virginia as the
draft Constitution came before the state convention on the question of ratification.
Virginia was the most wealthy and populous state, so its participation seemed
essential to the success of the government. Disestablishment of the Anglican
Church in Virginia spanned a ten-year period from 1776 to 1786,116 and there were
cleanup issues that still simmered well into the next century." 7 The issue of
monetary support for religion came to a head in 1784 and 1785, when an alliance
between religious dissenters (Presbyterians and Baptists) and statesmen led by
James Madison managed to defeat Patrick Henry's proposed Bill for the Support of
Christian Teachers. 1 8
The opposition to ratification of the 1787 Constitution had able leaders, such
as Patrick Henry, Richard Henry Lee, and George Mason. Mason had been one of
Virginia's delegates to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia and had
famously refused to sign when the other delegates summarily dismissed
consideration of a bill of rights." 9 Edmund Randolph, the governor of Virginia,
was also a Philadelphia Convention delegate that had refused to sign. However,
through the quiet work of George Washington and James Madison, Randolph
changed his mind, and by the time the state convention began, he announced his
newfound support for the Constitution.12 0
The Virginia convention got under way on June 2, 1788. Like Antifederalists
generally, Patrick Henry opposed ratification because the proposed Constitution
took too much power away from the states.121 The issue of religious freedom came
up only occasionally, and each time in reply to rather vague claims by Henry that
the Constitution put civil liberties at risk, including the right of conscience, while
114

1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note

12, at 326; see also COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS,

supra note 72, at 12.
" See Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment,supra note 8, at 1533-34.
116 See Esbeck, VirginiaDisestablishment,supra note 5,
at 65-89.
"1 See H.J. ECKENRODE, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN VIRGINIA: A STUDY
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REVOLUTION 130-55 (1910) (describing how the Anglican

Churches, formerly established, had to eventually give back their real and personal
property acquired during their pre-Revolution establishment).
Esbeck, Virginia Disestablishment,supra note 5, at 75, 85-87.
119 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 494-96 (Mason's statement on objections
118

to the Constitution).
120
121

BEEMAN, supra note 23, at 397.
Id. at 396.
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possibly empowering Congress to establish a national religion. Randolph was first
to respond to Henry's claim that the congressional powers enumerated in Article I
of the Constitution endangered a litany of rights including religious freedom.
Randolph said, ''I inform those who are of this opinion, that no power is given
expressly to Congress over religion."l2 2 He went on to observe that the Religious
Test Clause "puts all sects on the same footing," and that the multiplicity of
religious groups in the United States was a safeguard, in "that [the many sects] will
prevent the establishment of any one sect, in prejudice to the rest."l23
James Madison likewise challenged Henry's insistence that a bill of rights
was required to protect civil liberties, including religious freedom. Madison
belittled the efficacy of a bill of rights to successfully protect religious freedom
when a popular majority of the people was pressuring a legislature to favor one
sect. Like Randolph, Madison said safety would be found where there is a
multiplicity of sects, each checking the ambitious plans of the others, as was the
case in the vast United States.124 In the midst of this "rival sects" theory, Madison
said that he was pleased to note that in Virginia, "a majority of the people are
decidedly against any exclusive establishment."1 25 Then, in an oft-quoted passage
Madison said, with reference to the proposed 1787 Constitution, "[t]here is not a
shadow of right in the general government to intermeddle with religion. Its least
interference with it would be a most flagrant usurpation."l 2 6 The Madisonian
passage is singled out today because it conforms to the broad reading of "no
cognizance over religion" principle in Madison's 1785 Memorial and
Remonstrance.127 No bill of rights was needed, argued Madison. He appealed to
the delegates to trust him on this, for he was well known in Virginia as a champion
of religious freedom.12 8 Zachariah Johnson, a Federalist, extolled the Religious

3 ELLIoT's DEBATES, supra note 12, at 204. Randolph spoke prudently here when
he said that no national power was "expressly" given over religion. He wisely left open the
likelihood that general legislation on nonreligious subjects within Congress' enumerated
powers might well have an effect on religious conscience. For example, a familiar
quandary at the time was the matter of the military draft, clearly within congressional war
powers, and whether and how the draft should exempt religious pacifists.
122

123

124

Id.

Id. at 330.

Id. It is curious that Madison confined his remarks to only "exclusive"
establishments. Just three years before in late 1785, Madison had bested Henry, not in a
contest over a proposal to exclusively establish the Anglican Church in Virginia, but had
beaten back an attempt led by Henry to create a multiple establishment of Christian
125

churches. See Esbeck, Virginia Disestablishment,supra note 5, at 76-87.
126 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 330. The absoluteness of Madison's

remark contrasts with Randolph's more prudent claim that the Constitution delegated no
express power to touch on religion or religious freedom. Id. at 204.
127

See Esbeck, Virginia Disestablishment, supra note 5, at 82-83 (referencing

numbered paragraph I of Madison's Memorial).
128 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 330.
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Test Clause as a protection of religious conscience and also relied on the "rival
sects" theory as sufficient assurance against a national religious establishment.1 29
Patrick Henry managed to undermine.the Wilsonian argument that "all that is
not delegated is denied," relied on by the Federalists. He first pointed out that the
Constitution did expressly declare certain rights. Why were some rights necessary
to declare, he asked rhetorically, if all power not delegated was denied? Henry
further noted that Article I, Section 9, expressly denied certain powers to the
federal government. The powers listed in Section 9 were not in need of being
expressly denied if never delegated. 13 0 Thus, the Wilsonian argument did not ring
true with all the text.
On June 25, 1788, Virginia ratified the Constitution by the narrow margin of
eighty-nine to seventy-nine. However, in order to secure ratification, the
Federalists in Virginia, like those in Massachusetts and South Carolina before
them, had agreed to a list of amendments recommended by the Virginia
convention.131 A motion by Patrick Henry had forty amendments, but the first
twenty substantially paraphrase Virginia's Declaration of Rights.13 2 The proposed
twentieth amendment addressed religious freedom:
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner
of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by
force or violence; and therefore all men have an equal, natural, and
unalienable right to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates
of conscience, and that no particular religious sect or society ought to be
favored or established, by law, in preference to others.13 3
The phrasing here was a combination of section 16 of Virginia's Declaration of
Rights as adopted in 1776134 with language tacked on at the end requiring that no
one religion be preferred over others. This language of nonpreferentialism, said to
be the work of Patrick Henry,135 added a puzzling no-establishment feature to
Id. at 645-46. The "rival sects" theory was apparently used only in Virginia's and
North Carolina's conventions to argue for ratification. The argument also appears briefly in
FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), reprinted in 1 FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION, supra
note 39, at 330-31. The Federalist Papers were first published in a New York City
newspaper.
129

130

Mufioz, supra note 45, at 622.

131 Madison famously got Baptist backing for the Constitution by promising the
Reverend John Leland a bill of rights that protected religious freedom. WALDMAN, supra
note 26, at 136-37.
132 BEEMAN, supra note 23, at 399-400; 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 593
(Henry's motion).
1 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 659; COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note 72, at 13.
134 Esbeck, VirginiaDisestablishment,supranote 5, at 69.
135 IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON: FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1800, at
269 (1950).
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Virginia's rights-based declaration. Did Virginia presume that the national
government-absent adoption of the Virginia amendment-had the power to
affirmatively support religion so long as all religions were supported without
preference? Certainly Madison strongly opposed multiple establishments of
religion, for that was the object of his contest with Henry just three years before.
Multiple establishments would also violate Madison's promise to the Virginia
Baptists. But surely Henry did not intend that adoption of his nonpreferential
language was an indirect way of vesting Congress with the power to support all
religions so long as it did so without preferring some religions over others. With
every fiber in his being, Henry stood for Congress having less power, not more.1
Yet words are stubborn things. The text of the Virginia amendment is
nonpreferentialist, and fourteen months later that would temporarily cause trouble
in the United States Senate.
Overlapping the dates of the Virginia convention, the New York convention
commenced on June 17, 1788. As the ratification debate came to focus on New
York, the assembled delegates had full knowledge that the Confederation Congress
would be dissolved and that the new central government was a fait accompli. Ten
states had now ratified. This added to the ratification question whether New York
was prepared to go it alone as a sovereign nation-state no longer in confederation
with her former sister colonies. Matters of religion figured little in the convention
debates. Antifederalist Thomas Tredwell said that he favored the addition of a bill
of rights, inter alia, because presently the Constitution did not expressly prohibit a
national establishment of religion. 37 Another Antifederalist, John Lansing,
introduced several amendments as a condition of ratification, but his motion was
defeated.' 38 The meanings of Lansing's amendments were not debated, albeit they
were eventually adopted as recommendations.1 39 One of these amendments
addressed religious freedom: "That the people have an equal, natural, and
unalienable right freely and peaceably to exercise their religion, according to the
dictates of conscience; and that no religious sect or society ought to be favored or
established by law in preference to others." 4 0
This language is quite different from that used in the New York Constitution
of 1777,141 which disestablished the Church of England in the four lower counties
that comprised the City of New York.14 2 There never was an establishment
See LEVY, supra note 17, at 93.
'n 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 399-402. "I could have wished .. . to have
prevented the general government from . . . a religious establishment-a tyranny of all
136

others most dreadful, and which will assuredly be exercised whenever it shall be thought
necessary for the promotion and support of their political measures." Id. at 399.
138 2 ELLIoT's DEBATES, supranote 12, at 410-12.
139 See BEEMAN, supra note 23, at 403.
140 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 328; COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note 72, at 12.
141 See Esbeck, Dissent andDisestablishment,supra note 8, at 1480 n.324.
142 See id. at 1473-80 (telling the full story of establishment and eventual
disestablishment in New York).
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elsewhere in the State of New York. The word "established" in Lansing's
amendment is not defined. The free exercise language speaks of an exercise of
religion adjusted to each claimant's conscience. With respect to the question of
establishment, the text is nonpreferentialist. New York ratified the Constitution on
July 25, 1788, by a vote of thirty to twenty-seven, and the next day adopted as
recommendations the proposed amendments.
North Carolina's ratification convention did not assemble until July 21, 1788.
In early August, the convention voted not to ratify.14 3 Thus, North Carolina joined
Rhode Island as the only other holdout. However, there was lively debate in North
Carolina concerning religious freedom and the incipient Constitution. The
discussion began with Henry Abbot stating that the people harbor a fear for
religious conscience under the new system, and that by the treaty power the central
government might "make a treaty engaging with foreign powers to adopt the
Roman Catholic religion in the United States." 44 He went on to claim that "[m]any
wish to know what religion shall be established. I believe a majority of the
community are Presbyterians. I am, for my part, against any exclusive
establishment; but if there were any, I would prefer the Episcopal." 45 Turning his
attention to the Religious Test Clause, Abbot said that some worried "if there be no
religious test required, pagans, deists, and Mahometans might obtain offices
among us, and that the senators and representatives might all be pagans."l 4 6
A leading Federalist in the state, James Iredell, responded to these fears by
first extolling the spirit of toleration in the American states and pointing out that
the Religious Test Clause was to restrict Congress (not empower it), and thus it
promoted religious liberty.147 Addressing frontally the matter of congressional
power over establishment, Iredell responded with the longest dissertation at any
ratification convention on the matter of establishing religion:
They certainly have no authority to interfere in the establishment of any
religion whatsoever; and I am astonished that any gentleman should
conceive they have. Is there any power given to Congress in matters of
religion? Can they pass a single act to impair our religious liberties? If
they could, it would be a just cause of alarm. If they could, sir, no man
would have more horror against it than myself. Happily, no sect here is
superior to another. As long as this is the case, we shall be free from
those persecutions and distractions with which other countries have been
torn. If any future Congress should pass an act concerning the religion of
the country, it would be an act which they are not authorized to pass, by
the Constitution, and which the people would not obey. Every one would
143 BEEMAN, supra note 23, at 404; see also I
331 (giving the date as Aug. 1, 1788).
4 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 192.
145 id. (emphasis omitted).
146

ELLIOT's DEBATES,

supra note 12, at

id

Id. at 193; see also id. at 196-98 (additional comments by James Iredell on the
Test Clause).
147
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ask, "Who authorized the government to pass such an act? It is not
warranted by the Constitution, and is barefaced usurpation." The power
to make treaties can never be supposed to include a right to establish a
foreign religion among ourselves, though it might authorize a toleration
of others.
... It would be happy for mankind if religion was permitted to take

its own course, and maintain itself by the excellence of its own doctrines.
The divine Author of our religion never wished for its support by worldly
authority. Has he not .said that the gates of hell shall not prevail against
it? It made much greater progress for itself, than when supported by the
greatest authority upon earth.14 8
Iredell envisions here a central government that is barred from more than just the
establishment of a national church. Rather, the prohibition goes to any interference
in matters of religion. Organized religion is to be left to wax or wane on the merits
of its own beliefs and practices.
Reverend David Caldwell, a Presbyterian minister, rose to express dismay
that the Religious Test Clause could be understood as "an invitation for Jews and
pagans of every kind to come among us."l 4 9 A leading Antifederalist, Samuel
Spencer, took Reverend Caldwell's remarks to be proposing an exclusive
establishment by way of a religious test.150 He went on to argue that religious tests
not only had been instruments of religious persecution, but had kept virtuous men
from office while acting as no impediment to those of low principles.' Spencer
then extolled the Test Clause because "it leaves religion on the solid foundation of
its own inherent validity, without any connection with temporal authority; and no
kind of oppression can take place."' 5 2 William Lenoir raised the lack of express
limits on congressional power, fearing the absence of any restraint "against
infringement on the rights of conscience. Ecclesiastical courts may be established,
which will be destructive to our citizens. They may make any establishment they
think proper."' 53 Lenoir's long list of possible civil-liberty abuses, including those
as to religion, drew a rebuke from Richard Dobbs Spaight. Spaight had been one of
North Carolina's delegates to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. On
the matter of religion, he said:
I thought what had been said [by James Iredell] would fully satisfy that
gentlemen and every other. No power is given to the general government
Id. at 194. The "greatest authority" referred to is the Roman Empire. See also id. at
198-99 (comments by Governor Samuel Johnston on how America's many sects were an
assurance against a religious establishment).
148

14 9 Id. at 199.
15o
M'

Id. at 200.
Id.

ida
..Id. at 203.
152
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to interfere with it at all. Any act of Congress on this subject would be a
usurpation.
No sect is preferred to another. Every man has a right to worship the
Supreme Being in the manner he thinks proper. No test is required.. . . A
test would enable the prevailing sect to persecute the rest.

. .

. He says

that Congress may establish ecclesiastical courts. I do not know what
part of the Constitution warrants that assertion. It is impossible. No such
power is given them.15 4
Spaight was thus in agreement with Iredell's understanding of the Wilsonian
principle. As one can see, there was more discussion about religious establishment
in North Carolina than at any other state convention.
Although the vote for ratification failed, North Carolina did propose a host of
amendments. Twenty amendments were to comprise a bill of rights, and twenty-six
additional amendments sought to alter the particular frame of the new
government.155 North Carolina's proposed amendment with respect to religious
freedom was nearly identical to that of Virginia.' 56 This is puzzling. Recall that the
Virginia language, and now that recommended by North Carolina, prohibited only
the establishment of one religion over others-leaving open the implied possibility
of equal congressional support for all religions. However, from the debate set out
above most delegates-especially the remarks of the Federalist James Iredell and
the Antifederalist Samuel Spencer, as well as Richard Dobbs Spaight, a delegate to
the Philadelphia Convention-were all in agreement that religious freedom was
best secured when religion was left on its own to flourish or decline on the basis of
its own merit and the zeal of its adherents. Accordingly, the thrust of the debate
was to oppose all affirmative support because government involvement in religion
had led only to corruption of the church and religious persecution. These
sentiments in North Carolina aligned with those who had successfully brought
about the Virginia disestablishment in 1784-1786. Thus, in their view, government
had no jurisdiction over organized religion, which is left on its own to find
voluntary support. With this in mind, it is most unlikely that North Carolina chose
its religious freedom amendment with an eye to vesting in Congress a wholly new
implied power to directly aid religion so long as the aid was without preference.

From the foregoing, we see that the Federalists were of the firm conviction
that even in the absence of the First Amendment the new Congress had no power
Id. at 208. Richard Dobbs Spaight's argument relies on James Wilson's point that
when a power is not delegated it is thereby denied.
ss BEEMAN, supra note 23, at 405.
"564 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 244 (there were minor changes in
punctuation from the Virginia version); see also COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 72,
at 12.
114
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to directly legislate on religious conscience or to establish a church or multiple
churches. Many other Americans, who did not regard themselves as partisan, were
not so sure and wanted a bill of rights. Antifederalists wanted even more. They
sought to reduce the powers vested in the central government, thereby adding back
to the powers of the states. However, the amendments on religious establishments
proposed by some of the states created confusion. Specifically, the amendment
language by Virginia, New York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island did not
prohibit the nonpreferential support of organized religion, only the preference of
some religions over others. Did these states only fear a national government that
could favor one religious establishment over others? That is highly unlikely given
that by 1788 there was well-documented hostility in Virginia, North Carolina, and
Rhode Island toward the establishment of both exclusive and multiple churches.
Accordingly, it is well to look for additional evidence of the intended power of the
new government with respect to church-government relations. That points us to the
drafting and ratification of the First Amendment's two religious freedom clauses, a
matter set out in Part IV of this Article, and, in time, to the overarching theory of
the combined 1787 Constitution and Bill of Rights discussed in Part VI.
IV. DRAFTING THE PHRASES ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE FIRST FEDERAL
CONGRESS, MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1789, AND ENSUING STATE RATIFICATION

The First Federal Congress meeting in New York City was overwhelmingly
comprised of Federalists, meaning at this point simply those who had supported
ratification of the Constitution as distinct from Antifederalists who opposed
ratification. The House had forty-nine Federalists and ten Antifederalists; the
Senate had twenty Federalists and only two Antifederalists.' 57 However, at the
time, there were no political parties in the formal sense, only tendencies to favor
power in the central government or, its opposite, to desire' retaining more power in
the several states. President George Washington opposed the formation of political
parties and discouraged partisan division in his administration and within
Congress. 58 It was not until Washington's second term that parties calling
themselves Federalists and Republicans began to coalesce.159 It was during John
Adam's four-year presidency that the partisan lines hardened.160 Accordingly, the
15 ROBERT A. GOLDWIN, FROM PARCHMENT TO POWER: How JAMES MADISON USED
THE BILL OF RIGHTS TO SAVE THE CONSTITUTION 144 (1997).
158 See EDWARD J. LARSON, A MAGNIFICENT CATASTROPHE: THE TUMULTUOUS
ELECTION OF 1800, AMERICA'S FIRST PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 17-18 (2007).
159 The informal emergence of a Republican Party to oppose the Federalists

occurred
between November 1791 and December 1792. It was during this period that James
Madison anonymously published a series of essays in the National Gazette that laid out

policy alternatives to those of the Federalists. JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN CREATION:
TRIUMPHS AND TRAGEDIES AT THE FOUNDING OF THE REPUBLIC 179 (2007). However, it

was not until March 1796 that the Republican Party formally caucused and made explicit
its party status in opposition to the Federalist Party. Id. at 199.
160 Id. at 205-06.
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congressional debates in the summer of 1789 over what would eventually be called
the Bill of Rights were not partisan in the modern sense of that term, and the key
figure, James Madison, later a leading Republican and ally of Thomas Jefferson,
was in the forefront of those Federalists working to report out a bill of rights for

state ratification.16 1
In carefully preparing a draft of amendments to the Constitution, James
Madison had a pamphlet that compiled all of the two hundred plus state
constitutional amendments that had been recommended by six of the eleven states
at their ratifying conventions.162 Madison did not just dispassionately sift through
the recommended amendments, selecting those that had merit. Rather, he sorted
with an eye to retaining all national powers he deemed useful to an* energetic
government. He sought to fulfill his promise to safeguard rights that well-meaning
Americans believed were at risk, but he also maneuvered to discourage a second
constitutional convention, something Antifederalists earnestly sought. Further,
Madison did not hesitate to fashion amendments entirely of his creation, such as
those stating rights that limited state powers.16 3 No one else soon to join the First
Federal Congress was as diligent as Madison; thus, his sifting and sorting was
equally important with respect to those proposed state amendments he left out. 164
In chronological order of their recommendation for adoption, the state
amendments on religious freedom that Madison had before him were from New
Hampshire, Virginia, New York, and North Carolina. We cannot be certain, but
Madison likely also had copies of the failed amendments from Pennsylvania,
Maryland, and Massachusetts.

161 The

reliability of the congressional drafting history of the First Amendment is not
altogether certain. The House debate appears in 1 ANNALS OF CONG. (1789) (Joseph Gales
ed., 1834), available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwaclink.html. It is drawn
from the observations of visitors and much was taken from the notes of newspaper reporter
Thomas Lloyd. Marion Tinling, Thomas Lloyd's Reports of the First Federal Congress,
18 WM. &MARY Q. 519, 519 (1961). The Senate debates were closed to visitors, so all that

we have is the minutes of the Secretary to the Senate which recorded committee reports,
motions, and votes. Id. at 520. As to the reliability of the congressional record, see id. at
520; James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary
Record, 65 TEx. L. REv. 1, 20-21 (1986).
162 BRANT, supra note 135, at 264-65; MILLER, supra note 22, at 252.
163 BRANT, supra note 135,
at 265.
16 MILLER, supra note 22, at 252. Halfway through the amendment-drafting process,
.others in Congress wanted to go back and review the state-proposed amendments that
Madison had passed over, but by then the majority in Congress was in no mood for further
delay. BRANT, supra note 135, at 273-74.
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A. Before the House ofRepresentatives
May 4, 1789

"Before the House adjourned, Mr. Madison gave notice, that he intended to
bring on the subject of amendments to the constitution, on the 4th Monday of this
month."l 6 5 Madison made this announcement because he had advance knowledge
of a letter to be presented the next day by his fellow Virginian, Theodoric Bland.16 6
The letter was known to be hostile to Madison's plans.
May 5, 1789

A letter sent to the federal House of Representatives by the Virginia House of
Delegates and Virginia Senate sparked a discussion in the federal House over how
the amendment process should be handled. Because the letter requested a second
constitutional convention, the House members argued over whether Congress
could call such a convention or if the state-proposed amendments should be
referred to a House committee of the whole. An excerpt of the discussion follows:
After the reading of this application,
Mr. Bland moved to refer it to the Committee of the whole on the
state of the Union.
Mr. Boudinot 16 7 -According to the terms of the Constitution, the
business cannot be taken up until a certain number of States have
concurred in similar applications; certainly the House is disposed to pay
a proper attention to the application of so respectable a State as Virginia,
but if it is a business which we cannot interfere with in a constitutional
manner, we had better let it remain on the files of the House until the
proper number of applications come forward.

165

1 ANNALS OF CONG. 257.

There are two printings of the first two volumes of the

Annals of Congress. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understandingof Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1427 n.84 (1990).

The citations here are to the version with the running head "Gales & Seaton's History of
Debates in Congress." Readers with the version having the running head "History of
Congress" can find parallel passages by reference to the given date.
166 BRANT, supra note 135, at 264. Theodoric Bland was an Antifederalist and urged
consideration of the amendments proposed by Virginia. Although he opposed ratification
of the 1787 Constitution, he later supported Virginia's ratification of the Bill of Rights.
4 GEORGE LANKEVICH, ROOTS OF THE REPUBLIC: THE FIRST HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 116 (1996).
167 Elias Boudinot was a Federalist from New Jersey and an evangelical. LANKEVICH,
supra note 166, at 68-69.
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Mr. Madison said, he had no doubt but the House was inclined to
treat the present application with respect, but he doubted the propriety of
committing it, because it would seem to imply that the House had a right
to deliberate upon the subject. This he believed was not the case until
two-thirds of the State Legislatures concurred in such application, and
then it is out of the power of Congress to decline complying, the words
of the Constitution being express and positive relative to the agency
Congress may have in case of applications of this nature. "The Congress,
wherever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose amendments to this Constitution; or, on the application of the
Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a convention
for proposing amendments."E'6 8 3 From hence it must appear, that
Congress have no deliberative power on this occasion. The most
respectful and constitutional mode of performing our duty will be, to let
it be entered on the minutes, and remain upon the files of the House until
similar applications come to hand from two-thirds of the States. 16 9
Eventually the Virginia letter was entered into the Journal of the House of
Representatives of the United States, and the original placed in the files of
Congress.o70

It will be helpful at the outset of the House and latter Senate debates to
identify three of the major crosscurrents among scholars with respect to the Bill of
Rights and establishmentarianism about to be discussed. One current comes under
the heading of "nonpreferentialism," another under "specific federalism," and a
third under "scope" of the power that is denied to the national government. These
threedisputes are taken up later in this Part of the Article. A fourth crosscurrent,
which this Article takes up in Part V.B., is whether the religion clauses of the First
Amendment only protect liberty of conscience.
Contrary to the theory of nonpreferentialism, the scope of the text in the
amendments from Maryland and New Hampshire would have altogether
disempowered Congress from establishing a "national religion" (Maryland) or
enacting any law "touching religion" (New Hampshire). The scope of the
Maryland disempowerment was very narrow, whereas the scope of the New
Hampshire disempowerment was very broad. By way of contrast, the scope of the
text in the amendments from Virginia, New York, and North Carolina would not
168
169
170

1789),

Quoting U.S. CONST. art. V.

1 ANNALS OF CONG. 260 (May 5, 1789).
Id. at 261 (May 5, 1789); see also H. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (May 5,
available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collld=llhj&fileName=001/

llhj00 1.db&recNum=26&itemLink=D?hlaw:6:./temp/-ammem uEHk: :%230010027&link
Text-1.
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have prohibited the national government from aiding religion so long as the aid
was available to all religions without preference. For example, the national
government could have aided all religions, without preferring or establishing any,
by offering annual $1,000 cash payments to all clerics or other ecclesiastical
leaders. The no-preference language from these three states raises the question of
whether their proposed amendments were meant to imply that Congress retained
the power to aid religion-delegated to Congress somewhere in the original 1787
Constitution-so long as the national government did so without preferring some
religions over others.
This latter claim, called nonpreferentialism, is paradoxical insofar as it was
Antifederalists who had put forward the state-proposed amendments from Virginia,
New York, and North Carolina. As discussed above, Antifederalists wanted to
reduce Congress' power, not increase it. Yet, to infer nonpreferentialism into the
First Amendment would necessarily imply an increase in national power. While
some Antifederalists would have preferred a multiple establishment, they were
aware of America's religious pluralism, particularly stark as one moved along the
Atlantic seaboard. There were large pockets of religious opposition to
establishmentarianism of any sort, and thus any such multiple establishment was
possible only at a state level. 17 1 Moreover, from the perspective of the Federalists,
nonpreferentialism made little sense because Federalists were consistent in arguing
James Wilson's point that nothing in the 1787 Constitution delegated to
Congress-even by implication-the power to intermeddle with organized
religion. If the power was not delegated, it was denied. And that was soon made
explicit in the Tenth Amendment. The Wilsonian argument necessarily meant there
was no power in the 1787 Constitution to aid all religions without preference.
Finally, as we shall see below, there is little in the congressional debates indicating
that there was a serious push to permit national support for religion so long as no
particular religion was preferred. Madison's initial draft amendment ignored the
no-preference texts from Virginia, New York, and North Carolina. Federalists
were entirely in control of the amendment process in both chambers, and when nopreference texts were advanced in the Senate they were eventually voted down.
Nonpreferentialism is problematic for an additional reason. A more obvious
solution for Antifederalists to achieve their goal of enhancing state power was an
amendment that expressly disempowered Congress when it came to the
establishment of any or all religions, preferentially or nonpreferentially, thereby
leaving relations between church and government entirely in the power of the
states. Moreover, the New England Federalists would have been open to such an
approach, as they did not want the central government intermeddling in the
advantages then enjoyed by the Congregational Church in Connecticut,
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. These three states had mandatory religious
assessments at the parish level, but a taxpayer could designate his assessment to
the local church of his choice. In practice, this worked to the advantage of the far
more numerous Congregationalists. Such an amendment would also have served
171

Mufloz, supra note 45, at 585, 617.

HeinOnline -- 2011 Utah L. Rev. 529 2011

530

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[No. 2

the interests of those like James Madison who wanted to keep the national
government altogether out of the matter of establishing religion. Once again,
Federalists were entirely in control of the parliamentary procedure so whatever
they wanted would hold sway. But if Antifederalists' concerns could be
accommodated by the Federalists through inserting particular wording into the
amendment on no-establishment, then all the better for the eventual success of the
upcoming state ratification of the amendments. Thus, there were multiple reasons
all around to avoid nonpreferentialism.
That the First Amendment, along with all of the other provisions of the Bill of
Rights, was meant to bind only the new national government was not a source of
contention in 1789, nor is it a matter of contention today.' 72 This fact will be
referred to here as the "general federalist" character of the Bill of Rights, and
obviously includes the Establishment Clause. What is presently debated among
scholars is whether the final text of the Establishment Clause, first introduced by
the House-Senate Conference Committee, worked into the wording of the clause a
new participial phrase ("respecting an establishment") that was specifically
designed to preserve state sovereignty over the matter of religious establishment.
This I call "specific federalism." Specific federalism is a unique claim. The theory
attributes to the Establishment Clause alone a specific federalist character not
present in free exercise, free speech, free press, or other provisions of the first eight
amendments. The difference between the general federalist character of the Bill of
Rights and specific federalism did not become important until the mid-twentieth
century when the United States Supreme Court faced the question of whether to
"incorporate" the Establishment Clause through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, thereby making its restraints applicable to state and local
governments. 173
Finally, there is the question with respect to the "scope" of the congressional
disempowerment by virtue of the Establishment Clause. When Congress (and by
extension, the executive or judicial branches)174 exercised one of its enumerated
powers to "make .

.

. law," the more foresighted members in the First Congress

envisioned instances where such a law would have an incidental effect on religion.

When the issue came before the U.S. Supreme Court, it had little trouble holding
that the Bill of Rights was not binding on state and local governments. See Barron v.
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). In an opinion by Chief Justice John Marshall, the
Court said that the question was "of great importance, but not of much difficulty." Id. at
247.
173 The Supreme Court's incorporation of the Establishment Clause, making it a
restraint on state and local governments, first took place in Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1947). Specific federalism is refuted infra Part IV.H.
174 Although the text says "Congress," it is widely understood that the prohibitions in
the First Amendment run against all three branches of the federal government. Congress
makes the laws, to be sure, but the executive enforces them and the judiciary interprets
them.
172
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For example, a congressionally adopted copyright law' would necessarily raise
the question of whether a new translation of the Bible could be copyrighted. Or
assume that in formulating general legislation to implement the constitutionally
required census,176 Congress made a decision that one item usefully surveyed are
the trades and professions of Americans. That would necessarily mean counting
those Americans who are professional clerics or otherwise employed in full-time
religious service. So the census would incidentally touch on religion. That raises a
question whether the census, with respect to religious vocations, falls within the
scope of the no-establishment disempowerment, and thus is prohibited as an object
of congressional power.' 77 The First Federal Congress, as we shall see, finally
settled on the scope of the subject matter of federal disempowerment: laws
"respecting an establishment of religion," the meaning of which is only partly
revealed by the congressional debates.

With the foregoing preview of the issues of nonpreferentialism, specific
federalism, and scope of disempowerment in mind, we now turn to the bill of
rights debate in the House as it began in early June 1789.
June 8, 1789

James Madison addressed the House on the subject of amendments to the
Constitution. Madison moved that the House resolve itself as a committee of the
whole to consider his proposed amendments, but the House resisted this motion. It
was resisted by both Federalists, who thought amendments a poor use of time, and
Antifederalists, who wanted a second constitutional convention to consider a bill of
rights and structural amendments to reclaim state power."' Madison sought to
1 See U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (stating Congress shall have the power "To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors

and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . .
176 See id. art. I, § 2,
cl. 3.
1 A situation similar to this actually occurred when James Madison was President.
Madison reversed an administrative decision by the census bureau to catalog clerical
professions. He did so because of his view of the restraints on Congress imposed by the
Establishment Clause. See BRANT, supra note 135, at 272.
178 See the debate involving Smith, Jackson, Madison, Goodhue, Burke, Sherman,
White, Page, and Vining. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 441-48 (June 8, 1789) (Joseph Gales ed.,
1834); cf BRANT, supra note 135, at 264, 267-68. For some Federalists, time spent on a
bill of rights was a double mistake. Most importantly, the First Congress was busy writing
needed legislation to set up the infrastructure of the new government (e.g., the Federal
Judiciary Act). RICHARD LABUNSKl, JAMES MADISON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 195-96 (2006). Second, some High Federalists believed the 1787 Constitution was
a model needing little improvement, and focus on amendments only encouraged continuing
criticism by Antifederalists. CHARLENE BANGS BICKFoRD & KENNETH R. BOWLING, BIRTH
OF THE NATION: THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-1791, at 52-53 (1989).
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bring the ensuing controversy to an end by withdrawing his motion, and then
moving to have the House appoint a select committee to consider the proposed
amendments. He continued by remarking on the important role the amendments
would play "to limit and qualify the powers of the Government, by excepting out
of the grant of power those cases in which the Government ought not to act, or to
act only in a particular mode."l 79 The proposed amendments were thereby not
designed to vest new substantive powers in the national government, but rather to
state what powers did not lay with Congress under the original 1787 Constitution.
Accordingly, the amendments took power away from the new national government
(in the view of the Antifederalists) or merely clarified the limited delegation of
powers in the Wilsonian 1787 Constitution (in the view of the Federalists).
Agreement on what powers Congress did not have was a much easier task. 80
Madison also stressed that the amendments were to "satisfy the public mind"
worried about the lack of a bill of rights, and thereby gain the peoples' support for
the new government.' 8 ' After all, six states had ratified only because amendments
were promised to be forthcoming.
Madison then gave the proposed amendments their initial reading, from which
we get a glimpse of the provisions addressing religious freedom (and of particular
interest, the no-establishment phrase) in their earliest form. Madison's
amendments were proposed as interlineations into the existing text of the 1787
Constitution, as opposed to a list of amendments at the end of the document.' 82 By
inserting what later became the First Amendment into Article I, Section 9, once
again Madison's clear intent was that the amendment is a disempowerment of
national power, not a vesting of any new congressional power.
The amendments which have occurred to me, proper to be
recommended by Congress to the State Legislatures, are these:
Fourthly. That in article 1st, section 9, between clauses 3 and 4, be
inserted these clauses, to wit: The civil rights of none shall be abridged

on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national
religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of
conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.
The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a
well armed and well regulated militia being the best security of a free

country: but no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be
compelled to render military service in person.

' 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 454 (June 8, 1789).
180 See CURRY, supra note 7, at 193-94.
181
182

1 ANNALS OF CONG. 453-59 (June 8, 1789).
The interlineations were later changed at the insistence of others in the House, in

particular Roger Sherman. BRANT, supra note 135, at 268, 275.
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Fifthly. That in article 1st, section 10, between clauses 1 and 2, be
inserted this clause, to wit:
No State shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom
of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases.' 83
Madison's proposed Fourth Article did not resemble in the least any of the four
state-proposed amendments.184 In particular, he avoided the explicit no-preference
language from Virginia, New York, and North Carolina. And the no-establishment
scope of disempowerment was narrow ("any national religion"). Part of the
amendment was overly wordy, with the first and last parts addressing the
relationship between government, religion, and the individual, whereas churchgovernment relations occupied a brief middle.
As we shall see, stylistic changes-and more-were in the offing to
substantially alter the text. It is not uncommon to have the title of author (or
"father") of the Establishment Clause attributed to Madison because he was first to
introduce the religious freedom amendment. More accurately, though, Madison
gave continuing and close attention to the text of the religious freedom
amendment. Thus, while the text that emerged on September 24-25 bore his
fingerprints, the work was not of his sole paternity. Indeed, from Madison's
perspective, the no-establishment provision, reported out to the states in late
September, was an improvement over what he had first offered in June. On the
other hand, as we shall see below, the provisions on conscience were greatly
diminished from Madison's aspirations.
Madison's initial treatment of church-government relations was brief ("nor
shall any national religion be established"), with considerable but undefined
weight placed on what is meant by the word "established."18 5 On June 8th, its
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 450-51

(June 8, 1789) (emphasis added).
The no-establishment text in Madison's version does resemble the amendment
voted down in Maryland. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
185 Professor John Witte suggests the following meaning for "establishment"
as a
beginning point in defining the term as it was understood in 1789:
183

184

[T]the founders understood the establishment of religion to mean the actions of
government to "settle," "fix," "define," "ordain," "enact," or "set up" the
religion of the community-its religious doctrines and liturgies, its religious
texts and traditions, its clergy and property. The most notorious example of this,
to their minds, was the establishment by law of Anglicanism. English
ecclesiastical law formally required use of the Authorized (King James) Version
of the Bible and of the liturgies, rites, prayers, and lectionaries of the Book of
Common Prayer.It demanded subscription to the Thirty-Nine Articles of Faith
and the swearing of loyalty oaths to the Church, Crown, and Commonwealth of
England. When such ecclesiastical laws were rigorously applied-as they were
in England in the early Stuart period of the 1610s to 1630s, and again in the
Restoration of the 1660s to 1670s, and intermittently in the American coloniesthey led to all manner of state controls of the internal affairs of the established
Church, and all manner of state repression and coercion of religious dissenters.
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meaning was not a subject of any remarks by Madison. One reading is that the text
prohibits Congress from establishing one national religion, thereby implying.
Congress is open to establishing all religions. There are problems with that
interpretation. A more natural reading of Madison's text is that the use of "any"
means that the establishment of one or more religions is prohibited. Thus,
Congress' establishment of the Episcopal, Methodist, and Congregational churches
would constitute three violations of the no-establishment principle in the
amendment. Likewise, to establish all Protestant churches, separately or combined,
would be multiple violations of the amendment; and to establish all religions
would be multiple violations of the amendment as well.
Those of the nonpreferentialist view, however, argue that the proper reading is
that although Congress is prohibited from establishing any religion, there is
implied congressional power (stopping short of an establishment) to aid religion
without preference. For example, by implication the amendment does not prohibit
Congress from appropriating an annual $1,000 cash supplement to all clerics and
other ecclesiastical leaders. Such an appropriation would fall short of a full
establishment, it is argued, and thus by implication be permitted under Madison's
proposed text. However, Madison's text does not require equal treatment, so the
nonpreferentialist argument proves too much because the text is also open by
implication to government aiding some clerics with $1,000 payments, but giving
$500 to others, and nothing at all to yet others.
In Madison's explanation of the other amendments that concern religion, he
did remark on the proposed Fifth Article of Amendment, which would bind states
with respect to the equal rights of conscience, along with the rights of free press
and of jury trials in criminal cases. This was the only amendment Madison
proposed that would bind the states. We know that Madison wanted to protect
conscience inclusively defined. The prior year he had written Jefferson as to why
he opposed a bill of rights. One of the reasons was that in the debate over such a
bill "the rights of Conscience in particular, if submitted to public definition would

JOHN WITTE JR., GOD'S JOUST, GOD'S JUSTICE: LAW AND RELIGION IN THE WESTERN
TRADITION 186 (2006). Professor Michael McConnell identifies six elements of the Church
of England's establishment in England and the colonies: governmental control over the
doctrines, structure, and personnel of the state church; mandatory attendance at religious
worship services in the state church; public financial support; prohibition of religious
worship in other denominations; use of the state church for civil functions; and limitation
of political participation to members of the state church. Michael W. McConnell,
Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion,
44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2105, 2131, 2144, 2146, 2159, 2169, 2176 (2003). Professors
Witte and McConnell take into account that the English Act of Toleration accommodated
certain dissenters. Accordingly, while the English establishment had the listed
requirements, "approved" dissenters were excused by law from compliance. But that

official toleration did not change the definition of an establishment.
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be narrowed."' 86 In open debate Madison feared being unable to protect the nonChristian and the nonreligious, citing as an example, during the ratification of the
Constitution, the intolerance in New England to the Religious Test Clause
"open[ing] the door for Jews, Turks, and infidels" to serve in government.
Knowing he had a difficult task in advancing an inclusive protection of conscience
in public debate, especially with respect to the state, Madison plunged ahead:
I wish also, in revising the constitution, we may throw into that section,
which interdicts the abuse of certain powers in the State Legislatures,188
some other provisions of equal, if not greater importance than those
already made. The words, "No State shall pass any bill of attainder, ex
postfacto law," &c. were wise and proper restrictions in the constitution.
I think there is more danger of those powers being abused by the State
Governments than by the Government of the United States. The same
may be said of other powers which they possess, if not controlled by the
general principle, that laws are unconstitutional which infringe the rights
of the community. I should therefore wish to extend this interdiction, and
add, as I have stated in the 5th resolution, that no State shall violate the
equal right of conscience, freedom of the press, or trial by jury in
criminal cases; because it is proper that every Government should be
disarmed of powers which trench upon those particular rights. 189
By seeking to protect the equal right of conscience, Madison would extend the
same safeguard of conscience to the non-Christian and the nonreligious.
After further explanation with respect to his proposed amendments before the
House, Madison closed by again moving for the appointment of a select committee
"to consider of and report such amendments as ought to be proposed by Congress
to the Legislatures of the States, to become, if ratified by three-fourths thereof, part
of the constitution of the United States."1 90 Those seeking delay still resisted. So,
186 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON

297 (WILLIAM HUTCHINSON ET AL. EDS.,
1977). See also id. at 404-05 (reprinting a letter from Madison dated January 2, 1789, to
George Eve, a Baptist minister from Madison's congressional district in Virginia, stating
with reference to a bill of rights that "it is my sincere opinion that the Constitution ought to
be revised, and that the first Congress meeting under it, ought to prepare .

.

. the most

satisfactory provisions for all essential rights, particularly the rights of Conscience in the
fullest latitude").
'8 Id. at 297. For an account of the larger context of the Madison-Jefferson exchange
of letters on a bill of rights, see PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE
CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788, at 443-46 (2010). For reference to additional evidence
supporting Madison's fear that conscience could not be secured in sufficient scope in open
debate to protect non-Christians and the nonreligious, see id. at 444.
188 This is a reference to Article I, Section 10.
1 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 441-48 (June 8, 1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (emphasis
added).
190 Id. at 459 (June 8, 1789).
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Madison withdrew that motion and simply moved the adoption of his entire set of
proposed amendments. The threat of bringing matters to an immediate head
produced quick results. 191 The House promptly voted to refer the amendments to a
committee of the whole and then adjourned for the day.' 92 The House did not
return to the matter of amendments until mid-July,193 testing Madison's patience.
July 21, 1789
Madison "begged" the House to take action on the subject of the June 8th
amendments.194 The House responded by referring the matter to a Select
95
Committee of Eleven, one member from each of the states.1 The Select
Committee consisted of .Vining, Madison, Baldwin, Sherman, Burke, Gilman,
Clymer, Benson, Goodhue, Boudinot, and Gale.' 96

191 BRANT, supra note 135, at 264.
192 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 467-68 (June

8, 1789).
Id. at 685-86 (July 21, 1789).
194 Id. at 685 (July 21, 1789); see, e.g., BRANT, supra note 135, at 267 (quoting a
private letter by Fisher Ames of Massachusetts, a Federalist, to the effect that Madison was
seeking popularity while largely wasting Congress' time).
195 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 685-86 (July 21, 1789). At this time in their careers, all
members of the committee were Federalists except for Aedanus Burke of South Carolina,
and even Burke supported the Bill of Rights. See LANKEVICH, supra note 166, at 27, 36,
38, 45, 54, 63, 68, 74, 92, 106, 123. Concerning the composition of this Select Committee,
see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., If Judges Were Angels: Religious Equality, FreeExercise,
and the (Underappreciated)Merits of Smith, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 1189, 1254 (2008):
193

Given that the Framers established the House of Representatives on a basis
of proportional representation, it was, at least superficially, odd to assign such
an important task to a committee that did not itself reflect proportional
representation of the states. On reflection, however, because ratification of
amendments would require the consent of three-fourths of the state legislatures
(or conventions in the states called for the purpose of considering the
amendments), it undoubtedly made sense to create a committee constituted in a
fashion that would lead to the drafting of amendments that might enjoy the
broadest support among the states. A committee dominated by members from
more populous states, such as Virginia, New York, and Massachusetts, might
not be as effective at crafting amendments likely to secure the necessary support
to ensure ratification.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
196

1 ANNALS OF CONG. 690-91 (July 21, 1789). John Vining, a Federalist from

Delaware, was designated chair and Madison was designated vice-chair. BRANT, supra
note 135, at 268. Although chair of the Select Committee, Vining is known to have thought
the House could better spend its time on legislative matters. See LANKEVICH, supra note
166, at 36.
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July 28, 1789
The Select Committee of Eleven acted with dispatch by reporting back in just
one week. It issued its report on this day to the entire House, where the report was
tabled without discussion' 97 The phrases on religious freedom, as emerging from
the Select Committee, were not just simplified but were materially altered with
respect to no-establishment and matters of conscience. The report read:
The fourth proposition being under consideration, as follows:
Article 1. Section 9. Between paragraphs two and three insert no
religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal rights of
conscience be infringed.'98
... A well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, being
the best security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear
arms shall not be infringed; but no person religiously scrupulous shall
be compelled to bear arms.199
The committee then proceeded to the fifth proposition:
Article 1, Section 10, between the first and second paragraph, insert
no State shall infringe the equal rights of conscience, nor the freedom
of speech or of the press, nor of the right of trial by jury in criminal
cases.200
The Fourth Article produced by the Select Committee maintained a clear pattern of
two relationships: first, that of government and organized religion, and, second,
that of government, religion, and individual conscience. With respect to churchgovernment relations, the word "national" was omitted, probably because it was
thought redundant. The amendment was, after all, to be inserted into Article I,
Section 9, of the Constitution, and that section spoke only to limits on the national
government. The real scope of the disempowerment still lay with the meaning of
"established." Thus, the establishmentarian alterations by the Select Committee of
Eleven were stylistic. 20 1 Not so with respect to the relationship between the
national government and individual conscience. No longer were the "full and equal
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 699 (July 28, 1789).
Id. at 757 (Aug. 15, 1789) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
'99 Id. at 778 (Aug. 17, 1789) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
200 Id. at 783 (Aug. 17, 1789) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
201 Those of the "no preference" view can still claim that the restraint
("no religion
shall be established by law") prohibits only religious establishments, thereby leaving open
by implication that the national government could aid religion (while stopping short of
establishment) so long as none is preferred. Once again, however, the text does not require
equal treatment. Thus, the argument proves too much because it leaves the government
open by implication to provide national aid for some religions but not others.
9
9
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rights of conscience" protected, but only the "equal rights" thereof. Further, the
Select Committee omitted the reference to "religious belief and worship" not being
abridged. The changes appear to be for reasons other than mere brevity. "Religious
belief and worship" are easily said to be subsumed into the "full rights of
conscience," but it is unconvincing to claim that the "full rights" of conscience is
subsumed into the mere "equal rights" of conscience.
August 13-14, 1789

Richard Bland Lee 202 moved for the House to resolve itself into a Committee
of the Whole. Working as a Committee of the Whole permitted House agreement
on the text of each amendment by a mere majority vote. Once the draft
amendments were reported by the Committee to the entire House, adoption of each
amendment would require passage by a two-thirds vote.203 Having so resolved, the
Committee of the Whole began by discussing the Preamble to the Articles of
Amendment. 204 The next day, August 14th, the Committee resumed consideration
of the amendments, debating matters unrelated to the proposals concerning
religious freedom.205
August 15, 1789

The debate by the House, still sitting as a Committee of the Whole, turned for
the first time to the no-establishment provision. This day was the longest
discussion of the no-establishment principle in the House. The House ultimately
adopted an amended version proposed by Samuel Livermore, a Federalist from
New Hampshire. The debate unfolded as follows:
The House again went into a Committee of the whole on the
proposed amendments to the constitution, Mr. Boudinot in the chair.
The fourth proposition being under consideration, as follows:
Article 1. Section 9. Between paragraphs two and three insert "no
religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal rights of
conscience be infringed."

Richard Bland Lee was a Federalist from Virginia. See LANKEVICH, supra note
166, at
203121.
See U.S. CONST. art. V.
204 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (Aug. 13, 1789). "Resolved by the Senate and
the House
of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled, That the following articles
202

be proposed as amendments to the constitution, and when ratified by three-fourths of the
State Legislatures shall become valid to all intents and purposes, as part of the same." Id. at
735.
205

Id. at 745-57 (Aug. 14, 1789).
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Mr. S[i]lvesterl 20 61 had some doubts of the propriety of the mode of
expression used in this paragraph. He apprehended that it was liable to a
construction different from what had been made by the committee. He
feared it might be thought to have a tendency to abolish religion
altogether.207
Peter Silvester's remark is initially puzzling. The Select Committee's draft
amendment is rightly said to "abolish establishment," but it hard to see how it
might "abolish religion." Moreover, the Select Committee's amendment
unquestionably applied only against the national government, given its placement
in Section 9 of Article I, whereas all then-existing establishments in America were
at the state level. Silvester was a Federalist from New York. New York had
completed its disestablishment in 1777, so he could not have been motivated to
protect an established church in his home state.208 Silvester's "apprehensions" and
"fears" make sense only if his concern was that the amendment's text ("no religion
shall be established by law") was understood as "abolishing religion" because it
affirmatively protected the nonreligious and even the atheist. Today we are quick
to regard Silvester as intolerant. But in this period, many shared his concern that
latitudinarianism and the Enlightenment were on the rise. They thought that
orthodox religion was instrumental to good government and thus government
should not help to further religion's decline by safeguarding its opposite.
Silvester's belief was not an outlier because, as we will soon see, others joined in
his concern.
The debate continued:
Mr. Vining[2 09 ] suggested the propriety of transposing the two
members of the sentence.
Mr. Gerry[210 3 said it would read better if it was, that no religious
doctrine shall be established by law. 2 1 1
Elbridge Gerry's suggestion was an attempt by an Antifederalist to define
"established" narrowly, confining it to the legal codification of a religious creed.
His proposal goes to the scope of the disempowerment of Congress. The
Federalists proceeded to ignore Gerry. The debate continued:

206

at 81.

Peter Silvester was a Federalist from New York. See LANKEVICH, supra note 166,

207 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 757
208

(Aug. 15, 1789) (emphasis added).
Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment,supra note 8, at 1480.

John Vining was a Federalist from Delaware and an Episcopalian. See JOHN A.
MUNROE, HISTORY OF DELAWARE 85 (2006).
210 Elbridge Gerry was an Antifederalist from Massachusetts and an Episcopalian. See
M.E. BRADFORD, A WORTHY COMPANY 6 (1982) (listing Gerry as an Episcopalian);
LANKEVICH, supra note 166, at 52-53.
211 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 757 (Aug. 15, 1789) (emphasis
added).
209
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Mr. Shermanl 2 12] thought the amendment altogether unnecessary,
inasmuch as Congress had no authority whatever delegated to them by
the constitution to make religious establishments; he would, therefore,
move to have it struck out.
Mr. Carroll.[ 21 3-As the rights of conscience are, in their nature, of
peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest touch of governmental
hand; and as many sects have concurred in opinion that they are not well
secured under the present constitution, he said he was much in favor of
adopting the words. He thought it would tend more towards conciliating
the minds of the people to the Government than almost any other
amendment that he had heard proposed. He would not contend with
gentlemen about phraseology, his object was to secure the substance in
such a manner as to satisfy the wishes of the honest part of the
community.2 14
Roger Sherman was a Federalist from Connecticut who thought the
amendment process a waste of time because the 1787 Constitution delegated no
congressional authority to establish religion. Again, this is the Wilsonian
argument. Sherman also contemplated the possibility of multiple establishments.
Daniel Carroll was a Federalist as well. However, he was also a Roman
Catholic from Maryland. At the time, Catholics were a small minority in
America. 215 They were widely discriminated against, albeit much less so in
Maryland, which at its founding was a refuge for Catholics leaving Great
Britain. 2 16 Perhaps Carroll rose in answer to Sherman for he spoke in favor of
protecting "conscience" but said nothing about "establishment." Carroll reassures
the House that many well-meaning Americans, not just a few vocal dissenters in
New England, were sincerely fearful because the 1787 Constitution lacked a Bill
of Rights, and such was of particular concern to religious minorities. Everyone in
the room knew that Carroll was one such minority.
Madison responded to the remark by Silvester ("tendency to abolish religion
altogether"), as well as that of Sherman ("amendment altogether unnecessary"), as
follows:

Roger Sherman was a Federalist from Connecticut and a Congregationalist. See
BRADFORD, supra note 210, at 22 (listing Sherman as a Congregationalist); LANKEVICH,
212

supra note 166, at 22-23.
213

Daniel Carroll was a Federalist from Maryland and a Roman Catholic. See

LANKEVICH, supranote 166, at 42-43.
214 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 757-58 (Aug. 15, 1789).
215 Kathleen Flanagan, The Changing Characterof the American Catholic Church
1810-1850, 20 VINCENTIAN HERITAGE J. 3, 3-4 (1999) (stating Catholics were a minority
from the time of American colonization well into the early 1800s), available at
http://via.1ibrary.depaul.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1 211 &context-vhj.
216 Esbeck, Dissentand Disestablishment,supra note 8, at 1484.
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Mr. Madison said, he apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that
Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal
observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any manner
contrary to their conscience. Whether the words are necessary or not, he
did not mean to say, but they had been required by some of the State
Conventions, who seemed to entertain an opinion that under the clause of
the constitution, which gave power to Congress to make all laws
necessary and proper to carry into execution the constitution, and the
laws made under it, enabled them to make laws of such a nature as might
infringe the rights of conscience, and establish a national religion; to
prevent these effects he presumed the amendment was intended, and he
thought it as well expressed as the nature of the language would admit.2 17
Madison made four points in this reply. The first was that the noestablishment and conscience texts limit only Congress. Thus, state establishments
or other forms of local favoritism with respect to religion were left undisturbed by
the amendment. This is general federalism that is uncontested even today.
Moreover, as a Federalist, Madison was still unwilling to say that the noestablishment and conscience texts were necessary. In this he agreed with Roger
Sherman's earlier remark,2 18 but Madison went on to note that several stateproposed amendments suggested that a religious freedom amendment was prudent
because, as Carroll had confirmed, many Americans needed reassuring.219
Second, with respect to Silvester's fear, Madison unabashedly confirmed that
the text on conscience did indeed protect the nonreligious. Madison said that the
amendment would prohibit laws that "compel men to worship God in any manner
contrary to their conscience." This would include not just the dissenter, but the
non-Christian and the atheist.
Third, Madison noted that some of the fears expressed in the state ratification
conventions were not about the abuse of power expressly delegated to the national
government, but in the "effects" on both conscience and no-establishment that
were a consequence of the use by Congress of its delegated powers. The Necessary
and Proper Clause 22 0 had been singled out by opponents, notes Madison, as one
source of such implied power and hence detrimental "effects." It can thus be said
758 (Aug. 15, 1789).
At this point in his public life, Madison worked with Federalists to not diminish
the powers delegated to the central government. In the struggle for ratification of the 1787
Constitution, the Antifederalists' most effective argument was that it lacked a bill of rights.
Federalists, such as Madison, responded that a declaration of rights was unnecessary
because of the limited powers delegated to the new central government. In the debates
recorded here in 1789, Madison was careful to not take a position inconsistent to the one he
had maintained during 1787-1788.
219 As discussed earlier, New Hampshire, Virginia, New York, and North Carolina
had all proposed language for a religious-freedom amendment. See supra notes 114, 133,
140, 156 and accompanying text.
220 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 18.
217 1 ANNALS OF CONG.
218
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that one of the issues expressly thought about by the First Congress was how
general legislation pursuant to its enumerated powers in the 1787 Constitution may
have consequential-and indeed detrimental-effects on religious freedom.
Whatever the detrimental effects of Congress' powers on conscience or noestablishment, real or speculative, Madison argued that the proposed amendment
would be fully corrective.
Madison's fourth point was that the amendment not only restrained a
congressional establishment of religion but, in his opinion, also restrained the
national government from enforcing the "legal observation of [religion] by law." 221
This helps to define "establish[ment]" in Madison's thinking. The remark has
Madison saying that the scope of the proposed text was not just a bar to a fullfledged establishment but that the amendment disempowers Congress from
legislating elements ("legal observation of it by law") of a fully developed
establishment. As we have seen, the Church of England-the religious
establishment most familiar to the founders-had multiple elements where
particular observances were compelled by law.222
In the course of this colloquy, Madison said that he apprehended the meaning
of the no-establishment text as "Congress should not establish a religion," and not
"establish a national religion." 223 Madison could be understood here as altering the
meaning of the no-establishment text. By implication, it could be claimed that
Madison thought the text only denied power to establish one church, thereby
leaving Congress free to establish all religions without preference. Not only is such
an interpretation inconsistent with Madison's well-known views on church-state
relations both before and after this debate, but those of the nonpreferentialist view
can claim no solace in this reading because it attributes to the amendment a
meaning more narrow than nonprefereritialism. 224 That is, the claim proves too
much because such an interpretation of Madison's remark would also allow
preferential multiple establishments.
The debate continued:
Mr. Huntingtonl2 25 ] said
this subject [Mr. Silvester],
as to be extremely hurtful
amendment to mean what

that he feared, with the gentleman first up on
that the words might be taken in such latitude
to the cause of religion. He understood the
had been expressed by the gentleman from

1 ANNALS OF CONG. 758 (Aug. 15, 1789).
Professors Witte and McConnell indicate that a fully developed establishment had
multiple elements. See supra note 185.
223 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 758 (Aug. 15,
1789).
221

222

See Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim about
OriginalIntent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 875, 891-93 (1986).
224

225

Benjamin Huntington was a Federalist from Connecticut and a Congregationalist.

See LANKEVICH, supra note 166, at 26; Religious Affiliation of the Senators
and Representatives in the First United States Congress, ADHERENTS.COM (Dec.

7, 2005), http://www.adherents.com/gov/congress_001.html (listing Huntington as a
Congregationalist, the established church in the parishes of Connecticut).
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Virginia [Mr. Madison]; but others might find it convenient to put
another construction upon it. The ministers of their congregations to the
Eastward [i.e., Huntington's Connecticut] were maintained by the
contributions of those who belonged to their society; the expense of
building meeting-houses was contributed in the same manner. These
things were regulated by bylaws. If an action was brought before a
Federal Court on any of these cases, the person who had neglected to
perform his engagements could not be compelled to do it; for a support
of ministers, or building of places of worship might be construed into a
religious establishment.
By the charter of Rhode Island, no religion could be established by
law; he could give a history of the effects of such a regulation; indeed the
people were now enjoying the blessed fruits of it.[2 2 6] He hoped,
therefore, the amendment would be made in such a way as to secure the
rights of conscience, and a free exercise of the rights of religion, but not
to patronize those who professed no religion at all.
Mr. Madison thought, if the word national was inserted before
religion, it would satisfy the minds of honorable gentlemen. He believed
that the people feared one sect might obtain a pre-eminence, or two
combine together, and establish a religion to which they would compel
others to conform. He thought if the word national was introduced, it
would point the amendment directly to the object it was intended to
22 7
prevent.
Benjamin Huntington, a Federalist from Connecticut, said he shared
Silvester's concern that the "equal rights of conscience" text could be construed to
be "hurtful to the cause of religion" by protecting the nonreligious.228 He favored a
rephrasing so that the amendment secured "a free exercise of the rights of religion,
but not to patronize those who professed no religion at all." 22 9 Huntington also
This is an unflattering remark directed at Rhode Island about the negative effects
on the state of never having had an establishment. See McConnell, supra note 165, at 1427
n.84 ("In fact, far from being a positive example, Rhode Island was the pariah among the
226

colonies, with a reputation for disorder and instability: 'During and after the colonial
period, Rhode Island, "the licentious Republic" and "sinke hole of New England," was an

example to be shunned.').
27 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 758-59 (Aug.
228 Historian Thomas Curry interprets

15, 1789) (emphasis added).
Huntington's remarks as being fearful that the
proposed amendment gave Congress the power to interfere with state establishments.
CURRY, supra note 7, at 202-03. If correct, Curry's view would help bolster the "specific

federalism" argument. However, neither Silvester nor Huntington mentioned any concern
about Congress' enumerated powers being impliedly vested by the amendment to overturn
establishments at the state level. Rather, their expressed concern focused on the wording of
the amendment itself and how the federal judiciary might misconstrue the wording to
restrain state and local officials.
229 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 758 (Aug. 15,
1789).
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wanted to shield the Connecticut church-state arrangement favoring the
Congregational Church. Connecticut's arrangement was left unaffected by the
amendment because the proposed amendments were binding only on the national
government. Huntington's fear makes sense only if he was being overly cautious
that the amendment's text not be misconstrued as being binding on the states.23 0
Huntington goes on to supply an illustration of such a misconstruction. He thought
the amendment could be read by a federal court to essentially overturn
Connecticut's religious assessment law. The law, like that in Massachusetts and
New Hampshire, operated at the local level to provide tax support for churcles.231
The assessment in Connecticut and Massachusetts was mandatory, but each
taxpayer could direct the amount assessed to the local church of his choice.
Because each taxpayer could direct the amount of the assessment to the church of
his choice, Congregationalists like Huntington did not believe that the tax was a
violation of conscience.232 Nor did Congregationalists think such assessments
constituted an establishment of religion.2 33 Huntington made this clear in his
remarks by saying that he supported "the rights of conscience," and feared only
that the religious assessment "might be construed into a religious establishment"
by others.
Baptists in New England disagreed with Huntington, as he was likely aware.
First, Baptists believed that contributions to a church must be voluntary, and thus
the mandatory assessment was an affront to religious conscience even when the
money was ultimately paid over by the local assessor to their Baptist Church.234
Second, in practice, the assessment law worked to the advantage of the
Congregational Church. The Congregationalists overwhelmingly dominated in the
number of its followers, and they received assessments from those who were
marginally religious but not wanting to be viewed as such.235 Understandably,
Huntington's fear of misconstruction of the amendment's text as directly operative
against states is also evident by his sarcastic remark concerning Rhode Island and how
disestablishment there had only led to degradation of the morals of Rhode Island citizens.
Huntington has his facts wrong. The Rhode Island charter did not by its terms prohibit an
establishment. That does not take away from Huntington's point, however, for Rhode
Island never had an establishment. Nor was there any sentiment in the state for starting one.
Much of New England had disdain for the moral character of Rhode Island's people and
attributed it to the state's lack of support for religion and the reduced level of orthodox
belief by its citizens.
231 Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment, supra note 8, at 1439-48, 1512-24
(Massachusetts); 1501-11 (Connecticut); 1533 nn.537-38 (New Hampshire).
232 Id. at 1533 n.539 (illustrative of the interplay between religious taxes, on the one
hand, and both conscience and establishment, on the other hand).
233 Congregationalists contrasted their religious assessment laws with "true
establishments" such as the Church of England in Great Britain. See CURRY, supra note 7,
at 129-33.
234 2 WILLIAM G. McLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND DISSENT 1630-1833: THE BAPTISTS
AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 966-84 (1971).
235 Id. at 919, 925-26, 937-38.
230

HeinOnline -- 2011 Utah L. Rev. 544 2011

2011]

ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE INTERPRETATION

545

Baptists argued that this arrangement was not only a violation of conscience but
also an establishment of the Congregational Church. 36
To illustrate his concern over the amendment being misconstrued, Huntington
hypothesized a lawsuit in Connecticut federal court where a local assessor's claim
involved the nonpayment by a citizen of his religious assessment.2 37 Huntington
wrongly assumed that a federal judge assigned the case would have to follow the
proposed amendment. However, the amendments did.not bind state and local
officials. General federalism was obviously a point on which Huntington was
confused.
Of greater interest is Madison's passing contemplation during the foregoing
exchange with respect to the scope of the amendment. Madison said that the
proposed no-establishment phrase would bar not just the establishment of a single
sect, but also an establishment of multiple sects that combined together to achieve
such an objective.238 Thus, Madison's focus went beyond prohibiting a single
national church establishment. For example, he also sought to prohibit several
large denominations combining to form a national Protestant establishment.
Nonpreferentialists claim Madison's remarks as helping their cause by implying
that Congress could aid all religions without favoring any, while stopping short of
a full establishment. 2 39 Once again there are two problems with this claim: their
reading would also imply congressional power to aid two or three churches while
stopping short of a no-preference rule, and their reading does not take into account
Madison's broader and well-known view of church-government separation.
Rather than quarrel with Huntington about his confusion over the amendment
applying to state and local officials, Madison suggested wording that made it even
clearer that the amendment only applied to the central government. He proposed
inserting the word "national" to point the object of the amendment to the only
government it bound. Madison's fix backfired because, as the debate is about to
show, it drew the scorn of the Antifederalist, Elbridge Gerry. In the contest to
ratify the Constitution, Madison and other Federalists had insisted that the
document creates not a "national" but a "federal" government. This was done to
assuage the concern of those who complained that the Constitution took too much
power from the states.
id
If the local tax assessor was the proper party-defendant, as is likely, then a federal
trial court would have subject matter jurisdiction under Article III, Section 2, Clause 1.
238 Soon after the end of the Revolutionary War rumors began to circulate
that there
might be an attempt by the Presbyterians and Congregationalists to join in an effort to have
them become an established national religion. Both churches were Calvinist, albeit their
polity was markedly different. McLOUGHLIN, supra note 234, at 852 n.45 (1971); 1 E.H.
236
237

GILLETT, HISTORY OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

200-01 (1864). There was no basis to the rumors, but they persisted well into the crucial
years of 1787 and following. Such fear, however groundless, may have come to the
attention of Madison, leading to this remark on the House floor.
239

See Laycock, supra note 224, at 891-93 (arguing against these nonpreferentialist

interpretations of the debate).
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Mr. Gerry did not like the term national, proposed by the gentleman
from Virginia [Mr. Madison], and he hoped it would not be adopted by
the House. It brought to his mind some observations that had taken place
in the [state] conventions at the time they were considering the present
constitution. It had been insisted upon by those who were called
antifederalists, that this form of Government consolidated the Union; the
honorable gentleman's motion shows that he considers it in the same
light. Those who were called antifederalists at that time complained that
they had injustice done them by the title, because they were in favor of a
Federal Government, and the others were in favor of a national one; the
federalists were for ratifying the constitution as it stood, and the others
not until amendments were made. Their names then ought not to have
been distinguished by federalists and antifederalists, but rats and antirats.
Mr. Madison withdrew his motion, but observed that the words "no
national religion shall be established by law," did not imply that the
Government was a national one .... 2 40
Angering Gerry is one of the few recorded occasions where Madison slippedup during debate. He repaired the error by quickly withdrawing the motion. The
debate continued:
Mr. Livermore was not satisfied with [Madison's] amendment; but he
did not wish them to dwell long on the subject. He thought it would be
better if it was altered, and made to read in this manner, that Congress
shall make no laws touching religion, or infringing the rights of
conscience. 24 1
Like Madison, Samuel Livermore was a Federalist and he had a religious
background that lent itself to his being ecumenical and thus perhaps favorable to
religious freedom for all.242 He also hailed from New Hampshire, and. moved for
the substitution of a text nearly identical to that recommended by the New
Hampshire ratification convention. Livermore may have even been the author of
the amendment at the state constitutional convention, but we do not know as no
transcript of the convention was kept. Livermore's opening phrase ("Congress
shall make no laws") unmistakably pointed the object of the amendment to the
24o

added).

241

1 ANNALS OF CONG.

759 (Aug. 15, 1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (emphasis

Id. (emphasis added).

Samuel Livermore, the son of a clergyman, was a Federalist from New Hampshire
with ties to both the Congregational and Episcopalian churches. See LANKEVICH, supra
242

note 166, at 64-65; 1 ANsON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE INTHE UNITED STATES

315 (1950) ("His association with both Congregational and Episcopal churches, and his
study at a Presbyterian college [Princeton], may have been factors in developing his
interest in religious toleration.").
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federal government and not the states, thus meeting the fear of Huntington. It
achieved what Madison had tried to do by insertion of the word "national," but
without angering Antifederalists.
Livermore's text also had the consequence of preventing Congress from
enacting legislation to overturn state laws on religion, which had not been part of
the discussion so far.243 Nor was it a consequence discussed following introduction
of Livermore's amendment. Still, the text's literal effect is to raise the "specific
federalism" position: Congress is uniquely disempowered by the no-establishment
provision from "mak[ing] . . . laws touching religion." Livermore's text would

render ultra vires any congressional law where the subject matter impacted is a
state's manner of dealing with religion. That such an intent was not claimed or
disclaimed, or even remarked upon by anyone, is perhaps suggestive of no intent
along the lines of specific federalism. The text says one thing but the silence of the
Representatives implies another.
An even more remarkable unknown with Livermore's text came with his use
of the word "touching." This word choice substantially broadened the scope of the
disempowerment from negating national lawmaking that established religion to
one of negating national lawmaking that merely touched on religion. All sorts of
national legislation could incidentally "touch" religion, such as whether the
creation of federal bankruptcy courts meant that financially distressed churches
could be discharged of their debts.2 44 This broad scope surely would have caused
someone in the House to think about congressional legislation's consequential
effects on religion, not just about ultra vires actions clearly outside of Congress'
enumerated powers. It would have caused attentive Representatives to ask
themselves whether there were unintended consequences brought on by the sheer
breadth of Livermore's amendment. We learned the result five days later.
Finally, in the day's debate Livermore's amendment dropped the word
"equal" before "rights." Madison doubtlessly would have preferred to retain
"equal" so that it was clearer that the consciences of the nonreligious were
protected.
Remarkably, neither of the latter two changes in the text drew any discussion
on this day. The effect of both of these changes likely took a little time to be
digested. For the present, there was general relief all around that the Huntington
problem was solved. Matters concluded on that positive note:
[T]he question was then taken on Mr. Livermore's motion, and passed in
the affirmative, thirty-one for, and twenty against it. 24 5

The Huntington objection ran to the self-operation of the proposed amendment
when before a federal court. See supra note 228. That is different, of course, from being
concerned about legislation by Congress pursuant to the proposed amendment.
244 Congress is delegated the power to pass uniform laws on the subject of
bankru tcy. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
24 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 759 (Aug. 15, 1789).
243
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At the end of the day the proposed Article of Amendment now read: "Article I,
Section 9, between paragraphs 2 and 3 insert 'The Congress shall make no laws
touching religion, or infringing the rights of conscience."'
August 16, 1789

The House did not convene because it was a Sunday.
August 17, 1789

The House, still sitting as a Committee of the Whole, took up the proposed
amendments respecting conscientious objectors to war and prohibiting states from
infringing on the rights of conscience.24 6 The debate with respect to the amendment
directed against the states is reproduced below. It yields an important insight
concerning what the Representatives meant by the word "conscience." In complete
control of proceedings in the House, Madison and other Federalists were willing to
restrain states from infringing the equal rights of conscience but knew they had no
chance of restraining states from establishing religion. To attempt the latter would
have been futile, of course, because New England states still had powerful
establishments and were not about to have the national Constitution order them
abolished. Indeed, many of the New England Representatives were High
Federalists. Their votes were essential to Madison's efforts at shepherding
amendments through the House, and they were already reluctant to support a bill of
rights because they thought the effort a waste of time.
The Committee of the Whole then proceeded to the fifth proposition:
Article 1. section 10. [B]etween the first and second paragraph, insert
"no State shall infringe the equal rights of conscience, nor the freedom
of speech or of the press, nor of the right of trial by jury in criminal
cases."
1
is offered, I presume, as an amendment to the
Mr. Tucker.1247 -This
constitution of the United States, but it goes only to the alteration of the
constitutions of particular States. It would be much better, I apprehend,
to leave the State Governments to themselves, and not to interfere with
them more than we already do; and that is thought by many to be rather
too much. I therefore move, sir, to strike out these words.

Id. at 778-80 (Aug. 17, 1789).
Thomas Tudor Tucker was an Antifederalist from South Carolina. GOLDWIN,
supra note 157, at 130; LANKEVICH, supra note 166, at 113. Tucker's remark on this
246

247

amendment binding the states was the only recorded objection in the House. The provision
was eventually dropped in the Senate, likely for the reason stated here by Tucker. See also

infra note 287 and accompanying text.
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Mr. Madison conceived this to be the most valuable amendment in
the whole list. If there was any reason to restrain the Government of the
United States from infringing upon these essential rights, it was equally
necessary that they should be secured against the State Governments. He
thought that if they provided against the one, it was as necessary to
provide against the other, and was satisfied that it would be equally
grateful to the people.
Mr. Livermore had no great objection to the sentiment, but he thought
it not well expressed. He wished to make it an affirmative proposition;
"the equal rights of conscience, the freedom of speech or of the press,
and the right of trial by jury in criminal cases, shall not be infringed by
any State."
This transposition being agreed to, and Mr. Tucker's motion being
rejected, the clause was adopted.248
The House majority clearly thought they had the votes to pass an amendment
restraining states from infringing the rights of conscience 24 9 but members knew it
was foolhardy to attempt a restraint on state establishments. That meant that
Madison and the Federalists in the House regarded the liberty of conscience and
disestablishment as two different matters, and in this debate they did not regard a
state establishment as a violation of conscience.250 This is hardly surprising. In
England today there is liberty of conscience, but at the same time the Church of
England is established. 25 1 Likewise, Madison and others were aware that in
Virginia liberty of conscience was achieved in 1776, but it was not until 1786 that
the Anglican Church was disestablished.252 Accordingly, in the context of this
debate, "coercion" of conscience must truly confront an individual with a cruel
choice between obedience to the civil law or obedience to one's conscientious
beliefs. Without such coercion, there is no violation of conscience.
248

1 ANNALS OF CONG. 783-84 (Aug. 17, 1789) (emphasis added).

As an Antifederalist, Tucker was not so sure. He said that even a restraint on the
states with respect to conscience would alter some state constitutions. He might well have
been correct. For example, some states where there were no longer establishments still had
constitutional provisions with religious tests for public office and other coercive laws
directed at individuals of minority faiths or no religion. Accordingly, it should come as no
surprise that the amendment restraining the states was eventually dropped in the Senate,
and that the House made no attempt to restore it.
250 Historian Thomas Curry gets this wrong when he just assumes, without basis, that
an establishment of religion is necessarily coercive of "conscience" as that term is used in
this proposed amendment. See CURRY, supra note 7, at 204-06. Where there were state
establishments, certainly Baptists and other dissenters used the rhetoric of coercion-ofconscience to argue for disestablishment. But one can have an absence of coercion and a
mild establishment. This is what the Congregationalists thought they had in New England.
251 ENGLISH PUBLIC LAW 482-86 (David Feldman ed., 2004) (freedom of
conscience); ST. JOHN A. ROBILLIARD, RELIGION AND THE LAW: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN
MODERN ENGLISH LAW 84-103 (1984) (status of the Church of England).
249

252

Esbeck, Virginia Disestablishment,supranote 5, at 65-69, 85-89.
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At the end of the day the proposed Fifth Article read: "Article I, Section 10,
between paragraphs 1 and 2 insert 'Fifthly. The equal rights of conscience, the
freedom of speech or of the press, and the right of trial by jury in criminal cases,
shall not be infringed by any State."' 253 Madison had achieved a material
advance. By virtue of the requirement of equality, he could argue that the
bonscience of the nonreligious was protected same as the conscience of those who
held to a religion.
That the amendment passed the House of Representatives was an act of high
solicitude for religious freedom in those days. More telling, Madison did not even
try for a no-establishment amendment binding on the states. The latter would have
created a firestorm in New England where mandatory religious assessments at the
parish level were still popular.
August 18, 1789
The House, still sitting as a Committee of the Whole, passed the amendments
proposed by the Select Committee of Eleven, as now amended, and reported them
to the entire House.254 Thomas Tudor Tucker, also proposed sixteen new
255
amendments to the Constitution. They were largely structural changes with the
exception of the desire to insert the word "other" between the words "no" and
"religious" in the Religious Test Clause, Article VI, Clause 3, of the 1787
Constitution. 256 The Test Clause would then have read, "The Senators and
Representatives

before mentioned, and the Members

of the several State

Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and
of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this
Constitution; but no other religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States." 257
Tucker's aim was to characterize the oath to support the Constitution as religious
in nature. By deduction, that would mean that the nonreligious could not take such
an oath because they subscribed to no religion, effectively barring atheists from
national public office. All of Tucker's proposals, including this amendment to the
Religious Test Clause, were defeated.258 Once again, the House rejection of
Tucker's amendment indicated great tolerance for its day.
August 19, 1789
The full House began consideration of the amendments as reported by the
Committee of the Whole. A two-third majority was now required. The House

1 ANNALS OF CONG. 783-84 (Aug. 18, 1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
254 H. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 81-82 (Aug. 18, 1789).
255 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 790-92 (Aug. 18, 1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
253

256 Id. at 792 (Aug.
257 U.S. CONST. art.
258

18, 1789).
VI, cl. 3 (emphasis added).

1 ANNALS OF CONG. 792 (Aug. 18, 1789).
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decided to place the amendments in a "supplement" (or "bill") at the end of the
Constitution.259 From June 8th forward, Madison had proposed to interlineate the
amendments into the existing text of the 1787 Constitution. Those who opposed
him sought to keep the 1787 Constitution intact because they were High
Federalists who revered the Constitution as a monument to republican government
and thought the amendments were unnecessary. These Federalists, led by Roger
Sherman of Connecticut, sought to emphasize the amendments lesser importance
by placing them at the end. 2 60 History shows that the separate listing has had just
the opposite effect by giving the Bill of Rights its own revered place as a standalone founding document.
August 20, 1789

Debate continued on other proposed amendments, along with the phrases on
religious freedom again being amended. The House also debated the conscientious
objector language of the Sixth Article that concerned bearing arms. The debate
with respect to the no-establishment provision was as follows:
The House resumed the consideration of the report of the Committee
of the whole on the subject of amendment to the constitution.
Mr. Ames'[ 26 1] proposition was taken up. Five or six other members
introduced propositions on the same point, and the whole were, by
mutual consent, laid on the table. After which, the House proceeded to
the third amendment,12 621 and agreed to the same.

259

Id. at 796 (Aug. 19, 1789); see also

BRANT,

supra note 135, at 275 (Madison

finally yields to Sherman's persistence).
260 GOLDWIN, supra note 157, at 141-42, 145.
261 Fisher Ames was a Federalist from Massachusetts.
See WINFRED E.A. BERNHARD,
FISHER AMES: FEDERALIST AND STATESMAN, 1758-1808, at 3 (1965); see also LANKEVICH,
supra note 166, at 50-51; 2 VERNON LEWIS PARRINGTON, The Romantic Revolution in
America, in MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 1800-1860, at 280 (1930).
262 The "third amendment" referenced here could be either the amendments the
Committee of the Whole made to the report of the Select Committee of Eleven, see
H. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 82 (Aug. 18, 1789), or it may be a reference to Madison's
original Third Amendment, as proposed to the House on June 8, 1789, that read: "Thirdly.
That in article 1st, section 6, clause 1, there be added to the end of the first sentence, these
words, to wit: 'But no law varying the compensation last ascertained shall operate before
the next ensuing election of Representatives."' See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (June 8,
1789). Either way, the record in the House Journal on the next day, August 21st, lists the
Third Amendment as having the phrases on religious freedom, reflecting a change in the
numbering of the Articles of Amendment. See H. JOURNAL, 1st Cong.; 1st Sess. 85 (Aug.
21, 1789) ("3. Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof, nor shall the rights of conscience be infringed.").
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On motion of Mr. Ames, the fourth amendment[ 26 3 ] was altered so as
to read "Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or to
prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of
conscience." This being adopted,
The first proposition was agreed to.264
Some accounts have Madison, working behind the scenes, enlisting Fisher
Ames of Massachusetts to put forth this version on church-government relations
and religious liberty. 265 The first thing to note is that this text restores the scope of
the disempowerment of Congress' authority to "establishing" religion and thereby
abandons Livermore's impossibly broad "laws touching" religion. 26 6 No one can
say for certain, but likely the House had come to realize over the last five days that
the scope of the amendment's restraint needed to be narrowed lest countless and
unavoidable effects of general legislation unintentionally impacting religion were
to be within the negation of congressional power. The second matter of note is that
the term "free exercise" was introduced for the first time into the text of the
amendment, and it was stated separate from "conscience." The relationship
between "free exercise" and "conscience" is not explained.26 7 Five days before
Madison had lost the adjective "equal" modifying conscience, which diminished
the likelihood that the amendment would be interpreted as protecting the
The "fourth amendment" referenced here could be either the amendments the
Committee of the Whole made to the report of the Select Committee of Eleven, see
H. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 82 (Aug. 18, 1789), or to Madison's original Fourth
263

Amendment, as proposed to the House on June 8, 1789, that read, in relevant part:
"Fourthly. That in article 1st, section 9, between clauses 3 and 4, be inserted these clauses,

to wit: 'The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship,
nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of
conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed."' See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451

(June 8, 1789).
264 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 795-96 (Aug. 20, 1789). The "first proposition" referenced
here is Fisher Ames' motion to alter Madison's original Fourth Amendment introduced on

June 8, 1789.
BRANT, supra note 135, at 271. Others cast doubt on whether Ames would have
cooperated with Madison as Brant suggests. See Marc M. Arkin, Regionalism and the
Religion Clauses: The Contribution of Fisher Ames, 47 BUFF. L. REv. 763, 766-71, 789265

91(1999).

1 ANNALS OF CONG.

759 (Aug. 15, 1789).
The founding generation reserved conscience to mean "the right to be left alone"
in embracing (or rejecting) religious beliefs, whereas free exercise meant a "right to act
publicly" on those beliefs so long as the observance did not directly harm others. JOHN
WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
EXPERIMENT 45 (3d ed. 2011). Accordingly, the free exercise of religion was at once
broader and narrower than conscience. It was broader because it was fully expected that the
exercise of one's faith might bear on public matters and it was more narrow in that a
prerequisite was that one first had to subscribe to a religion before its exercise could be
266
267

protected.
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nonreligious. The addition of "free exercise" opened the possibility of arguing that
the conscience phrase was broader and thus protected the nonreligious.
The term "free exercise" appeared in 1776 as part of Section 16 of Virginia's
Declaration of Rights and would have come to the attention of the House by way
of the proposed amendments from Virginia and North Carolina. 26 8 Madison used
the term in Virginia back in 1776. As a freshman legislator, Madison had
successfully substituted the right of "free exercise" of religion in place of George
Mason's use of "toleration" in the draft Virginia Declaration.
August 21, 1789

Debate continued on the proposed amendments. The free exercise language
appearing in the House Journalwas slightly altered in style from that of the prior
day. 26 9 The Annals of Congressmake no mention of any additional debate over any
of the religious freedom provisions. The House Journalreads:
The House proceeded to consider the original report of the [Select]
committee of eleven, consisting of seventeen articles, as now amended;
whereupon the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth,
ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, and
sixteenth articles being again read and debated, were, upon the question
severally put thereupon, agreed to by the House, as follows, two-thirds of
the members present concurring, to wit:
3. Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, nor shall the rights of
conscience be infringed.
5. A well regulated militia, composed of the body of the People, being
the best security of a free State, the right of the People to keep and bear
arms shall not be infringed; but no one religiously scrupulous of
bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service in
person.
11. No State shall infringe the right of trial by jury in criminal cases;
nor the rights of conscience; nor the freedom of speech or of the
press.270
268

Esbeck, Virginia Disestablishment,supra note 5, at 66-69. Madison did not coin

the phrase "free. exercise" of religion. Rather, the phrase made its first appearance in
America in the Maryland Act Concerning Religion adopted in 1649. COMPLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 72, at 17.
269 H. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (Aug. 21, 1789); see also Laycock, supra note
224, at 875, 879 n.27.
270 H. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (Aug. 21,
1789).
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August 22, 1789

The House concluded its deliberations on the other amendments and referred
the task of arranging the amendments to a Style Committee for presentation to the
Senate. 27 1 Thomas Tudor Tucker again proposed an amendment inserting the word
"other" into the Religious Test Clause, and the motion was again defeated.272
August 24, 1789

The Style Committee issued its report to the House. There was only one
minor change of interest. The amendment barring states from infringing the rights
of conscience was moved from the eleventh to the fourteenth position.
Accordingly, at the end of the day, religious freedom was addressed in Houseproposed amendments three, five, and fourteen.
The House ordered the clerk to deliver an engrossed copy of the Resolve of
the House to the Senate for its consideration.273 In all, the House proposed a total
of seventeen Articles of Amendment.

Before turning to the record in the Senate where we have only the resolutions,
motions, and amendments from the Senate Journal,but not the senatorial debates
because the Senate met in secret, an interim summary is useful concerning what
was debated by Representatives in the House. Once again, because of their
overwhelming numbers, the Federalists controlled the real give-and-take. The
House did not debate over a choice reflecting the Representatives struggling
between nonpreferential support for religion, on the one hand, and prohibiting the
establishment of religion, whether single or multiple, on the other hand.275 Only
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 808 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). The Style Committee
was composed of Egbert Benson, Roger Sherman, and Theodore Sedgwick. All were
Federalists. See LANKEVICH, supra note 166, at 27, 58, 74.
272 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 807; see supra notes 255-258 and accompanying text.
273 H. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (Aug. 24, 1789); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 808-09
271

(Aug. 24, 1789). Professors Witte and Nichols state that the religious provisions of the

amendments were revised in the Style Committee. See WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 267,
at 87-88, 107 (citing 3 LINDA DEPAUW ET AL. EDS., DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 159, 166 (1972)). However, the
language cited as having been changed in the Style Committee matches the language in the
House Journalfor August 21st, the day before the House sent the amendments to the Style
Committee. See H. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 85. The Style Committee apparently
altered only the order of the amendments on religious freedom. Compare id. at 85 (Aug.
21, 1789), with S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 103-06 (Aug. 24, 1789).
274 S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 103-06 (Aug. 24, 1789).
275 Professor Douglas Laycock explores the claims of nonpreferentialist scholars
during the drafting stages in the House up to this point, and he convincingly refutes them.
See Laycock, supra note 224, at 885-94; see also CURRY, supra note 7, at 207-15
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once had Federalists expressed concern that state establishments might need
protection. On August 15th, Huntington expressed concern about religious
assessments in Connecticut. At the end of that long debate, however, Huntington
was satisfied that the revised text ("Congress shall make no laws . . .") was clear
that the amendment did not bind the states. That undermines the theory of specific
federalism which claims that additional federalist wording was later thought to be
needed and, hence, the theory's explanation for the late addition of "respecting" in
the Conference Committee.
By way of contrast, the scope of the restraint of Congress' disempowerment
with respect to "establishment" did receive considerable attention in the House.
Most importantly, on August 20th the House trimmed back Samuel Livermore's
version of "laws touching religion" to the one Fisher Ames introduced, namely "no
law establishing religion." Also, on August 15th, the Federalists ignored the
Antifederalist Elbridge Gerry's attempt to narrow the scope of the restraint on
congressional power to merely "no religious doctrine."
The pattern of two independent phrases on religion-one addressing noestablishment and the other conscience-during the House debate through August
24th, was replicated in the Senate. We turn there now.
B. Before the UnitedStates Senate
This is an apt point to remember that senators were elected by the legislature
of each state, and thus they were more likely than the House representatives to be
sympathetic to federalist concerns if there were any. This works to make the theory
of specific federalism, which did not emerge during Senate debate, even less
probable.
August 24, 1789
The engrossed Resolve of the House was read into the Senate Journal.276 This
includes the Third, Fifth, and Fourteenth Articles of Amendment, as adopted in the
House on August 21st and again on August 24th. After the Resolve of the House
was read, the Senate rejected a motion to put off the subject of amendments to the
next congressional session. 2 7 7

(dispelling nonpreferentialism, but by a different path than that taken by Professor
Laycock, namely highlighting historical inconsistencies and contrasting them with the
beliefs of the founders).
276 S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 103-06 (Aug.
24, 1789).
277 Id. at 106 (Aug. 24,
1789).
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September 3, 1789
The Senate extensively debated the provisions on religious freedom in the
Third Article as adopted by the House. The record of the Senate Journalappears as
follows:
The Senate resumed the consideration of the Resolve of the House
of Representatives on the Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States.
On motion, To amend Article third, and to strike out these words,
and insert, "One
"Religion or prohibiting the free Exercise thereof,"
2781
others,"[
to
preference
in
Society
Religious Sect or
It passed in the Negative.
On motion, For reconsideration,
It passed in the Affirmative.2 79
The Third Article now read: "Congress shall make no law establishing one
Religious Sect or Society in preference to others, nor shall the rights of
conscience be infringed." The nonpreferential terminology likely came from the
amendments proposed by Virginia, New York, and North Carolina. Clearly, this
version of the amendment adopted the no-preference position. Assuming that this
text also implied that Congress has among its enumerated powers in the 1787
Constitution the authority to legislate about religious establishments,2 80 then the
only power denied by the scope of this Senate version is where Congress prefers
one religion over others. The proceeding continued:
On motion, That Article the third be stricken out,
It passed in the Negative.
On motion, To adopt the following, in lieu of the third Article,
"Congress shall not make any law, infringing the rights of
conscience, or establishing any Religious Sect or Society,"
211
It passed in the Negative.

This proposal has an establishment clause similar to the amendment proposed by
New York. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
279 S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 116 (Sept. 3, 1789) (emphasis added).
280 Such an assumption is unlikely to be correct. The assumption would have meant
rejecting the argument by James Wilson that all powers not delegated were denied. See
supra. notes 87-88 and accompanying text. While Antifederalists questioned Wilson's
argument the Federalists did not, and it was the Federalists who were in complete control
of the rocess in the Senate.
21 s. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 116 (emphasis added).
278
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This rejected version of the amendment would have dropped explicit use of
the no-preference language. Nonetheless, had this version passed it could be said to
still align with nonpreferentialism theory because Congress is denied only the
power to establish a "Religious Sect or Society," leaving the no-preference option.
Once again, however, this rejected version could also be read to imply Congress
had the power to create multiple establishments-countermanding a no-preference
reading. Of course, the nonpreferentialist's rejoinder would be that the proposal
was voted down for just that reason. The proceedings continued:
On motion, To amend the third Article, to read thus"Congress shall make no law establishing any particular
denomination of religion in preference to another, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof, nor shall the rights of conscience be
infringed"It passed in the Negative.2 82
This rejected version of the amendment makes explicit use of the no-preference
text. We cannot know for sure, but it likely was rejected for reasons of style. The
proceedings continued:
On the question upon the third Article as it came from the House of
RepresentativesIt passed in the Negative.
On motion, To adopt the third Article proposed in the Resolve of the
House of Representatives, amended by striking out these words"Nor shall the rights of conscience be infringed"It passed in the Affirmative.283
This was a sudden turnabout in two respects. First, a no-preference amendment
was rejected in favor of the House's no-establishment language. The Third Article
now read: "Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof." This textual formulation is not to change, thus making
an uphill battle for the proponents of nonpreferentialism.
Second, the new text drops "rights of conscience." This narrowed the
protection of individual religious rights. No doubt a law can violate conscience
whether the individual subjected to coercion subscribes to a religion or not. But,
the "free exercise" of religion can only be violated if one first has a religion to
exercise. Madison's desire to protect the nonreligious began to slip away just as
Silverster and Huntington had advocated during the House debate on August 15th.

282 Id. at

117 (Sept. 3, 1789) (emphasis added).
added).

283 Id. (emphasis
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September 4, 1789
The Senate adopted an amended version of the Fifth Article on bearing arms
that eliminated its religious scruples clause..8 While unexplained, this change
likely reflects a compromise whereby it was agreed that the matter of a military
draft and religious pacifism are best handled in Congress with the flexibility of

legislation. 28 5
September 7, 1789
The Senate refused to adopt the proposed Fourteenth Article which would
bind the states with respect to the rights of conscience (as well as trial by jury,
speech, and press).286 The sparse entry in the Senate Journalappears below:
The Senate resumed the consideration of the Resolve of the House
of Representatives of the 24th of August, on "Articles to be proposed to
the Legislatures of the several States as Amendments to the Constitution
of the United States."
On motion, To adopt the fourteenth Article of the Amendments
proposed by the House of Representatives*
It passed in the Negative.287
The probable rationale is that the Senate did not want the Fourteenth Article
to disturb the varied state arrangements with respect to even the matter of liberty of
conscience, a question on which there was some agreement anmong Americans at
that time. In a larger sense, however, the First Congress (reflecting the concern that
animated many Americans) envisioned a bill of rights as restraining only the
national government. The national government alone presented a new threat and
thus the national government alone was in need of restraining by a new bill of
rights. This thinking underlies what I earlier called general federalism.
The theory of specific federalism might be said to be mildly bolstered by the
rejection of Madison's "rights of conscience" binding on the states. The rejection
could be said to be evidence that the First Congress thought the matter of religious
liberty in the states as exclusively one for each state to resolve. The counter to that
argument is that Madison's rejected amendment had to do with conscience-the
relationship between government, religion, and the individual. Specific federalism,
284

S. JOURNAL, Ist Cong.,

285

WITrE, supra note 185, at 203-04.

1st Sess. 119 (Sept. 4, 1789).

The Senate also rejected an amendment characterizing the oath to support the
Constitution as religious in character by inserting the word "other" into the Religious Test
Clause of the Constitution. The House had twice rejected the same proposal. See supra
notes 255-258 and accompanying text.
287 S. JOURNAL, Ist Cong., 1st Sess. 121 (Sept. 7,
1789).
286
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by way of contrast, focuses on the uniqueness of the Establishment Clause. That
clause has to do with the relationship between government and organized
religion.288 Accordingly, the better view is that the rejection of Madison's
amendment binding on states does not support the theory of specific federalism.
September 9, 1789
For reasons not stated, the Senate reconsidered its work of September 3rd and
passed yet a new version of the Third Article. For reasons of style, it also
combined the Third with the Fourth Article (addressing the rights of speech, press,
assembly, and petition). The record of the Senate Journalappears as follows:
Proceeded in the consideration of the Resolve of the House of
Representatives of the 24th of August, "On Articles to be proposed to the
Legislatures of the several States as Amendments to the Constitution of
the United States"-And,
On motion, To amend Article the third, to read as follows:
"Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a
mode of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or
abridging the freedom of speech, or the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and petition to the Government for the redress of
grievances"It passed in the Affirmative.289
This change operated to greatly narrow the scope of the congressional
disempowerment over establishmentarian issues. Two familiar elements of Great
Britain's Church of England were that the government controlled the church's
creed and its liturgy. The scope of the foregoing amendment denying congressional
power with respect to "articles of faith" and "mode of worship" focused only on
creeds and liturgy, leaving the implication that Congress arguably retained power
over the many other aspects of a full establishment. This was the narrowest scope
of the congressional disempowerment considered in either the Senate or the House,
with the exception of that offered by the Antifederalist Elbridge Gerry (and
ignored by the House Federalists) on August 15th. 29 0
The Senate then passed all of its amendments to the Resolve of the House on
Articles of Amendment, which the Senate had reduced from seventeen to twelve in
number. It then sent them to the House.

See supra text accompanying notes 184, 201.
S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 129 (Sept. 9, 1789) (emphasis added).
290 See supra text accompanying notes 210-212.
288

289
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C. Back to the House ofRepresentatives
September 10, 1789
The House received the message that the Senate had passed amendments to its
Resolve of the House on Articles of Amendment.29 1
September 19, 1789
The House considered the Senate's amendments to the Resolve of the House
on Articles of Amendment. The House debate at this stage is not recorded.292
September 21, 1789
The House resumed consideration of the amendments proposed by the Senate
to the Resolve of the House and requested a Committee of Conference with the
Senate concerning points of disagreement. 293 The House Journal recorded which
amendments proposed by the Senate that the House disagreed with, including those
to the Third 'Article, as follows:
The House resumed the consideration of the amendments proposed
by the Senate to the several articles of amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, as agreed to by this House, and sent to the Senate for
concurrence: Whereupon,
Resolved, That this House doth agree to,, . . [various] amendments

proposed by the Senate to the said articles; two-thirds of the members
present concurring on each vote.
Resolved, That a conference be desired with the Senate on the
subject matter of the amendments disagreed to, and that Mr. Madison,
Mr. Sherman, and Mr. Vining, be appointed managers at the same on the
294
part of this House. ]

Ordered, That the Clerk of this House do acquaint the Senate
therewith, and desire their concurrence.295

1 ANNALS OF CONG. 923 (Sept. 10, 1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
Id. at 938 (Sept. 19, 1789); H. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 115 (Sept. 19, 1789).
293 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 939 (Sept. 21, 1789); H. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 11516 (Sept. 21, 1789).
294 The three House members of the Conference Committee had earlier been on the
House Select Committee of Eleven. See supra note 196. Madison, Sherman, and Vining
were all Federalists. Concerning Vining, see supra notes 196 and 209.
295 H. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 115-16 (Sept.
21, 1789).
291
292
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D.. Back to the United States Senate
September 21, 1789
The message from the House informing the Senate of some disagreement to
the proposed amendments of the Senate of September 9th to the House Resolve of
August 24th, as well as requesting a conference, was received. The Senate
"receded" on its third amendment, but insisted on all others. 2 96 It thus agreed to the
House-Senate conference.
A message from the House of RepresentativesMr. Beckley, their Clerk, brought up a Resolve of the House of this
date, to agree to [various Senate] . . . Amendments ... and to disagree to
[various Senate] . . . amendments: Two thirds of the members present

concurring on each vote: And "That a conference be desired with the
Senate on the subject matter of the amendments disagreed to," and that
Mr. Madison, Mr. Sherman, and Mr. Vining, be appointed managers of
the same, on the part of the House of RepresentativesThe Senate proceeded to consider the Message of the House of
Representatives disagreeing to the Amendments made by the Senate "To
Articles to be proposed to the Legislatures of the several States, as
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States" -And,
Resolved, That the Senate do recede from their third Amendment,
and do insist on all the others.
Resolved, That the Senate do concur with the House of
Representatives in a conference on the subject matter of disagreement on
the said Articles of Amendment, and that Mr. Ellsworth, Mr. Carroll, and
Mr. Paterson be managers of the conference on the part of the Senate.297
E. The Committee of Conference
Going into the Committee of Conference the Senate's version of the Third
Article read, "Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a
mode of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridging the
This reference to a "third amendment" was the Senate's third of twenty-six
amendments dated September 9th to the House Resolve of August 24th, and did not pertain
to the Third Article of Amendment about religious freedom and free expression.
297 S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 141-42 (Sept. 21, 1789). Oliver
Ellsworth was an
Antifederalist from Connecticut. Charles Carroll was a Federalist from Maryland and the
only Roman Catholic in the Senate. William Paterson was a Federalist from New Jersey
and an evangelical Presbyterian. See LANKEVICH, supra note 166, at 32-33, 78-79;
296

RICHARD STREB, ROOTS OF THE REPUBLIC: THE FIRST SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
1789-1795, at 47-48, 66-67 (1996); WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 267, at 89.
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freedom of speech, or the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and petition the Government for the redress of grievances." 298 Whereas the House
version of the Third Article read, "Congress shall make no law establishing
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, nor shall the rights of
conscience be infringed."299
The Conference Committee was comprised of five Federalists and one
Antifederalist, so the Federalists remained firmly in control. Of the six, only
Madison was from a state whose ratifying convention had recommended the
adoption of amendments. The Conference did not face a choice between a
nonpreferentialist Senate version and a no-establishment House version. So
nonpreferentialism was not in play. Nor was specific federalism a feature of either
of the two choices going into Conference. Rather, the difference between the
Senate and House versions was over the scope of the disempowerment of Congress
with respect to the establishment of religion. That is, the Conference Committee
faced a choice between a narrow Senate disempowerment ("no law establishing
articles of faith or a mode of worship") and a broader House disempowerment ("no
law establishing religion"), albeit a House version not as broad in scope as the
earlier Samuel Livermore proposal in the House.
September 22-24, 1789

No record of the negotiations among members of the Committee of
Conference exists. The absence of Madison, Sherman, and Vining from the House
roll as reflected in the records of the House Journal and Annals suggests that the
Committee of Conference met over two days, September 22nd and 23rd. The
House members of the Conference Committee agreed to all of the Senate's
proposed amendments to the Resolve of the House of August 24th, except for
those to the Third and Eighth Articles. The Conference altered these two
Articles, 300 and then the joint agreement was reported back to the House and
Senate.
Senator Oliver Ellsworth's handwritten notes are the most contemporaneous
record emerging from the Committee of Conference. They reflect his report to the

298

S. JOURNAL,

1st Cong., 1st Sess. 129 (Sept. 9, 1789) (emphasis added).

299H. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (Aug. 21, 1789) (emphasis added).
300 Irving Brant, one of James Madison's biographers, claims Vining and

Sherman
had displayed little interest in the amendment with respect to religious freedom. Brant then
speculates that the Conference Committee language was likely that of Madison. BRANT,
supra note 135, at 271. Some evidence supports this claim. As previously noted, John
Vining, a Federalist, see supra notes 196, 209, thought the House was wasting valuable
time drafting a bill of rights. See supra note 196. Roger Sherman, also a strong Federalist,
sought to downplay the importance of the amendments by listing them separately at the
back of the Constitution. See supra notes 212, 259-261 and accompanying text.
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Senate on the results of the negotiations but not its rationale. 301 His entry on the
Third Article is reproduced below:
[T]hat it will be proper for the House of Representatives to agree
to the said Amendments proposed by the Senate, with an Amendment
to their fifth Amendment, so that the third Article shall read as follows:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
Religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of Speech, or of the Press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances....,302
With respect to the no-establishment principle, the Conference Committee's
text ("no law respecting an establishment of religion") favored the House version
over that of the Senate. So, something close to the broader-in-scope House version
of disempowerment had prevailed. 30 3 There also may have been a trade-off in
Conference. The Conference Committee favored the Senate version when it came
to adopting the stand-alone "free exercise" text rather than the broader House
protection for both "free exercise" and "rights of conscience." The alteration was
not one of mere style, as if "conscience" was thought redundant and could be
subsumed under "free exercise." Neither the House nor Senate had been using
these terms as if they were interchangeable. So perhaps a broader no-establishment
restraint on Congress was traded for a narrower free exercise right in people if they
subscribed to a religion. Madison's hope to safeguard the conscience of the
nonreligious was lost. We know the result, but we cannot know if it was a
conscious trade-off.
Both sides, including Madison, expressed disappointment with the overall
process and substance of amendments. 304 The final scope of the no-establishment
disempowerment was broader than Madison's initial proposal on June 8th. On the
other hand, Madison's amendment binding on the states was defeated in the
Senate, and his June 8th text with respect to conscience and the national
government had been narrowed such that it did not protect the nonreligious.
As a starting point, a normative meaning of "an establishment" suggests a
single national religion established by law. Nevertheless, from the congressional
debate we know that combined church establishments were also contemplated as
prohibited by the amendment, not just the establishment of a single national
religion. Madison hypothesized such a combination during the debate of August

301 COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 72, at 8; see also S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong.,

Ist Sess. 145 (Sept. 24, 1789).
302

COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note

72, at 8 (emphasis added, underline and

strikethrough in original).
303

See BRANT, supra note 135, at 271 (Brant claims a "House victory" with respect to

no-establishment.).
304 MAIER, supra note

187, at 454-55.

HeinOnline -- 2011 Utah L. Rev. 563 2011

UTAH LAW REVIEW

564

[No. 2

15th.30 s If the drafters had intended to prohibit the establishment of only a single
religion, it is likely they would have said so explicitly. 3 06 So the amendment
permits reading the restraint on Congress' power as being broader than just a bar
on the establishment of a single national religion.30 7
For the sake of argument, assume the narrowest reading of the Establishment
Clause, namely that it only prohibits the establishment of a single national religion.
If that is all that the clause does by way of disempowering Congress, then the First
Federal Congress certainly selected a circuitous way of saying so. If this narrowest
of interpretations is correct, then why not simply say there is no congressional
power to "establish a single religion." Instead, the text disempowers Congress
from "mak[ing] . . . law respecting an establishment of religion." Certainly the

greatest fear would be the establishment of a single religion, but that was not the
only fear. So the final text leaves open additional possibilities that are also outside
of Congress' power. For example, the text is easily understood as prohibiting
Congress from establishing two or three large Protestant denominations, or all
Protestant churches. It comes down to what is meant by "an establishment," and
once again originalism gives no clear answer to that question.
F. FinalAction in the House ofRepresentatives
September 24, 1789
The House considered the Report of the Committee of Conference. As the
Report recommended, the House agreed to recede from its disagreements with the
Senate's amendments on all but the Third and Eighth Article.30 s
The House proceeded to consider the report of a Committee of
Conference, on the subject matter of the amendments depending between
the two Houses to the several articles of amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, as proposed by this House: whereupon, it was
resolved, that they recede from their disagreement to all the amendments;
provided that the two articles, which, by the amendments of the Senate,
are now proposed to be inserted as the third and eighth articles, shall be
amended to read as follows:
See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
It is unlikely that the use of the indefinite article "an" before "establishment" was
intended to mean that the restraint on national power is limited to the establishment of a
single national church-thereby allowing the national establishment of two or more
churches. Cf Laycock, supra note 224, at 884-85.
307 A way to think about the operation of the text is: if Congress' establishment of the
Congregational Church would be one violation of the "an establishment" text, then
Congress' establishment of both the Congregational and Presbyterian Churches would be
two violations of the text.
308 The Eighth Article was the proposed amendment securing a right to a jury in a
criminal trial.
305
306
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ART. 3. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
3 091
of religion, or prohibiting [a or the][ free exercise thereof [, or ;]13 101
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances. 1
The Report of the Committee of Conference as recited in the House Journaland in
the Annals was passed by a vote of thirty-seven to fourteen,3 12 thus adopting the
Conference's version of Article Three.
The House then resolved that the president of the United States forward
copies of the twelve Articles of Amendment to the eleven states, along with copies
to Rhode Island and North Carolina.3 13
On motion, it was resolved, that the President of the United States
be requested to transmit to the Executives of the several States which
have ratified the Constitution, copies of the amendments proposed by
Congress, to be added thereto, and like copies to the Executives of the
States of Rhode Island and North Carolina.314
G. FinalAction in the United States Senate
September 24, 1789

The Senate considered the Report of the Committee of Conference and
ordered that the Report "lie for consideration." 3 15 Later that day, the clerk of the
House reported to the Senate that the House had agreed to all of the changes in the
Conference Committee Report.316
309

The Annals read "or prohibiting a free exercise thereof," whereas the House

Journalreads "or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Compare 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 948

(Sept. 24, 1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834), with H. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess, 121 (Sept.
24, 1789). The record in the Senate Journal agrees with the House Journal. See S.
JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 145 (Sept. 24, 1789)..
310 The Annals use a comma, whereas the House Journal uses a semicolon. Once
again the record in the Senate Journalagrees with the House Journal.See S. JOURNAL, Ist

Cong., 1st Sess. 145 (Sept. 24, 1789).
1"1 ANNALS OF CONG. 948 (Sept. 24, 1789).

Id.; H. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 121 (Sept. 24, 1789). The House Journal and
the Annals list a roll call vote on the "alteration of the [E]ighth [A]rticle" but not on the
Third Article.
313 These two states had not yet ratified the 1787 Constitution and thus were not part
of the Union.
314 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 948 (Sept. 24, 1789); H. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 122
(Sept. 24, 1789).
15 S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 145 (Sept. 24, 1789).
"' Id. at 148 (Sept. 24, 1789).
312
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September 25, 1789
The Senate concurred in the Report of the Conference Committee, as agreed
to by the House of Representatives the prior day:
The Senate proceeded to consider the Message from the House of
Representatives of the 24th, with Amendments to the Amendments of the
Senate, to "Articles to be proposed to the Legislatures of the several
States, as Amendments to the Constitution of the United States"-And
RESOLVED, That the Senate do concur in the Amendments proposed
by the House of Representatives, to the Amendments of the Senate.m
Two-thirds of both the House and Senate had now agreed on the text of the Third
Article.
September 29, 1789
A Preamble explaining the impetus behind their passage, followed by a list (or
bill) of the twelve proposed Articles of Amendment, was inserted in the record of
the Senate Journalas follows:
The Conventions of a Number of States having, at the Time of their
adopting the Constitution, expressed a Desire, in order to prevent
misconstruction or abuse of its Powers, that further declaratory and
restrictive Clauses should be added: And as extending the Ground of
public Confidence in the Government, will best insure the beneficent
Ends of its InstitutionARTICLE THE THIRD. Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.m
The congressional Preamble leaves it beyond doubt that the amendments
vested no new powers in the national government. On the contrary, the
amendments were to reassure Americans that the national powers delegated in the
1787 Constitution are not to be misconstrued or abused so as to impute powers to
the national government that it did not have. Understanding this limited purpose is
' Id. at 150-51 (Sept. 25, 1789).
This final record of the proposed Third Article uses a comma instead of a
semicolon to set apart the phrases on religious freedom from those phrases on speech,
press, assembly, and petition. Compare id at 145 (Sept. 24, 1789), with id. at 163 (Sept.
29, 1789) (emphasis added, italics in original).
318
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crucial in rightly interpreting the relationship between the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses to not be in tension. 3 19 By reassuring the American people, the
Federalists hoped to take away much of the support for a second constitutional
convention. In this they succeeded.
H. Refuting the Theory of Specific Federalism

What at first seems strangely new to the text is the introduction of the
participle "respecting." Then, as now, respecting means "considering," "with
regard or relation to, regarding, [or] concerning." 3 20 A first reading is that in
comparison to even the House version, the introduction by the Conference of the
word "respecting" seemingly broadens the disempowerment of Congress from
laws "establishing religion" to "respecting an establishment of religion." It appears
broader because now Congress cannot establish or disestablish religion. Hinging
as it does on the first appearance of the word "respecting" and that its introduction
is said to specifically prevent interference with those state establishments still in
existence, such a reading is the theory of specific federalism. 321
To one focused only on the text as it emerged from Conference Committee,
the introduction of "respecting" appears to fit with specific federalism. However,
recall that a premise underlying the entire debate in both the House and Senate is
that all of the Articles of Amendment vested no new power in the national
government.322 This aligns with the Wilsonian argument, made again during the
House debate by Roger Sherman on August 15th, and the attitude of Federalists
generally, that the 1787 Constitution delegated no national power over the matter
of religion, including over religious establishments in the states. And Huntington's
confusion during the House debate of August 15th led to a rewriting of the text so
that he was satisfied a federal court could not enforce the Establishment Clause
against the parish-level religious assessments which favored the Congregational

319

See supra notes 179-181, 318-319 and infra notes 488-490 and accompanying

text (when introducing the proposed bill of rights, Madison stated that the amendments
would not expand national powers, but would limit and qualify them); see also infra Part
VI.B. (discussing the impossibility of tension between the religion clauses).
320 WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE,
UNABRIDGED 2123 (2d ed. 1952). The word "respecting" also appears in the Property
Clause vesting power over federal property in Congress. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
Once aain, it is used in the sense of "relation to" or "regarding."
32 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 32-34 (1998); John S. Baker, Jr.,
Establishment of Religion, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 302, 303
(Edwin Meese III et al. eds., 2005); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the
Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle,27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085,
1089-92 (1995); Mufioz, supra note 45, at 629-30; William C. Porth & Robert P. George,
Trimming the Ivy: A Bicentennial Re-examination of the Establishment Clause, 90 W. VA.
L. REv. 109, 135-37 (1987).
322 See supra notes 7, 179-181 and infra notes 488-490 and accompanying
text.
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establishments in New England.323 Finally, whatever the suspicions and objectives
of the Antifederalists, the Federalists were in firm control of the Conference
Committee. These combined factors strongly indicate that in the Conference
Committee the manner by which the states (in New England and elsewhere) dealt
with establishmentarian matters was not in play. By way of contrast, specific
federalism requires there to have been an active concern in the First Congress that
the no-establishment text could be construed to imply substantive power in the
national government to interfere with state establishments-substantive power that
was squelched by the introduction into the text of the participle "respecting." As
matters went to Conference, there is no record of any such concern.
1. Grammar
Before jumping to the conclusion that a last-minute alteration in the noestablishment text by the Conference Committee was substantive (indeed,
federalist), there is a stylistic explanation that more simply accounts for the
modification in Conference. A straightforward explanation is that the Conference
made a grammatical improvement to sharpen the focus of the no-establishment text
that first started with the House version. Going into Conference, the House version
read: "Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof, nor shall the rights of conscience be infringed."324 If first we
make the Conference's textual change dropping "rights of conscience," the House
version would then read: "Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or
prohibitingthe free exercise thereof" The desired focus of the Third Article was to
emphasize both aspects of religious freedom: no-establishment and free exercise.
However, there are two participles ("establishing" and "prohibiting") that brought
the focus down on the two objects of the participial phrases, namely "religion" and
"free exercise." The drafters did not want the focus on "religion" but on
"establishment." That meant taking the participle "establishing" and changing it to
"establishment," thereby making it the object in a participle phrase. The
Conference Committee would have needed a new participle ("respecting" was
selected), leading to a new participial phrase ("respecting an establishment") that
places the desired focus on the new object ("establishment"). This stylistic change
was desirable because the Third Article now begins with two parallel participial
phrases ("respecting an establishment" and "prohibiting the free exercise") that
place the desired focus on "establishment" and "free exercise," respectively.
Finally, the now parallel participial phrases are modified by the same prepositional
See supra notes 207-208, 218-222, 225-245 and accompanying text. When the
founding generation was truly concerned about federalism and religious freedom it knew
how to plainly say so. Consider two of the amendments during the state ratification
conventions. See supra, notes 91 (Pennsylvania) and 98 (Massachusetts). And when
federalism was truly threatened, such as Madison's amendment to protect conscience from
state violations, Congress knew how to bury the threat. See supra notes 247-248 (Tucker's
opposition based in federalism) and 287 (Senate voting down the amendment).
324 H. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (Aug.
21, 1789).
323
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phrase ("of religion"). The focus of no-establishment before and after the
Conference was the same: assure the American people that Congress had no power
to establish religion. Accordingly, on this reading the grammatical improvement
had no substantive impact.
The foregoing explanation is straightforward and makes sense as a mere
stylistic change to the House version. It is also in line with how committees work
when tasked with reconciling competing drafts while making as little substantive
change in meaning as possible. Although we cannot know if this is why the
Conference Committee introduced "respecting" into the text, the more simple
explanation is also the more likely.
2. Reason

Those holding to the theory of specific federalism seize on "respecting" as
central to their argument that the Establishment Clause had embedded in it at the
last moment by the Conference Committee a federalist principle specifically
designed to preserve state sovereignty over how each state handles its church-state
affairs. 3 2 5 Four observations about this theory need to be made, each of which
undermines specific federalism. 32 6
First, it was unremarkable that both the prior versions and the new Conference
Committee text had some consequential federalist impact. The earlier House and
Senate versions also had participles that worked to incidentally limit congressional
power over how each state handled certain of its church-state affairs. For example,
the final House version said that Congress lacked power to "make . . . law

establishing religion." The final Senate version said that Congress lacked power to
"make . . . law establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship."327 In both
versions, "establishing" is a participle, and the participle limited congressional
power over the described subject matter. If the national government had no power
over the subjects of creeds and liturgy and a particular state had an establishment,
it would follow that this Senate version would have had some federalist impact in
helping preserve that state's creeds and liturgy in the face of congressional
legislation to the contrary. The Conference Committee's substitution of the
participle "respecting" for the participle "establishing" did not make the
Conference version uniquely federalist. Rather, all of the versions in play
indirectly restrained some congressional power concerning how states handled
certain of their establishmentarian matters. What evolved over the various House
325
326

Mufioz, supra note 45, at 630.
Professor John Witte calls the evidence for this "reading of the 'respecting'

language . . . very thin." WITTE, supra note 185, at 229. He suggests an additional

argument concerning specific federalism: if Congress had intended the no-establishment
principle to do the work of both general and specific federalism it would have been easy for
the Conference Committee to have drafted the phrase to read, Congress shall make no laws
respecting "a state establishment" of religion. Id. at 197 (emphasis added); see also id. at
229.
327 S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 129 (Sept. 9, 1789).
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and Senate versions was not a first-time introduction in Conference of a federalist
text, but debate over the scope of the congressional disempowerment. In sum,
nothing in the text indicates that the Conference Committee was suddenly seized
by a new and irresistible "state's rights" urge and led to insert "respecting" into the
Establishment Clause with the aim to uniquely preserve state establishments.
Second, the Establishment Clause restraint on congressional power works to
limit the national government with respect to a given subject matter: the pros and
cons of establishmentarianism. This is a jurisdictional restraint: the Establishment
Clause limits Congress with respect to both the state and national governments.
True, the participle "respecting" meant that Congress was prohibited from
interfering with laws "respecting an establishment" of religion at the state level via
laws. However, the participle "respecting" also meant that Congress was
prohibited from interfering at the national level "respecting an establishment" of
religion.328 So, the restraint is not just federalist (restraining Congress vis-d-vis the
sovereignty of the several states) but rather jurisdictional (restraining Congress visA-vis church-government relations, be the government national or state). Moreover,
the scope of this disempowerment is the same with respect to both levels of
government, state and national. Accordingly, overblown claims that "respecting"
means that the national government can have nothing to do with church-state
relations at the state level but that "respecting" means only that Congress cannot
establish a single religion at the national level 329 rely on an asymmetry that defies
the plain text. The same words ("no law respecting an establishment of religion")
grammatically define an identical scope of congressional disempowerment,
whether that disempowerment has the consequence of protecting residual state
sovereignty or limiting the national government when acting within its enumerated
powers such as governing the territories or regulating the Army and Navy. Specific
federalism is not just wrong, but it diverts attention to federalism when the focus
should be on the full scope of the national disempowerment, namely the limited
jurisdiction of the national government with respect to establishment. I return to
this mischief in Part VI.A.
Third, the rights with respect to free speech and free press in what became the
First Amendment also have a participle, i.e., "abridging." As with the participle
"respecting," it can equally be said that the participle "abridging" disempowered
Congress with respect to certain subject matters at the state level within the scope
Hereafter Congress must be mindful of the Establishment Clause whenever it
exercises delegated national powers. For example, when establishing post offices pursuant
to Article I, Section 8, Clause 7, Congress should take into account the Establishment
Clause when deciding to suspend operations for postal delivery on Sundays because it is
the Christian Sabbath. Likewise, when regulating the territories pursuant to Article IV,
328

Section 3, Clause 2, Congress can touch on religion but it cannot "make . . . law respecting

an establishment." Indeed, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which the First Congress
reenacted, did touch on the matter of religion in Articles I and III but did so in a manner
that was not "an establishment" of religion. See Act of Mar. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 52
(Aug. 7, 1789).
329 See AMAR, supra note 321, at 32; Mufioz, supra note
45, at 630.
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of a participial phrase (i.e., "abridging the freedom of speech, or ... press, or the
right . . . to assemble, and to petition."). 3 30 In other words, the Conference
Committee's substitution of the participle "respecting" for the participle
"establishing" appears unremarkable with respect to federalism-in contrast to an
exotic claim that the Conference uniquely reached out and embedded a specific
federalist provision in the Establishment Clause. 3 What is noteworthy in the
Conference Committee's substitution of participles from "establishing" to
"respecting" is that the substitution more clearly causes the first participial phrase
in the First Amendment to focus on the meaning of "establishment" as opposed to
the meaning of "religion." That stylistic improvement does not help the theory of
specific federalism.
Fourth, as the matter went to Conference, the record in the House and Senate
were without complaint that any state believed that her sovereignty over churchstate arrangements was in need of additional protection. The concern voiced earlier
by Huntington during the House debate of August 15th was resolved to his
satisfaction by Livermore's phrase ("Congress shall make no laws

. . .")

that

pointed the object of the disempowerment solely at Congress.332
3. Answering the Proponents
Professor Vincent Mufioz subscribes to the specific federalism theory,

namely, that the addition of the word "respecting" by the Conference Committee
was solely about preventing interference in state establishments. He finds in the
early Senate versions of the Third Article a felt need to protect how the states dealt
with establishmentarian matters. His argument is that early Senate versions of the
no-establishment principle appear to borrow the no-preference language from the
amendment proposed by Virginia,334 which Mufioz rightly traces back to Patrick
S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 163 (Sept. 24, 1789).
This is not to say that there is no difference between the participle "respecting," on
the one hand, and the other participles "prohibiting" and "abridging" in the First
Amendment. Prohibiting and abridging are negatives on a government's power with
respect to a person's free exercise or expression. These participles create rights. On the
other hand, "respecting" is a reference not to a person's free exercise or expression but to a
certain subject matter that is being placed off limits to the government. Hence, "respecting"
sets a jurisdictional limit that runs against the government as opposed to creating a right
that runs in favor of the rights-holder. See infra text accompanying notes 397-401.
332 See supra notes 241-245 and accompanying text. As we have seen, when they
ratified the 1787 Constitution neither Connecticut nor Massachusetts asked for an
amendment to protect their religious establishments. Additionally, as will be shown below,
see infra table accompanying notes 349-358, neither state ratified what became the First
Amendment. If citizens in these states had truly feared for their Congregational
establishments as claimed by specific federalism, it makes no sense that citizens in these
states would not even bother to ratify a federalist provision meant to protect their
Congregational Churches.
3 Mufioz, supra note 45, at 629-30.
334 See supra note 133 and accompanying text (Virginia's proposed amendment).
330
331
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Henry. 335 For example, the Senate text from September 3rd read in nonpreferential
terms: "Congress shall make no law establishing One Religious Sect or Society in
preference to others."3 3 6 Henry was a staunch Antifederalist, hence he sought to
reduce national powers and thereby increase retained state powers.137 The final
Senate version that went to Conference Committee denied Congress the power to
make "law establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship." 3 Mufioz argues
that Congress "faced the choice between adopting [a] text that would recognize
[Congress'] lack of power (the House proposal), or language that would regulate
[Congress'] power and thereby, arguably, augment it (the Senate proposal)." 33 9
Mufioz claims that the final Senate version augmented congressional power as
follows: by denying Congress the power to establish "articles of faith or a mode of
worship" the text suggested Congress had the implied power to establish religion
except with respect to "articles of faith or a mode of worship." Mufioz reads the
choice between the House and Senate versions, and the Conference Committee's
decision to favor the House version, as "unmistakably federal[ist]." 340 It was
"unmistakably federal[ist]" and hence a choice in favor of retained state powers,
reasons Mufioz, because a rejection of the Senate version was a rejection of the
notion that Congress had implied power in the 1787 Constitution to establish
religion.
Contextually this makes little sense. Federalists were in complete control of
the amendment process in the Senate, and they were committed to the Wilsonian
argument that the Constitution was one of enumerated powers. Federalists had
repeatedly offered assurance that the 1787 Constitution delegated no power to the
national government over the matter of religious establishment. Additionally, the
proposed amendments, including the Third Article, did not vest new powers in the
national government. Indeed, the focus of the amendments was just the opposite:
the amendments, including the Third Article, were offered to expressly put into
words certain powers that Congress did not have, thereby reassuring the American
people that citizens had little to fear from the new government. The six members
of the Conference, five of whom were Federalists, would have immediately
recognized any suggestion that the Senate version of the Third Article implied
power in Congress over establishmentarianism as a false implication. All this
being so, it is pure fancy to suppose that the Conference, in order to avoid a
supposed power-vesting Senate version, favored the House version. Indeed, as
Mufioz would have it, the Conference chose the House version but then beefed-up
Mufioz, supra note 45, at 628-29.
S. JOURNAL, Ist Cong., 1st Sess. 116 (Sept. 3, 1789).
33 It is thus counterintuitive for Mufioz to link Patrick Henry and Virginia's proposed
amendment, on the one hand, to a conjectural desire in the Senate to expand congressional
power.
338 S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 129 (Sept. 9, 1789).
339 Mufoz, supra note 45, at 629. Earlier Senate versions augmented congressional
power, according to Mufloz, because to expressly deny to Congress the power to prefer one
religion over others implied that Congress had the power to support all religions.
335

336

340

d
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the federalist nature of that version by inserting "respecting" into the amendment's
text.
The Conference Committee, of course, did face a choice between the House
version and the Senate version. And, as related above, the Conference did not
choose either version, but fashioned a version of its own that clearly built on the
House version with respect to religious no-establishment. In these few respects,
Mufioz is correct. However, the theory of specific federalism ultimately depends
on a claim that the shift in participle from "establishing" to "respecting" was a
clever last-minute maneuver by the Conference Committee-a maneuver that had
no substantive importance until Everson3 4 1 was decided in 1947-158 year later!
A far less strained reading of the choice before the Conference Committee is
that the House and Senate options differed over the scope of the limitation to
impose on congressional power. The House choice with respect to scope was "no
law establishing religion,"3 4 2 and the Senate choice with respect to scope was "no
law establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship." 3 4 3 The Conference's
decision to favor the House version was a decision to choose the broader of the
two disempowerments on Congress. That decision was not "unmistakably
federal[ist]," as Muhioz claims. Rather, it was jurisdictional. The decision has all
the traits of a straightforward choice about the desirable scope of the
disempowerment of Congress' authority with respect to church-government
affairs. This is particularly so given that even Mufioz admits that the
Antifederalists had 'no say in the matter, the First Congress being dominated by
Federalists. This straightforward interpretation of events is preferable to Muiioz's
exotic explanation, an explanation that had no legal consequence until Everson
incorporated the Establishment Clause in 1947. If anything, rather than
"unmistakably federal[ist]," the decision by the Conference to choose the House
version, with grammatical improvements motivating the insertion of "respecting,"
was unmistakably pro religious freedom. The Conference text favored religious
freedom because when the national government has no jurisdiction with respect to
the affairs of organized religion, then organized religion is free to govern its own
affairs. This was the repeated call of the dissenters: free the church.
In order to interject Antifederalist influence into the drafting process, Mufioz
has to go back to the origin of the Senate-rejected nonpreferential language from
Virginia, with Patrick Henry's fingerprints thereon. That is nylon thin support
indeed, given that the Federalists in control of Congress saw Henry as their most
able opponent. Once again, at this point in the process no member of Congress,
neither Federalist nor Antifederalist, was complaining that his own state's
sovereignty over establishmentarian affairs was insecure and thus in need of more
protection from interference by the national government. And, once again, the
scope of the restraint on power works to limit Congress' jurisdiction over
establishmentarian subject matters both in the several states and in the national
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
H. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (Aug. 21, 1789).
343 S. JOURNAL, Ist Cong., 1st Sess. 129 (Sept. 9, 1789).
341

342
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government's wielding of its enumerated powers such as overseeing the territories
or regulating the Army and Navy. This line of argumentation is not new. It is at
least as old as James Madison and his Report on the Virginia Resolution of 1800. 3 44
The better reading is that the no-establishment text as it emerged from
Conference was jurisdictional, not merely federalist. As acknowledged above, a
rejection of the theory of specific federalism 345 is not a rejection of the idea that the
text of the Establishment Clause had some consequential effect on federalism by
limiting congressional power to interfere in a state's church-state affairs.346 That
34 5 FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 39, at 141. The context of Madison's
celebrated Report of 1800 is the constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Acts enacted
during the Presidency of John Adams. See Kurt T. Lash, James Madison's Celebrated
Report of 1800: The Transformationof the Tenth Amendment, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 165,
180-82 (2006). The acts were being enforced against critics of the Adams Administration,
and the Republican opposition argued, inter alia, that enforcement was in violation of the
Free Speech and Free Press Clauses of the First Amendment. The matter came on for
debate before the Virginia House of Delegates, then controlled by Republicans, which had
earlier issued The Virginia Resolutions, critical of Adams and of the actions of Federalists
generally. In their defense, Federalists filed a Report of the Minority on the Virginia
Resolutions. 5 FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 39, at 136. Believed to be the work
of John Marshall, see Kurt T. Lash, Minority Report: John Marshalland the Defense of the
Alien and Sedition Acts, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 435, 435-36 (2007), the Minority Report focused

on the text, "Congress shall make no law .

.

. abridging" freedom of speech or press.

Pointing out that, pursuant to the text, Congress is only restrained from abridging speech
and press, the Minority Report argued that Congress is thereby free to regulate speech and
press in ways that fall short of a complete abridgement. 5 FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION,
supra note 39, at 138. In Madison's rebuttal, which he set out in the aforementioned Report
of 1800, the line of argumentation parallels the one in the text with respect to Mufioz: the
Federal government is one of enumerated powers, thus all powers not given are reserved;
the enumerated powers do not reach over free press or are incidental to it; that the
Constitution's ratification was secured upon assurances that amendments would be
adopted; the amendments rendered rights more safe under the Constitution because they
made explicit the reservation of power delegated to Congress; any doubt that the
amendments were not a grant of more power is erased by the Senate's resolution
accompanying the amendments' adoption to the effect that the amendments were to prevent
any misconstruction or abuse of congressional power; and that the amendments placed an
additional restriction on Congress, all so that American's might have more confidence in
the new government. Id at 143, 146-47.
3 See supra text between notes 326-328.
346 Arguments based on the larger historical context have been assembled against the
idea that the Establishment Clause was intended to protect state establishments. See Steven
K. Green, "Bad History": The Lure of History in Establishment Clause Adjudication,
81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1717, 1752-53 (2006) (arguing against the Establishment Clause
having had a federalist intent because: (1) while there were establishments in the New
England states as defined by our present understanding of the term, in 1789-1791 most of
the New England states denied they had an "establishment" when faced with criticism by
Baptists that they did establish the Congregational Church; (2) the clear trend in 17891791 was toward disestablishment, thus there was little reason for members of Congress
from New England to waste political capital on preserving establishments from federal
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said, the primary focus of the congressional debate which led to the final text of the
Establishment Clause was to limit the power of the national government, not to
protect the states.
L Ratification in the States, October 1789 to March 1792
After receiving the twelve proposed amendments from the First Congress, on
October 2, 1789, President Washington forwarded them to each of the states for
consideration pursuant to U.S. Constitution Article V.3 4 7 About two and one-half

interference; and (3) the majority of calls for the protection of religious freedom in a Bill of
Rights centered on rights of conscience and equality among religions, not
disestablishment).
I agree with Professor Green insofar as the conscious purpose of the Establishment
Clause was to limit national power. However, the Establishment Clause surely did have the
consequence of protecting state establishments from some national interference. See supra
text between notes 326-328. Green's assertion that others have "bad history" is open to
debate. For example, consider the New England establishments he says were soon on the
outs, Vermont disestablished in 1807, Connecticut in 1818, New Hampshire in 1819, and
Massachusetts in 1832-33. Maine was carved out of territory held by Massachusetts;
Maine disestablished in 1820. See Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment,supra note 8, at
1524-40. These establishments had far more staying power than Green allows, and we can
be certain members of the 1789 Congress from New England would have fought to keep
their establishments. The House debate on August 15th by Representative Huntington tells
us that much.
New Englanders, other than those from Connecticut, did deny that they had an
"establishment." However, they did so as a matter of rhetoric. Their religious assessment
laws permitted each taxpayer to designate which church was to receive his religious tax
payment. The dominant Congregationalists thought this arrangement so enlightened that
they refused to admit to Baptist charges of "establishment," which carried with it
opprobrium. So, Green is right about Baptist charges of "establishment" and denials of the
same by Congregationalists, but it was just the rhetoric of a political spate internal to each
New England state. That does not mean that Congregationalists in the First Congress were
not fully aware that the church-state arrangement in New England greatly favored the
Congregational Church. And it follows that they were not about to permit any wording in
the Bill of Rights that would bring about a loss of that advantage.
Finally, Green may be right that a tally of the calls would show more for protection of
conscience than for the no-establishment principle. But, both were called for, and Baptists
in Virginia and New England were especially vocal. Moreover, the terms were often used
in overlapping ways. If calls for disestablishment were down, it was because by 1789, only
New England still had established churches. And, the Baptists in Virginia had the promise
of the singularly important James Madison that the recently won Virginia disestablishment
would not be endangered by the new national government. The Baptists and Madison
agreed that the means for achieving that promise was a Bill of Rights that denied national
power over matters of establishment. Although I reject specific federalism, unlike Green, I
can understand how those devoted to specific federalism find some reinforcement for their
theory in Madison's promise to the Virginia Baptists.
347 5 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1171 (1980).
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years later, on March 1, 1792, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson formally
announced that ten of the twelve proposed amendments (Articles Third through
Twelfth) had been ratified by the requisite three-fourths of states, thereby ending
the formal period of ratification.34 8
The following table lists the states that ratified the proposed amendments by
the date of each state's ratification. Almost none of the state-by-state debate over
the proposed amendments has survived, or indeed was ever recorded. Much of the
surviving record is in various letters and newspaper accounts.
Table 2: Ratification of the Amendments by the States,
November 20, 1789-March 1, 1792
Date of
Ratification by
State

Date
Ratification
Reported to
the Federal

State

Amendments
Ratified

Record
of
Debate?

New Jersey 49

1, 3-12

No

Maryland 350

1-12

No

North Carolina st

1-12

No

South Carolina

1-12

No

1, 3-12

No

Congress

1

November 20,

August 6,

1789

1790

December 19,

January 25,

1789

1790

December 22,

June 11,

1789

1790

January 18,

April 1,

1790

1790

January 25,

February 15,

New

1790

1790

Hampshire353

6

January 28,

March 8,

Delaware.s4

2-12

No

1790

1790

-

February 2,

-

Massachusetts

3-11

Minimal

2
3
4
5

1790

348 id

S349LABUNSKi, supra note 178, at 245; SCHWARTZ, supra note 347, at 1181, 1200-01.

350 SCHWARTZ, supra note 347, at 1172, 1176, 1193-94.
351 LABUNSKI, supra note 178, at 245; SCHWARTZ, supra note 347,

at 1184, 1199.
347, at 1195-96.
3
11
Id. at 1179, 1182-83, 1194-95.
354 Id. (letter to President Washington from the Governor of Delaware, which omits
352 SCHWARTZ, supra note

the exact date of ratification by the Delaware Legislature); see also Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States of America, FINDLAW, http://caselaw.1p.findlaw.com/

data/constitution/amendments.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Amendments]
(see footnote 2).
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February 27,

April 5,

1790

1790

March 10,

March16,

1790

1790

June 7,

June 30,

1790

1790

November 3,
1791
December 15,
1791

January 18,
1792 December 30,
1791

New York 5

1, 3-12

No

Pennsylvania356

3-12

No

Rhode Island5

1, 3-12

No

Vermont

1-12

No

Virginia

1-12

Yes

Scholars disagree over whether the amendments needed to be ratified by ten
or eleven states, the confusion arising because Vermont joined the Union after the
proposed amendments had been sent to the states for ratification but before ten
states had properly ratified.359 The point became moot because by the time
Jefferson formally announced ratification, at least eleven states had ratified the
Third through the Twelfth Articles.
Jefferson's tally at the time of his announcement did not include
Massachusetts. The legislature of that state had never sent notification of
ratification to anyone in the national government. 3 60 As secretary of state, Jefferson
asked Christopher Gore, the U.S. attorney for Massachusetts, about the status of
Massachusetts' ratification and was informed on August 18, 1791, of the
legislative failure.36'

3ss SCHWARTZ, supra note 347, at 1181-82, 1197-98 (according to the notification
sent to President Washington, the House resolved on February 22, 1790, the Senate
resolved on February 24, 1790, and the "Council of Revision" resolved on February 27,
1790).
3 Id. at 1176, 1180, 1197.
357 Id. at 1199-1200; see also Amendments, supra note 354 (see footnote 2).
358 SCHWARTZ, supra note 347, at 1202-03; see also Amendments, supra note 354
(see footnote 2) (President Washington's correspondence to Congress does not include the
date of Vermont's ratification).
3s9 See LEVY, supra note 17, at 106 ("The admission of Vermont to the Union made
necessary the ratification by eleven states."). But see SCHWARTZ, supra note 347, at 1172
("The state ratifications . . . ended when Virginia became the tenth state to ratify at the end
of 1791.").
360 By February 2, 1790, both houses of the Massachusetts legislature had passed the
third through the eleventh amendments, but the legislature failed to finalize the ratification
by formally declaring their passage. This anomaly is explained in SCHWARTZ, supra note
347, at 1172.
361 See LABUNSKI, supra note 178, at 246; see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 347, at
1175-76 (including the letter from Christopher Gore, explaining the failure of notice by the
Massachusetts legislature).
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The Massachusetts ratification process was problematic.362 The Massachusetts
House and Senate provisionally approved the third to eleventh proposed
amendments, omitting the first, second, and twelfth.6 Final ratification stalled
because a special committee dominated by Antifederalists declined to give
approval to the earlier passage of the Third through Eleventh Articles .3 The
special committee's only reason to not report approval of the earlier House and
Senate actions was that the amendments to the Constitution proposed by
Massachusetts back in 1788 should again be recommended to Congress. 36 5
Massachusetts is the first state where some official transcript of the debate
over the amendments was recorded.366 The Massachusetts House was particularly
troubled over the proposed twelfth amendment, which said powers not granted by
the Constitution to the federal government or reserved to the states were retained
by the people. 36 7 While it is clear from the House and Senate journals that the
Massachusetts House struggled over this amendment, no official record of the
House's objections exists. 36 8 However, in other transcripts concerning
Massachusetts' ratification debate are instances where the Governor of
Massachusetts, John Hancock, exhorted the legislature to consider the proposed
amendments. In one such instance, a speech before the legislature, he began by
suggesting that the House objection was to the Twelfth Article reserving powers
not expressly delegated to either the federal or state government being retained by
the people. One such power reserved to the state, said Hancock, was "to support
the faith." 36 9 The reference may well be a nod to Massachusetts' power to levy
religious assessments at the parish level. This generally favored the local
Congregational Church. While Hancock makes no mention of the religion clauses
in the proposed Third Article, he was perhaps reassuring the dominant
Congregationalists that ratification of the Twelfth Article did not negate the state's
power to impose religious assessments.
Virginia ratified the first of the proposed amendments (concerning the size of
the U.S. House) on November 3, 1791, and President Washington reported that
partial ratification to Congress on November 14, 1791.370 When Virginia ratified
the balance of the amendments on December 15, 1791, President Washington

362 LABUNSKI, supra note

178, at 246; see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 347, at 1172,

1174-75.
363 SCHWARTZ, supra note 347, at

1179, 1182-84.
36 LEVY, supra note 17, at 107; SCHWARTZ, supra note 347, at 1175, 1182-84.
365 Id. at 107.

366 LABUNSKI, supra note 178, at 245; see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 347, at 1173-

76,1178-79,1183-84.

367 LABUNSKI, supra note 178, at 246.
368 SCHWARTZ, supra note 347, at 1174-75.

369 Id. at 1178-79 (speech by Governor John Hancock to the Massachusetts
legislature, Jan. 28, 1790).
370
Id. at 1201.
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forwarded the full ratification message to the U.S. House and Senate on December
30, 1791.371
Virginia is the only state where some official record exists of a debate
concerning the religion clauses, albeit the record is complex and must be situated
in its larger context of the Antifederalist struggle to call a second constitutional
convention or to secure amendments to the 1787 Constitution that would trim back
the powers of the national government with respect to direct taxation and the
regulation of commerce.372 In late September 1789, Virginia's two U.S. senators,
Richard Henry Lee and William Grayson, wrote the Virginia governor and
legislature stating their disappointment with the twelve submitted Articles of
Amendment. 373 The letters complained that Virginia's amendments proposed in
1788 had not been adopted by Congress, that the powers of the central government
remained unchecked, and that civil liberties were endangered by the new
government. However, neither the Third Article nor religious freedom was
explicitly mentioned. The Virginia House, a majority of which were Federalists,
approved all the amendments on December 24, 1789.
Dividing by a vote of eight to seven, the Virginia Senate held up ratification
for almost two years, ostensibly because of objections to the Third, Eighth,
Eleventh, and Twelfth Articles. 7 The eight Antifederalist senators claimed that
the proposed Third Article neither protected the right of conscience nor prohibited
certain features commonly associated with an established church. The eight
senators explained their opposition as follows:
The 3d amendment, recommended by Congress, does not prohibit
the rights of conscience from being violated or infringed: and although it
goes to restrain Congress from passing laws establishing any national
religion, they might, notwithstanding, levy taxes to any amount, for the
support of religion or its preachers; and any particular denomination of
christians might be so favored and supported by the General
Government, as to give it a decided advantage over others, and in process
of time render it as powerful and dangerous as if it was established as the
national religion of the country.
This amendment then, when considered as it relates to any of the
rights it is pretended to secure, will be found totally inadequate, and
betrays an unreasonable, unjustifiable, but a studied departure from the
amendment proposed by Virginia and other States, for the protection of
these rights. We conceive that this amendment is dangerous and
fallacious, as it tends to lull the apprehensions of the people on these

17

Id. at 1201-02.

372

Id. at 1185, 1188-89.

Id. at 1186-89.
Id. at 1176-77, 1184, 1188-91.
375 Levy, supra note 17, at 109; SCHWARTZ, supra note 347, at 1191-93.
373

374
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important points, without affording them security; and mischievous,
because by setting bounds to Congress, it will be considered as the only
restriction on their power over these rights; and thus certain powers in
the government, which it has been denied to possess, will be recognized
without being properly guarded against abuse.3 76
Read narrowly, the Establishment Clause could be said to prohibit only the
establishment of a national religion-albeit one familiar with the drafting history
would not do so. So construed, however, these eight senators went on to suppose
the Third Article thereby left Congress free to impose some features of what were
commonly associated with an "establishment," while stopping short of a full
establishment or national church.37 7 Indeed, the examples given by the senators as
consequences to be avoided track those made by James Madison, as well as
Presbyterian and Baptist dissenters,. when successfully opposing Patrick Henry's
General. Assessment Bill in 1784-1785.378 Finally, the senators point as to the
Third Article implying congressional powers never granted ignores the operation
of the proposed Twelfth Article.
What casts suspicion on these objections by the eight state senators is not just
that they were known to be Antifederalists, but also that they had a voting record
of supporting the earlier-established Anglican Church in Virginia and had argued
in favor of Henry's General Assessment Bill when it was debated in 1784-1785.
Likewise, U.S. Senators Richard Henry Lee and William Grayson had opposed
Virginia's ratification of the 1787 Constitution 3 79 and still sought more statefriendly amendments taking power away from the national government. If these
twelve Articles of Amendment were not ratified, an opportunity would open up for
another round of amendments more to their liking.
In a letter dated November 20, 1789, updating President Washington on
Virginia's progress with the amendments, James Madison questioned these state
senators' sincerity and confidently stated his belief that the eight Antifederalists
would be unsuccessful in blocking the amendments.3 so Specifically, Madison
wrote:
If it be construed by the public into a latent hope of some contingent
opportunity for prosecuting the war agst. the Genl. Government, I am of
opinion the experiment will recoil on the authors of it.

. .

. One of the

principal leaders of the Baptists lately sent me word that the amendments
14th. Sess., at 62-63 (Va. 1789); see also LEVY, supra note 17, at
107-08. For the amendment on religious freedom originally proposed by Virginia, see
supra note 133 and accompanying text.
37 Professors John Witte and Michael McConnell each give a multipart definition of a
full establishment. See supranote 185.
376

S. JOURNAL,

See Esbeck, VirginiaDisestablishment,supra note 5, at 82-85.
n7 BEEMAN, supra note 23, at 370, 372-73.
380 LEVY, supra note 17, at 109-10.
378
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had entirely satisfied the disaffected of his Sect, and that it would appear
in their subsequent conduct."'
The referenced letter from Virginia Baptists to Madison382 is important because it
was the Baptists who had, along with the Presbyterians, allied with Madison and
other statesmen in Virginia to defeat Henry's General Assessment Bill. And the
Baptists are thought to have thrown their votes behind Madison to elect him to the
U.S. House of Representatives, said by some to have been in return for Madison's
promise to deliver on a bill of rights that protected religious freedom at the national
level.
On January 5, 1790, Madison wrote to President Washington to again express
confidence that the tactics of the Antifederalists would ultimately backfire against
them:
You will probably have seen by the papers that the contest in the
Assembly on the subject of the amendments ended [in the] loss of them.
The House of Delegates got over the objections to the 11 & 12, but the
Senate revived them with an addition of the 3 & 8 articles, and by a vote
of adherence prevented a ratification. On some accounts this event is no
doubt to be regretted. But it will do no injury to the Genl. Government.
On the contrary it will have the effect with many of turning their distrust
towards their own Legislature. The . miscarriage of the 3d. art:
particularly, will have this effect.384
Almost two years later, Madison's confidence was rewarded by the Virginia
Senate's ratification on December 15, 1791.385 Considered in the context of the
Antifederalists' goal to reduce the power of the new national government, the lapse
of time between eventual ratification and the published interpretation of the
religion clauses in the Third Article by the slim majority of Antifederalist senators,
and their earlier opposition to Virginia disestablishment, there is every reason to
12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 186, at 453 (letter from Madison to
President Washington dated Nov. 20, 1789).
382 SCHWARTZ, supra note 347, at 1185. The Baptist letter is found in
5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION.OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
1786-1870, at 215 (1905) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
383 MILLER, supra note 22, at 194, 240, 248-49. See DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 382, at 144 (Madison clarifying to a Baptist minister that he now supported a bill of
rights); id at 137-41 (Letter from George Nicholas to James Madison (Jan. 2, 1789))
(Madison supporter urging further outreach to Reverend Reuben Ford, a Baptist minister);
LABUNSKI, supra note 178, at 167 (Letter from Benjamin Johnson to James Madison (Jan.
19, 1789)) (supporter reporting that Reverend Eve had held a meeting at a Baptist Church
recalling Madison's spirited services on behalf of Baptists).
381

12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 186, at 453; see also
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 382, at 230.
385 LEVY, supra note 17, at 111.
384
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fully discount the understanding of the religion clauses that had been published in
October 1789 by the eight senators. 3 86
On March 1, 1792, Secretary of State Jefferson officially notified the several
states that the Third through Twelfth Articles of Amendment had been successfully
ratified, thus implying the First and Second Articles had thus far failed. A stylist
renumbered the successful Articles the "First through Tenth," and only after some
time did they take on the popular appellation "Bill of Rights." Madison, Jefferson,
Washington, and their contemporaries did not call the ten amendments a "Bill of
Rights." That began to occur only after the Civil War.387 With uncharacteristic
understatement, Secretary Jefferson wrote:
I have the honor to send you herein enclosed, two copies duly
authenticated, of an Act concerning certain fisheries of the United States,
and for the regulation and government of the fishermen employed
therein; also of an Act to establish the post office and post roads within
the United States; also the ratification by three fourths of the Legislatures
of the Several States, of certain articles in addition and amendment of the
Constitution of the United States, proposed by Congress to the said
Legislatures ....

The Georgia and Connecticut legislatures failed to ratify the proposed
amendments. 38 9 The religious freedom provisions in the Third Article were not a
cause of the opposition, or even discussion, in these two states. Georgia contended
that it had not yet been proven that the proposed amendments were necessary.390
The Connecticut House ratified all of the amendments except the Second in
1789391 and again in 1790. However, the Federalists, who held a majority in the
Connecticut Senate, declined to take up the amendments because they thought to
do so would only strengthen the Antifederalist criticism that the original
Constitution was flawed.392 In 1939, these two states, along with Massachusetts,
ratified the amendments in a ceremonial recognition of the 150th anniversary of
the amendments' initial submission to the states.393
In summary, so far as indicated from the sparse convention records, state
ratification of the Third Article generated no opposition, indeed no debate, except
in Massachusetts and Virginia. In Massachusetts, the Antifederalists in the state
senate were able to forestall ratification for reasons other than opposition to the
Id. at Il1 ("[T]here is every reason to believe that Virginia [ratified] the First
Amendment [in December 17911 with the understanding that [the clauses] had been
misrepresented [back in October 1789] by the eight senators.").
387 MAIER, supra note 187, at 463-64.
388 SCHWARTZ, supra note 347,
at 1203.
386

389 Id. at 1172, 1201,
390 LEVY, supra note
391
392

1203.

17, at 106.

SCHWARTZ, supra note 347, at
LEVY, supra note 17, at 106.

393 SCHWARTZ,

1181.

supra note 347, at 1172.
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Third Article. In Virginia, the opposition was by eight Antifederalists who held a
slim majority in the state senate. Although it took almost two years, popular
support for the Third Article eventually broke through the blocking tactics of the
Antifederalists, and Virginia became the tenth state to ratify what we now know as
the Bill of Rights. Given that the likely reason behind the delay in Virginia's
ratification was Antifederalist maneuverings, it is best said that the surviving
record of state ratifications yields no additional insight into the original meaning of
the Establishment Clause. What little we do know is from Virginia where there
was popular support for the Third Article.
V. PLAIN MEANING OF THE TEXT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
In relevant part, the First Amendment reads, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
While there is but one clause here addressing religious freedom, there are two
participial phrases ("respecting an establishment" and "prohibiting the free
exercise") modifying the object ("no law") of the verb ("shall make").
Grammatically, each participial phrase is equal to and has a meaning independent
of the other phrase.3 94 Finally. "of religion" is a prepositional phrase. "Religion"
modifies "establishment," confirming that the key to the original meaning of the
phrase is the meaning of establishment in the context of constitution making in
1789-91.'9
In this Part, we take up the matter of the plain meaning of the text of the
Establishment Clause as finally agreed to by both houses of Congress on
September 24-25, 1789, with a greater focus on examining what "establishment"
did not mean rather than what it did mean. Some of these issues necessarily arose
in Part IV, but it would have unduly disrupted the presentation of the unfolding
congressional debates recorded there to have pursued them more deeply. That will
be the task here.
A. The Establishment Clause Does Not Codi@f a PreexistingRight
The phrasing of many of the first eight amendments in the Bill of Rights does
not suggest that these rights were being newly created. Rather, the text reads as if
many of these rights were already held by Americans. Thus, the rights are merely
394 Their independent and equal status is evident because either participial phrase can
be omitted and the remaining phrase still makes sense. That is, the opening clause to the
first semicolon would make sense if it read, "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion." It would also make sense if the opening clause to the first
semicolon read, "Congress shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion."
395 That "religion" modifies "establishment" is grammatically evident: "of religion" is
a prepositional phrase and is thus unnecessary to retain a complete sentence. That is,
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment," is a complete sentence. Or one
could turn "religion" into an adjective without changing the clause's meaning, as in
"Congress shall make no law respecting a religious establishment."
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being made explicit, as a matter of reassurance and thus hedge against future
abuse, and accordingly they were not superseded by the powers delegated to the
new government in the 1787 Constitution.3 96
This understanding is suggested by the various participles and verbs chosen
by the members of the First Federal Congress who drafted the text. It is perhaps
most obvious when reading the phrasing of the Fourth Amendment,3 97 which
begins by stating an existing right and then negating Congress' power to
"violate[]" that right. That textual pattern is evident in most of the First
Amendment as well. Participles like "prohibiting" and "abridging" 39 8 and the noun
"right" characterizing both "assemble" and "petition" in the First Amendment, as
well as the verb "infringed" in the Second Amendment,3 99 are all indicative of
preexisting rights that the new government is acknowledging. The Ninth
See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3091 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("The Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment] cannot claim to be
the source of our basic freedoms-no legal document ever could . . . ."); District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008) ("[I]t has always been widely understood
that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified apre-existing
right. The very text of the Second Amendment implicitly recognizes the pre-existence of
the right and declares only that it 'shall not be infringed."'). The Report on the Virginia
Resolutions of 1800, authored by James Madison, stated with respect to two of the rights in
the First Amendment: "Both of these rights, the liberty of conscience and [freedom] of the
press, rest equally on the original ground of not being delegated by the Constitution, and,
396

consequently, withheld from the Government." 5 FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note

39, at 146. Madison wrote this passage in the course of arguing that the use of the word
"abridging" in the text ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom .. . of the
press.") should not be read as reserving to Congress a limited power to regulate the press so
long as Congress did not totally abridge it. Such a reading, argued Madison, would be
contrary to the fact that the First Amendment did not in the first instance grant these two
rights, but only acknowledged the rights which "rest[ed] . . . on ... original ground." The
founding generation viewed the declaration of rights in the earlier-adopted state
constitutions in the same manner. WOOD, supra note 83, at 271-73.
3
NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 100 n.77 (1937) (noting that the text
that eventually became the Fourth Amendment "did not purport to create the right to be
secure from unreasonable searches and seizures but merely stated it as a right which
already existed."). In relevant part, the Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This

understanding that rights are acknowledged but not granted by a constitution was hardly

novel.
398 In relevant part, the First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law ...
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress

of grievances." Id. amend. I.
399 The Second Amendment provides: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Anns, shall not be
infringed." Id. amend. II.

HeinOnline -- 2011 Utah L. Rev. 584 2011

2011]

ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE INTERPRETATION

585

Amendment even speaks in terms of other rights "retained by the people,"4 00
suggesting many of the foregoing explicitly listed rights in the first eight
amendments are already possessed by Americans.4 01
The participle "respecting" in the phrase "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion" stands out as quite different. The
distinction is not that no-establishment is a direct command to Congress restraining
its use of powers delegated elsewhere, as this command is also present with regard
to free exercise, fre'e speech, free press, as well as the rights to assemble and
petition. The difference is that the participial phrase "respecting an establishment"
is not describing a right (preexisting or otherwise) but is describing a discrete
subject matter or topic (i.e., "an establishment") with regard to which Congress is
not empowered to "make .

. .

law." In that sense, the Establishment Clause does

not read as if it is describing an existing right (e.g., free exercise, free speech, or
free press) already held by the people. Rather, it is as if the Establishment Clause is
describing a limit on Congress' power to legislate on a discrete subject matter or
topic.
Of course, the congressional drafters did not mean to imply that Congress, in
the absence of the Establishment Clause, had an enumerated power to "establish[]
. . . [a] religion" under the 1787 Constitution. Federalists were in complete control
of the drafting process. And, as we have seen from James Wilson's speech
forward, . the Federalists, including Madison, repeatedly denied that the 1787
Constitution vested such power in Congress. 402 Rather, to the drafters the
Establishment Clause meant only that readers of the 1787 Constitution should be
reassured that Congress had no jurisdiction concerning the subject matter of "an
establishment." In short, the plain text of the first participial phrase in the First
Amendment is different from all the rights-based phrases in the First Amendment,
as well as those in the Second and Fourth Amendments.
It follows that text of the Establishment Clause reads like part of the structural
frame of the national government (i.e., delegations and denials of power), not as an
acknowledgment of a rights-based principle. As such, the Establishment Clause is
a precautionary negation of national jurisdiction over a narrow, but nonetheless
400 The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." Id.
amend. IX. The Antifederalists (as well as others) thought adoption of a bill of rights
prudent because they still harbored concerns that the new central government might abuse
its powers, and most Federalists thought the amendments unnecessary but generally
harmless. However, the failure to mention a right among those explicitly listed in a bill of
rights left a supplicant open to the argument by the government's attorney that the asserted
right did not exist because it was not among those explicitly listed. That concern was
alleviated by the Ninth Amendment.
401 The seeming absoluteness of the word "prohibiting," as contrasted with the matterof-degree nature of words like "abridging" or "infringed," should not be taken literally such
that the right of "free exercise" is only violated by the government's total blockage of an
adherent's religious practice. See WITTE, supranote 185, at 202.
402 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying
text.
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highly important, subject matter described as "an establishment," thereby leaving
power over that subject matter to the states or to the people and their religious
societies.403 The phrase is silent with respect to who holds the authority over "an
establishment" denied to the national government, but implicitly, such authority is
vested in organized religion. That is the assumption behind the now popular idiom
"the separation of church and state." It is easy to see how some federal courts later
came to characterize the Establishment Clause as a limit on their subject matter
jurisdiction as defined in Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution. 4 04
When a branch of government exceeds its limited authority, the other branches are
constitutionally brought to bear to check such abuses of power. Similarly, on
crucial (but hopefully rare) occasions, the nation will check organized religion and
at times religious societies will in turn check and thereby serve as a limit on the
authoritarian pretensions of the government.
It seemed common sense for religious conscience, free speech, free press,
freedom to assemble, and freedom to petition to have been regarded by Americans
as preexisting rights. However, in the period 1789-1791 the choice between
establishment and disestablishment was still contested in many states. Indeed, in
the New England states it was highly disputed terrain with establishmentarians in
the dominate role. So it would have made no sense to have thought of the
Establishment Clause as protecting a preexisting right.
When Congress reported the proposed Articles of Amendment to the states for
ratification, some New England states still had tax-supported churches and a strong
establishmentarian constituency, whereas other states had recently gone through a
disestablishment struggle and placed authority over religious societies in the hands
of voluntarily supported houses of worship. At the national level, however, the
new government never had to choose between establishment and disestablishment
as there had never been a national church. Rather, the structural nature of the
Establishment Clause meant it denied national power to establish a national church
and likely more. Such a limitation on the power of the national government left a
jurisdictional restraint on its authority, thereby leaving matters respecting "an
establishment" in the hands of the people and their religious societies.
Given the different nature of the text of the Establishment Clause, one can
hardly fault the modern Supreme Court when, after its Everson decision in 1947, it
began to read the Establishment Clause as allocating power between two centers of
authority, church and state.405 The Court envisioned the Establishment Clause as
policing the boundary between church and state and its judicial task to keep
governmental power from trespassing over a line delineated as matters about "an
establishment of religion." This was a division of the institutions of organized
See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on
GovernmentalPower, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 42-51 (1998) [hereinafter Esbeck, Establishment
Clause as Structural] (collecting cases where the Court dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction).
405 See generally id. at 25-32 (arguing that the Everson decision began the Court's
modern era of separationism between church and state).
403

404
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religion from the offices of the nation-state, however, not a separation of religion
from public affairs.40 6 The latter would be quite impossible, for it would mean
cleaving in half the very heart of those citizens who have allegiance to both church
and state.
Since Everson, the Court has made this line-drawing task harder than it was
thought to be in 1789-1791. In part, this is because the post-Everson line drawing
has to take place in a myriad of state and local governmental arenas, not just with
respect to the national government. This line-drawing task has also become more
difficult because of the increase in the size and regulatory activity of government.
Lastly, the people and their religious allegiances have become more plural.
B. The Establishment Clause Is Not Limited to ProtectingOnly Conscience

Professor Noah Feldman suggests narrowing the scope of religious freedom
as understood by the modern Supreme Court. Feldman argues that the
Establishment Clause protects only liberty of conscience.4 07 His proposition is
based on the historical claim that in the late eighteenth century the only American
consensus on religious freedom was that liberty of conscience ought to be
protected.40 8 Feldman thus believes that the protection of conscience is all that
406

See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 640-42 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring

in the judgment) (reasoning that the Establishment Clause may not be used to keep

religious adherents from full participation in public life).
407

See Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause,

77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 351-52 (2002) [hereinafter Feldman, The Intellectual Origins].
Professor Feldman later wrote a book for a popular audience that is based on his
conscience-only reading of the scope of the First Amendment. See NOAH FELDMAN,
DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM-AND WHAT WE SHOULD Do
ABOUT IT 26-27 (2005) [hereinafter FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD]. But the book assumes
the correctness of the thesis in his earlier law review article. Id. at 27 n.19. So our attention
is best focused on the merits of the original article.
408 Feldman, The Intellectual Origins, supra note 407, at 378-79, 397-98. Feldman's
claim that by 1789 there was near universal agreement on the protection of religious
conscience is somewhat exaggerated. Consider, for example, the letter of the Danbury
Baptist Association of Connecticut to then President Thomas Jefferson dated October 7,
1801. Letter from the Danbury Baptist Associatioh' to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 7, 1801),
availableat http://www.stephenjaygould.org/ctrl/dbajefferson.html. The association wrote
to congratulate Jefferson on his election. Jefferson's reply to the Danbury Baptists is the
now famous letter wherein Jefferson unveiled his view of the First Amendment as
"building a wall of separation between Church & State." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), available at http://www.stephenjay
gould.org/ctrl/jeffersondba.html. In the letter, however, the Danbury Baptists complained
bitterly about how they were subject to violations of their religious liberty by government
and religious officials who during the late campaign had the temerity to accuse Jefferson of
being "an enemy of religion Law & good order." Letter from the Danbury Baptist
Association to Thomas Jefferson, supra.From the perspective of the small group of
dissenting Baptists, they were put upon because in Connecticut, "[r]eligion is considered as
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could have been agreed to by the First Congress. It follows, Feldman postulates,
that protection of conscience is the full scope of the original meaning of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.40 9
Feldman's innovation is problematic at multiple levels. First, we examined
earlier the amendments proposed by New Hampshire, Virginia, and New York
during the ratification of the Constitution-and North Carolina and Rhode Island
later copied Virginia's proposal. We also considered a constitutional amendment
debated in Maryland, although it did not pass. Each of these amendments
addressed conscience and no-establishment separately. Accordingly, these stateproposed amendments assumed an understanding of religious freedom that went
beyond just liberty of conscience.4 10
Indeed, one could begin a few years earlier by taking note of how Virginia
had worked through its struggle for religious freedom. In Virginia, conscience was
protected in the state constitution as of 1776 but disestablishment of the Anglican
Church was not achieved until 1786.41 Second, the adoption of a Bill of Rights
(including the First Amendment) was possible only because the First Congress
confined the purpose of the amendments to agreeing on those powers that were not
delegated to the national government. As historian Thomas Curry explained: while
Americans sharply disagreed over governmental power with respect to issues such
as the establishment of religion, they could agree on Congress not being vested
with any power over such establishments.4 12 Feldman is thus answering the wrong
question. The question before the First Congress was not what substantive rule the

the first object of Legislation; and therefore what religious privileges we enjoy (as a minor
part of the State) we enjoy as favors granted, and not as inalienable rights: and these favors
we receive at the expense of such degrading acknowledgements, as are inconsistent with
the rights of freemen." Id. No doubt the Congregationalists of Connecticut did not view
their system as a Violation of conscience, but as in many things burdens on conscience
depend on one's point of view. In 1789, the establishment in Connecticut was not
anywhere near collapse. Disestablishment did not occur until 1818. Esbeck, Dissent and
Disestablishment,supra note 8, at 1501-11, 1541-42.
409 Feldman, The Intellectual Origins, supra note 407, at 398, 411. The Supreme

Court rejected Feldman's position as early as Engel v. Vitale. 370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962)
("The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any
showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which
establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving
individuals or not.

. .

. When the power, prestige and financial support of government is

placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious
minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain. But the
purposes underlying the Establishment Clause go much further than that.").
410 See supra notes 103, 107, 114, 133, 140, 156 and accompanying text (proposed
amendments from these six states).
. 411 Esbeck, Virginia Disestablishment, supra note 5, at 65-70 (adoption of the
Virginia Declaration of Rights in 1776); id. at 86, 88 (defeat of Patrick Henry's Assessment
Bill in 1784-1785 and passage of Jefferson's Religious Freedom Bill in early 1786).
412 See CURRY, supra note 7, at 193-94.
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Congress of 1789 agreed to with respect to religious freedom, but what the
Congress agreed were the powers not held by the new central government.
Third, Feldman's argument is at odds with the separate treatment of the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses as they independently evolved during the 1779
drafting process beginning in the House, then the Senate, and finally the
Conference Committee. For example, on June 8, 1779, James Madison proposed a
separate amendment binding on states that involved only the protection of
conscience. That amendment was unlike Madison's amendment binding on the
national government which involved both the concepts of conscience and noestablishment.4 13 This not only shows a clear distinction between conscience and
no-establishment, but it shows that Madison accepted from the very start that the
no-establishment principle would be binding on the national government but not
the states.414 The distinction was maintained a week later in the report to the House
by the Select Committee of Eleven.4 15 The distinction remained through the several
August drafts in the House 4 16 and through the several September drafts in the
Senate, albeit the Senate reduced freedom of conscience along the way to the "free
exercise of religion.'417 Finally, the House/Senate Conference Committee
maintained the distinction when it proposed two independent participial phrases
("respecting an establishment" and "prohibiting the free exercise"), clearly
maintaining two independent legal concepts. Thus, not only Madison but also the
House and Senate members active in the debate faithfully maintained the
distinction between conscience and no-establishment that eventually came to be
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.
Fourth, Feldman's thesis causes him to distort the normative meaning of
coercion, for conscience is violated only when coerced. For example, quite
understandably, he wants the Establishment Clause to prevent many types of
government programs where there is funding going to religious organizations.4 18
To argue that the Establishment Clause prevents government funding to religious
413 See supra note 183 and accompanying text. Compare Madison's amendment
directed at the national government numbered "Fourthly," with his amendment directed at
the states numbered "Fifthly."
414 This is borne out in the modern Supreme Court's differentiation of the two religion
clauses in that a violation of free exercise requires a showing of coercion of conscience,
whereas a violation of no-establishment does not. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 221, 223 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962).
415 See supra notes 198, 200 and accompanying
text.
416
See supra notes 202-273 and accompanying text.
417 See supra notes 279-289 and accompanying text. The Free Exercise
Clause is
narrower than "rights of conscience," because a claimant must first adhere to a religion
before he can claim that its free exercise is being unconstitutionally hindered. In contrast, a
claim that one's conscience is unconstitutionally coerced by the government over a
religious matter does not necessarily require that the claimant first adhere to a religion.
418 FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD, supra note 407, at 237-39 (stating that his solution,
inter alia, is to prohibit government money and similar aid from going to religious
organizations).
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organizations, Feldman must claim that such funding constitutes coercion of
conscience.419 But this is rather fanciful when the source of government funding is
taxes paid into the general treasury. The logical conclusion of Feldman's argument
is that every taxpayer suffers coercion, even though many of these taxpayers would
support (or at least feel indifferent to) a law that, inter alia, aided religious schools
*420
or charities.
Fifth, as noted in the prior paragraph, for Feldman it is coercive of conscience
for a taxpayer to pay taxes into the general treasury from which some money may
later be appropriated to religious organizations.42 1 It thereby becomes coercive, not
Feldman, The IntellectualOrigins, supra note 407, at 417-21.
The lack of logic to Feldman's notion is laid bare in Steven D. Smith, Taxes,
Conscience, and the Constitution, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 365 (2006). Historically, coercion
with respect to taxpayers was present only when there was a special or earmarked tax
traceable to a religious use and no other. See Esbeck, Virginia Disestablishment,supra note
5, at 89-90 (recognizing the religious assessment proposed by Patrick Henry and defeated
by Madison and Protestant dissenters in Virginia in 1785 was a special tax earmarked for
religious purposes, and thus truly coercive because it compelled what was essentially a
tithe; accordingly, the defeat of Henry's bill is not evidence that the use of tax monies
collected for general purposes and paid into the general treasury are coercive of conscience
when tax money is later appropriated to religious organizations for public purposes).
421 It is not hard to surmise where Feldman derives this definition of coercion. In Flast
v. Cohen the Court said that one of the abuses with which the Establishment Clause was
concerned is the spending of tax funds to support religion. 392 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1968).
However, there are problems with Feldman's reliance on this passage in Flast.First, Flast
says that taxpayer conscience is only one of the abuses addressed by the Establishment
Clause. Id at 103. Unlike Feldman, whose thesis limits the scope of the clause solely to a
claim of conscience, the Court recognized many additional abuses corrected by the
Establishment Clause. Second, Flast only grants standing to sue, so the holding was
limited. The Court then remanded for proceedings on the merits. Id. at 106. The actual
rules on when a legislative appropriation from general tax funds does or does not violate
the Establishment Clause are far narrower than Flast's conception of taxpayer conscience.
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the modem Court set the parameters for when "indirect"
funding that reaches religious organizations is permitted under the Establishment Clause.
536 U.S. 639 (2002). If beneficiaries of a secular program have a genuine choice with
respect to where they take their benefit to claim their government-funded services, then the
program is constitutional. In Mitchell v. Helms, the modem Court set the parameters for
when "direct" funding that reaches religious organizations is permitted under the
Establishment Clause. 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality opinion). If the purpose of the
funding program is secular, the service providers eligible to administer the aid are selected
without regard to religion, and the government monitors to prevent diversion of any funds
from being used for explicitly religious activities, then the program is constitutional.
Written by Justice Thomas, the plurality opinion in Mitchell was joined by four justices.
The controlling law in Mitchell turns on the separate concurring opinion by Justice
O'Connor, joined by Justice Breyer. Id. at 836. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188,
193 (1977) (explaining that when the Supreme Court fails to issue a majority opinion, the
opinion of the members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds is
controlling). Accordingly, there is complete disharmony between Feldman's argument that
419
420
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when the taxes are initially paid, but only when (and if) the money is later
appropriated by the legislature to organizations some of whom are religious.
Feldman does not explain why the moment of coercion is delayed until the actual
moment of the appropriation-a moment likely not even known to the taxpayer,
unlike the moment in time when the taxpayer initially pays his taxes.422 One can go
on and press Feldman concerning why is it not also coercion of conscience when a
taxpayer is forced to pay taxes into the general treasury from which some money
will certainly be appropriated for causes which directly countermand the
taxpayer's sincere religious beliefs? Given Feldman's logic, it should also be
actionable coercion to force a religious pacifist (e.g., a Quaker) to pay federal
income taxes of which a significant percent will go to military weaponry and
fighting wars. If the abstraction of tax-derived money going, inter alia, to pay for
education in science and mathematics at a religious school is actionable coercion in
Feldman's analysis, then why is the Quaker's more palpable coercion of
religiously informed conscience not recognized as coercion actionable under the
First Amendment? Yet the Court will not give the Quaker standing to sue as a
taxpayer because there is no coercion.42 3 When Feldman insists a taxpayer suffers
religious coercion, the inconsistency in how he summarily brushes off the
pacifistic Quaker makes no sense.
Sixth, Feldman would make actionable taxpayer coercion only when the
money paid into the general treasury eventually makes its way into the hands of a
religious organization. However, many other taxpayers are conscientious objectors
a taxpayer's Establishment Clause claim is limited to liberty of conscience such as
conceived in Flast and the modem Court's application of the Establishment Clause to aid
for religious organizations in Zelman and Mitchell.
422 Flast'sprinciple of taxpayer coercion misreads the history of Madison's "not even
three pence" argument in his Memorial and Remonstrance to defeat Patrick Henry's
religious assessment bill in Virginia. See supra note 420. The Court's recent decision in
Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, continued Flast's historical

mistake. 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1448 (2011) ("[W]hat matters under Flast is whether sectarian
[institutions] receive government funds drawn from general tax revenues, so that moneys
have been extracted from a citizen and handed to a religious institution in violation of the
citizen's conscience."). In the Virginia struggle, Madison argued that even "three pence" of
tax monies paid under Henry's proposed bill would violate conscience because it was an
ear-marked tax, that is, the tax monies would have been collected by the state and paid
directly over to Christian clergy. Thus, Henry's proposed tax was like a compelled tithe,
truly coercive and directly traceable to the coerced taxpayer. Feldman's claim is not so
constrained. He would find coercion of conscience where a taxpayer pays his taxes into the
general treasury. Feldman, The Intellectual Origins, supra note 407, at 416-17 (tepidly
defending his claim of taxpayer coercion as "debatable," while failing to respond to
arguments to the contrary). As noted in the text, logic cannot support such an extension of
the concept of coercion, and neither Flastnor Winn can change Virginia's disestablishment
history to suit Feldman's thesis.
423 See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971) (plurality in part) (dismissing a
taxpayer free exercise claim because of lack of coercion); Bd. of Ed. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236, 248-49 (1968) (same).
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to nonreligious uses of their taxes. For example, they are deeply disturbed at
corporate bailouts, issuance of off-shore drilling leases, or the enforcement of drug
laws covering the use of cannabis for medical purposes. But such objections of
conscience have a secular basis, not religious. So by Feldman's logic such
objections do not count as denials of liberty of conscience. However, interpreting
the First Amendment to protect liberty of conscience should make these deeply felt
secular objections actionable by taxpayers as well, and Feldman offers no rationale
for why they do not. Feldman's privileging of a taxpayer's claim when challenging
governmental appropriations only when the monies make their way to a religious
organization makes no sense. What does make sense is to say, as the modem
Supreme Court has said, that a violation of the Establishment Clause does not
require a showing of coercion of conscience.424 That means, of course, abandoning
Feldman's claim that the no-establishment principle protects only conscience. And,
indeed, since Everson, the Court has applied the Establishment Clause to protect
interests other than liberty of conscience. For example, the Court has found that the
government has exceeded its powers as limited by the Establishment Clause when
composing voluntary prayers; conducting voluntary devotional Bible reading; 426
resolving creedal disputes;4 2 7 or involving the judiciary in explicitly religious
events, beliefs, and practices.428
Seventh, if only coercion of conscience is prohibited by the First Amendment,
as Feldman claims, then government may favor one or some religions over others.
Indeed, as in England today, government may have a full-fledged church
establishment and still avoid coercing the faiths of others who choose not to be a
member of the Church of England.4 29 Feldman does not explain how his premise
avoids that logical consequence.
Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 221, 223 (1963); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962).
425 See Engel, 370 U.S. at 425 (stating that it is not for the government to compose
prayers for voluntary daily recitation by public school students).
426 See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 205-07, 223-24 (stating that it is not for the government
to select biblical passages for voluntary daily devotions to begin the public school day).
427 See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981) (stating that it is not for
the government to determine whether plaintiff had a correct or incorrect view of Jehovah's
Witnesses beliefs and practices); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696, 709-10 (1976) (holding that civil courts may not probe into church polity or the
process of removal of clerics in a hierarchical church).
428 See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 n.6, 271 n.9, 272 n.1 1 (1981) (stating it
is not for the government to determine whether a university student organization's speech
is worship or nonworship religious speech).
429 Cf Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971) (dismissing a Free Exercise
Clause claim challenging a program to fund institutions of higher education, including
religious colleges, because taxpayer plaintiffs were unable to show religious coercion); Bd.
of Ed. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248-49 (1968) (dismissing a Free Exercise claim
challenging a program that lent secular textbooks to K-12 schools, including religious
schools, because taxpayer plaintiffs were unable to show religious coercion).
424
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Finally, shrinking the religion clauses to merely protect individual conscience
is altogether inconsistent with the Western legal tradition. The two participial
phrases up to the first semicolon of the First Amendment indicate two distinct
components of religious freedom.4 30 One component addresses the relationship
between government, the individual, and religion (i.e., free exercise). The second
component addresses the relationship between government and organized religion
(i.e., no-establishment or separation of church and government). 4 31 For over a
millennium, Western civilization has envisioned religious freedom to be about not
just the liberty of the individual but 'also the separation of government and
church.4 32
It is not happenstance that Feldman's version of the historical developments
leading to the adoption of the Establishment Clause bends the record toward his
preference for liberalism's claim that ultimately only the nation-state and
individuals matter, denying any autonomy for organized religious societies not
reducible to the aggregate rights of their individual members. From the perspective
of the West, Feldman's position fails to account for the dual-authority relationship
of church and state that has deeply marked Western civilization and led to its
highest form of religious freedom in the American states, a freedom which rejects
a state's power to use organized religion to unify and stabilize the state. The latter
step is the rightly celebrated American notion of full religious freedom-not just
liberty of conscience-through the institutional separation of church and civil
government.
C. The Establishment Clause'sNegation ofPower Is Limited
and Permits Regulatory Exemptions
Consider again just the text, "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion."433 The text does not deny Congress power to "make.. . .
law" about religion. Rather, it more narrowly denies Congress the power to "make
... law" about "an establishment" of religion.

The religion clauses provide: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
431 Coercion of conscience is about preventing personal harm. It is for
that reason that
we often associate coercion of religious-based conscience with the Free Exercise Clause. In
contrast, the no-establishment principle is about policing the outer limits of the
government's jurisdiction when it comes to treading on matters within the purview of
organized religion. The Establishment Clause is thus primarily about the structural harm
that can result when church-government relations are disordered. See Esbeck,
Establishment Clause as Structural,supranote 404, at 40-42.
430

432 HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION 88-119 (1983); CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY: KEY
DOCUMENTS, DECISIONS, AND COMMENTARY FROM THE PAST THREE CENTURIES 1-7 (John
F. Wilson & Donald L. Drakeman eds., 3d ed. 2003); BRIAN TIERNEY, THE CRISIS OF
CHURCH AND STATE: 1050-1300, at 1-5 (1964).
433 U.S. CONST. amend. I

HeinOnline -- 2011 Utah L. Rev. 593 2011

UTAH LAW REVIEW

594

[No. 2

Thus, for example, assume that soon after 1791 Congress passed a
comprehensive law regulating conscription into the Army and Navy. In exercising
its express constitutional power to oversee the armed forces, 434 Congress provided
an exemption from the draft for religious pacifists. Nothing in the Establishment
Clause prohibits such an exemption. That is, adopting an exemption for religious
pacifists is certainly to "make [a] law respecting" religion, but it is not to more
narrowly make a law about "an establishment" of religion. The draft exemption is
designed to merely allow pacifists to follow certain practices born of their religious
conscience, not to permit the government to affirmatively advance religion. That
is, the object of the exemption is not to advance religion but to advance religious
freedom.
As a second example, it would be fully consistent with the scope of the
Establishment Clause for Congress to enact comprehensive legislation under the
Interstate Commerce and Taxing Clauses 435 requiring large employers to provide
unemployment compensation to their employees, but then exempt religious
organizations from the act. To enact such a religion-specific exemption is certainly
to "make [a] law respecting" religion. But the exemption is not more narrowly a
law "respecting an establishment" of religion. 4 3 6 Once again, the exemption is
designed to merely allow individuals to follow certain religious practices if they
are already so inclined.
The foregoing raises a larger issue regarding the constitutionality of religious
exemptions from regulatory and tax burdens. It is a categorical mistake to presume
that a statutory religious exemption is a form of religious "favoritism" or
"preference." Look again at the text. Although the government cannot "make [a]
law" in support of "an establishment" of religion, it may "make [a] law" in support
of religious freedom. Indeed, that would have to be so because the Free Exercise
The Constitution grants Congress the authority "[t]o make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
435 The Interstate Commerce Clause grants to Congress the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States." Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Taxing Clause reads,
"The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises ...
but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." Id. art.
1, § 8, cl. 1.
436 See, e.g., Rojas v. Fitch, 127 F.3d 184 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that a statutory
exemption for religious organizations from an unemployment compensation tax did not
violate the Establishment Clause). In a similar vein, although the Free Exercise Clause by
its terms does not allow for a law "prohibiting" religious exercise, the government retains
authority to pass a law allowing those wishing to independently pursue their religious
interests to do so without regulatory interference. For example, a public school in the
District of Columbia is free to have a policy allowing a teacher to observe a religious holy
day as one of the teacher's allotted "personal days." Although the public school
accommodates the teacher's religious liberty, the power to do so does not come from the
Free Exercise Clause (because, as discussed above, the clauses in the Bill of Rights were
not a grant of new national power). But neither does the Establishment Clause negate a use
of national power, power delegated elsewhere in the Constitution, to expand religious
liberty.
434
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Clause is itself a law in support of religious freedom. Moreover, there are two
provisions in the 1787 Constitution that expressly safeguard independent acts of
religious observance: the Religious Test Clause 4 3 7 and the provisions permitting an
affirmation in lieu of an oath to accommodate Quakers and other small sects.4 38
The First Amendment would not make any sense if the Establishment Clause
contradicted the Free Exercise Clause, or if the Establishment Clause overrode or
nullified these two other explicit accommodations of religious exercise.
While a plain reading of the text is reason enough,4 39 the logic of this plain
reading is straightforward. For example, all agree that the First Amendment is pro
freedom of speech and pro freedom of the press. By the same token, the First
Amendment is pro religious freedom. This is as true of the Establishment Clause
as it is true of the Free Exercise Clause. Sponsoring or supporting religions, on the
one hand, and sponsoring or supporting acts of religious freedom, on the other
hand, are two very different things. While the post-Everson Establishment Clause
prohibits the government from supporting religion, it does not prohibit the
government from supporting religious freedom.440 Although religious- exemptions
from general regulatory and tax burdens are compatible with the text of the
Establishment Clause, exemptions that discriminate among religions or that cause
government officials to be drawn into the task of resolving a question of religious
doctrine in order to administer a law do violate the Establishment Clause.44'
Another way of stating the matter is: government avoids establishing religion
by leaving its private exercise alone, which is exactly what a legislative religious
exemption does. Religious exemptions not only allow for private acts of religious
freedom, but they also reinforce the desired separation of church and state. Hence,
it is entirely proper that the Supreme Court has held in every congressional
religious-exemption case to come before it that the act of Congress in question did
not violate the Establishment Clause.442 The Court's specific rationale in these
437

See supra text accompanying notes 16-17, 54-61..

438 See supra text

accompanying notes 12-13.
Some are helped with a visual. The religion clauses do not read "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment -o religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof." If the three struck-out words had in fact been omitted, then the two phrases would
render religious exemption in contradiction. But the presence of the text "an establishment
of," renders the two clauses in harmony and both supportive of religious freedom.
439

440 See Carl H. Esbeck, When Accommodationsfor Religion Violate the Establishment
Clause: Regularizingthe Supreme Court'sAnalysis, 110 W. VA. L. REv. 359, 360, 367-68,

372-74 (2007).
4' Id. at 387-95 (setting forth five rules concerning errors to avoid in drafting a
religious exemption in legislation).
.442 See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (holding that federal civil rights
legislation requiring states to accommodate many religious practices of prison inmates was
consistent with the Establishment Clause); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (holding that a
nondiscrimination statute could exempt religious organizations from the prohibition on
religious discrimination in employment consistent with the Establishment Clause); Gillette
v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (holding that a religious pacifist opposed to all war
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cases has not always been entirely clear or even logical, but the justices have
consistently reached the correct result-a result fully in harmony with the text of
the religion clauses.443
VI. THE CONSTITUTION'S OVERALL STRUCTURE AND UNDERLYING POLITICAL
THEORY AS BEARING ON THE MEANING OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

A. Incorporatingthe Establishment Clause: Confusing a FederalistClause
with a JurisdictionalClause
The incorporation of the Establishment Clause through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment presents an intriguing legal problem, but one
of interest only to academics until Justice Clarence Thomas first took note in his
concurring opinion in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.444 The essence of the puzzle is
that if the Establishment Clause is structural rather than rights based, then it makes
no sense to incorporate the clause as a Fourteenth Amendment "liberty" applicable
to the states. Of course, there is no chance that Everson's incorporation of the
clause will be reversed.445 Aware of that reality, Justice Thomas has taken the less
ambitious tack of arguing that the Establishment Clause should be applied to the
states with reduced rigor.46
could be exempt from the military draft consistent with the Establishment Clause); The
Selective Serv. Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (holding that clergy, theology
students, and religious pacifists could be exempt from the military draft consistent with the
Establishment Clause).
44 The foregoing demonstrates why law professor Philip Kurland's theory that the
First Amendment requires a "religion blind government" is deeply flawed. See PHILIP B.
KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW: OF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE SUPREME COURT 18,
112 (1962) (proposing that the First Amendment means religion can never be used as a
basis for legislative classification by the government). Kurland's theory is contrary to the
very text of the two religion clauses which are proreligious freedom.
444 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678-80 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3084 n.20 (2010)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (reaffirming his view that
the Establishment Clause is federalist and thus not capable of incorporation as a right);
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 727-29 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); Elk Grove
United Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 50-51 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment).
44 The Court expressly rejected the idea of reversing incorporation in Wallace v.
Jaffree. 472 U.S. 38, 48-55 (1985) (striking down a state law requiring a moment of
silence for prayer or meditation in public schools as a violation of the Establishment

Clause).
446 Justice Thomas suggests that when applied to the states the Establishment Clause
should be focused only on prohibiting religious coercion and stopping discrimination
among religions. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 728-29 (Thomas, J., concurring); Newdow, 542
U.S. at 50-51 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Zelman, 536 U.S. at 678-80
(Thomas, J., concurring).
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The first thing to be sorted when the topic of incorporation of the
Establishment Clause arises is the confusion between two very different concepts.
There is an important difference between a federalist Establishment Clause and a
jurisdictional Establishment Clause. A federalist clause tied to the last-minute
introduction of "respecting" into the text by the Conference Committee-which
this Article calls "specific federalism"-is not supported by the record in the First
Federal Congress. 4 47 The latter-an Establishment Clause that in certain respects
separates church and government and thereby structures relations between these
two centers of authority-is suggested by the text.448 A jurisdictional
Establishment Clause has not only separated organized religion and the national
government since 1789-91, but beginning with its incorporation by Everson the
clause has separated organized religion from government in general (national,
state, and local). In summary, a "specific federalist" Establishment Clause is about
national/state structure whereas a jurisdictional Establishment Clause is about
church/government structure. The former is not supported by original meaning
whereas the latter is suggested by it.
The theory of specific federalism is embraced by, for example, Professor Kurt
Lash. 44 9 He believes that the original Establishment Clause could not be
incorporated as a "liberty" through the Fourteenth Amendment. However, Lash
maintains that between 1789-91 and 1868 (the year the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified) both the states and Congress had come to regard the clause as the
grant of an individual right.4 50 He therefore argues that the Thirty-Ninth Congress
must have intended to incorporate the Establishment Clause as one of the rights in
the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights, making it binding on the states.4 5 1
Lash's argument that the Thirty-Ninth Congress regarded the Establishment
Clause as rights based has its detractors.452 Nonetheless, if one assumes arguendo
"

See supra Part IV.H.2-3.

See supra Part IV.H. 1-2, as well as notes 394-404 and accompanying text.
321, at 1090-92.
450
Id. at 1089, 1105-17.
451 Id. at 1088, 1099, 1141-45. This would lead to two meanings for the
Establishment Clause: one meaning binding on the national government and a different
meaning binding on state and local governments. That would be messy but manageable.
45 The evidence that the meaning of the Establishment Clause changed during this
period is thin and not altogether convincing, as is the paltry evidence that the Thirty-Ninth
Congress gave thought to the meaning of the Establishment Clause when the Fourteenth
Amendment was debated in 1866-1867. See HAMBURGER, supra note 6, at 436 n.112
(discussing why it is unlikely that the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to alter the
meaning of the Establishment Clause); see also AMAR, supra note 321, at 253, 385 n.91
(noting that the historical evidence is sparse and that members of the Reconstruction
Congress did not list no-establishment among their catalog of individual rights); Jonathan
448

449 See Lash, supra note

P. Brose, In Birmingham They Love the Governor: Why the Fourteenth Amendment Does
Not Incorporate the Establishment Clause, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 1, 17-29 (1998)

(reviewing the congressional history of the post-Civil War debate over the drafting of the
Fourteenth Amendment with respect to religious freedom and concluding that in 1866-
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that Lash is correct insofar as he believes that a federalist Establishment Clause
existed at one time because of the work of the House-Senate Conference of
September 22-23, 1789, but had lost its federalist character by 1868, it does not
follow that the Establishment Clause thereby took on the nature of an individual
right. Rather, it is highly probable that the Establishment Clause retained its
jurisdictional character as separating church and government. Indeed, many of the
sources that Lash cites as evidence that the public forgot the federalist character of
the Establishment Clause are also evidence that the public increasingly began to
consider the clause as guaranteeing the separation of church and government. 4 5 3
Everson incorporated the Establishment Clause in 1947. In Lash's view,
incorporation is not a problem because the clause had become a right, and rights (if
fundamental) are properly incorporated as "liberty" interests secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment. However, to the extent that the post-1868 Establishment
Clause separates church and government-that is, it continues to set a
jurisdictional limit on governmental interference with organized religionincorporation is still awkward because it treats church/government separation as a
"liberty" interest. The latter makes little sense because separation is about policing
a boundary between two entities.
Lash is not the only one to fail to keep the national/state divide distinct from
the church/government divide. In an article cataloging individual rights under state
constitutions as of 1868, Professor Steven Calabresi and one of his students
collected those state constitutions which had adopted a clause similar to the federal
Establishment Clause.454 Calabresi then reasons that if by 1868 a state had adopted
such a clause in its own constitution, the state must not have believed that the
Establishment Clause was federalist. 455 I agree. But Calabresi goes on to assumeas does Lash-that therefore the state must have perceived the Establishment
Clause as an individual right.456 That does not follow. Rather, such a state likely
presumed that the Establishment Clause separated church and government, the
latter being a jurisdictional limit separating these two centers of authority.

1867 the Establishment Clause continued to be viewed as a power-limiting clause rather
than as a rights-based clause).
453 Lash quotes from various state court cases holding that Sunday closing laws
violated the principle of church-state separation. It was common for courts to say that all
civil power had been denied as to spiritual matters. Lash, supra note 321, at 1105-10.
Additionally, with respect to doctrinal disputes which cause two factions to claim
ownership of the real estate of a church, Lash quotes several state rulings based on
common law that once again church-state separation disempowered the civil courts to
resolve disputes over doctrine. Id. at 1111-17. These cases are about lacking civil
jurisdiction over religious matters more than they are about individual rights.
.454 Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights under State
Constitutions when the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are
Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REv. 7, 31-33 (2008).
455 Id. at 32.
4 56

d
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The question of whether the Establishment Clause-properly understood as
jurisdictional-is capable of incorporation as a Fourteenth Amendment "liberty,"
this Article leaves for the reader to resolve to her own satisfaction. 457 That said,
even if the Supreme Court had never incorporated the Establishment Clause in
Everson, the clause still would separate organized religion and government. A
failure to incorporate would only mean that the national government alone would
be separated from organized religion. In that event, the clause's denial of national
power with respect to establishmentarianism still would have substantive
consequences in the nature of limiting the national government's jurisdiction.
From 1791 forward, an assumption of non-incorporation would mean that at the
national level Congress alone would have had no power to "make . . . law

respecting an establishment of religion." However, Congress would remain free to
draw on powers enumerated in the 1787 Constitution with respect to enacting a
law that may have touched on religion. For example, using its enumerated power
to regulate the armed forces, 458 Congress could provide for military conscription
but then could also regulate (that is, touch on) religion by exempting religious
pacifists from the draft. Such a statute is within Congress' original enumerated
powers, whereas the pacifist exemption, albeit touching on religion, is not a law
about "an establishment" of religion. As discussed above, the First Amendment
Using the process of "selective incorporation," the Everson Court applied the
Establishment Clause through the "liberty" provision in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, making the restraints of the clause binding on state and local
governments. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1947). Selective incorporation
uses fundamental rights analysis to determine which rights in the first eight amendments of
the Bill of Rights should bind state and local governments. However, the Establishment
Clause does not set forth a right but rather sets a structural boundary between organized
religion and government. See supra notes 328-329, 397-404, 413-417, 424-428, 432 and
accompanying text. Therefore, the argument that incorporation of the Establishment Clause
was a mistake is that the clause is incapable of being incorporated as a fundamental right
because no-establishment is not a right but is instead structural. Cf McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3084 n.20 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (reaffirming his view that the Establishment Clause is federalist and thus
not capable of incorporating as a right); id. at 3111 n.40 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (agreeing
with the logic that if a clause is structural, such as a federalist clause, then such a clause
cannot be incorporated). In defense of incorporation, on the other hand, is the argument
that enforcement of the Establishment Clause has the consequence of protecting, inter alia,
the right of conscience to be free of government-imposed religion even for those who
subscribe to no religion. The rejoinder to that argument is that constitutional structure often
yields liberty as a consequence, but that still does not make structure capable of
incorporation because it is not a right. The surrejoinder is that the doctrine of selective
incorporation is not limited to rights qua rights but also reaches liberties that are a
consequence of structure. See id. at 3123 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that structure
might be selectively incorporated "the extent to which incorporation will advance or hinder
the Constitution's structural aims."). For more discussion and a collection of authorities,
457

see Esbeck, Establishment Clause as Structural,supra note 404, at 25-32.
458 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 12-14.
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text necessarily makes this distinction as to the scope of the Establishment
Clause.459 So the military conscription statute with its religious exemption does not
run afoul of the limited denial of national power imposed by the Establishment
Clause. The exemption advances religious freedom rather than advances religion.
That was true in 1791, and it is true today.
We thus see that the early Congress, with an eye to the Establishment Clause,
necessarily had to work out a definable line between when the national government
had jurisdiction to pass general legislation on a matter that merely touched on
religion and those occasions when it lacked jurisdiction to pass legislation because
its subject was about "an establishment" of religion. Whether one calls it a
jurisdictional boundary, a substantive rule, or a structural restraint, this case-bycase line drawing would have required Congress over time to systematically work
out relations between the national government and organized religion. This is
another way of saying that the no-establishment text necessarily operated to police
the boundary between organized religion and the national government.
It is almost certainly true that the Federalists in control of the House and
Senate in September 1789 did not have a fully developed rule of churchgovernment relations. To that limited extent, I agree with Professor Steven Smith
that the search for a fully developed substantive rule of church-government
relations in the congressional debates of 1789 will fail.4 60 But from the plain text it
cannot be doubted that the amendment prohibited as a matter of substance a
national establishment. That Federalists and Antifederalists agreed that Congress
should have no power with respect to matters of "an establishment" is revealingnot in the sense of federalism, but in the important sense of limiting natioltal
jurisdiction.
A substantive rule defining the line between church and government should
have developed case by case as Congress (and the other federal branches)
faithfully sought to make general laws that might touch on religion but did not,
more narrowly, promote an establishment of religion. Additionally, because the
national government was at first small and for the most part did not focus on dayto-day domestic matters, the occasion for national laws about religion were few.
Further, congressional members often regarded the pervasive Protestant ethic that
was reflected in their legislation as part of general culture, morals, ceremony, or
public virtue as opposed to advancing Protestant beliefs. It was not until after the
Civil War that the Establishment Clause was called on to do actual work in the
federal courts. And it was not until the Court decided Everson that it drew more
459

460

See supra Part V.C.
See STEVEN D.

SMITH,

FOREORDAINED

FAILURE:

THE

QUEST FOR A

22-27, 45-48 (1995) (arguing that in
its original meaning, the Establishment Clause had no substantive theory of religious
freedom); cf HAMBURGER, supra note 6, at 106 n.40 (rejecting Smith's claim that the
Establishment Clause was without substantive meaning, and noting that for historical
reasons its operation was likely acknowledging the jurisdictional nature of church and
government). We can, of course, still say much about what the Congress of 1789 did not
mean by an establishment. Indeed, much of this Article endeavors to do just that.
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
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intensely from the lessons learned during the disestablishment in Virginia and
other states to reconstruct a substantive meaning for the Establishment Clause.
B. The Impossibility of Tension between the Religion Clauses

The Free Exercise Clause is rightly acknowledged as protecting religious
liberty. However, there is a widely held misconception that the Establishment
Clause is to hold religion in check. If the latter were true, then when the two
clauses overlapped they would at times conflict or be in tension. That is not the
case. The clauses are complementary, each in their own way protecting religious
freedom. 4 6 1 As we have seen, eleven states had ratified the Constitution by the end
of July 1788.462 As directed by the Confederation Congress, national elections of
presidential electors and representatives in the House followed in the fall and
winter of 1788.463 The implementation of the new government was set to begin in
March and April of 1789 as Congress and President Washington's administration
congregated at a temporary capital in New York City. 464 A proposed bill of rights
was introduced by James Madison in the House of Representatives on June 8,
1789, debated in Congress from July to September 1789, and ratified over two
years later by three-quarters of the states in December 1791.
Focusing on the early Constitution's overall structure and theory, we begin
with the fact that the Establishment Clause has its origin as a part of the Bill of
Rights. The Bill of Rights did not vest any new power in the national government;
it did just the opposite. 46 5 Most provisions in the first eight amendments
comprising the Bill of Rights 46 6 were designed to negate an assumption of power
by the national government being wrongly implied from some power-delegating
clause in the 1787 Constitution. That is why the provisions in the Bill of Rights are
often referred to as "negative rights."467 They tell the national government what it
See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) ("Although these two clauses may
in certain instances overlap, they forbid two . quite different kinds of governmental
encroachment upon religious freedom.").
462 See supra table accompanying notes
349-358.
463 See 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supranote 12, at
332-33.
464 See LABUNSKI, supranote 178, at 180, 183-84.
465 See LEVY, supra note 17, at 141-42; WALDMAN, supra note 26,
at 153.
466 The Ninth Amendment is a rule on how to construe the 1787 Constitution
and its
first eight amendments. It reads: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONsT.
amend. IX. The Tenth Amendment is likewise a rule on how to construe the 1787
Constitution. It reads: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment thereby makes explicit what James Wilson
and other Federalists argued repeatedly during the ratification period, namely that the
national government was one of enumerated powers.
467 See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring)
("[T]he Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the
individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact from the government.").
461
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has no power to do, as opposed to telling the government what it may (or must)
affirmatively do.
During the debate over ratification of the 1787 Constitution, numerous
Americans called for safeguards against an overly expansive interpretation of
certain power-granting clauses to the proposed government.4 6 For many
Americans-not just Antifederalists-James Wilson's argument that the new
government was one of limited, enumerated powers 4 69 was reassuring but not
sufficient. They wanted it in writing. For example, these Americans worried that
the wording of the Necessary and Proper Clause 4 70 was so open-ended that it could
be a vehicle for implying unlimited national power.47 1 If Wilson was correct, they
argued, then why would Article 1, section 9 of the Constitution be necessary to
deny the grant of certain rights and powers? 472 Similarly, Baptists in Virginia
worried that the Religious Test Clause, while prohibiting the imposition of
religious qualifications on those holding national office, was so narrow in its
protection of religious liberty that the Test Clause could be read as giving license
to Congress to violate religious freedom more generally-for example, by
imposing a national tax to support a national church.47 3
See supra notes 86, 181 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
470 See supra note 282 and accompanying text; U.S.
468

469

CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("To
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.").
471 For example, in defending the need for a bill of rights to protect religious freedom
in the face of Federalists' complaints that the amendments were unnecessary, James
Madison specially mentioned complaints about the Necessary and Proper Clause:

Whether the words are necessary or not, he did not mean to say, but they
had been required by some of the State Conventions, who seemed to entertain an
opinion that under the clause of the constitution, which gave power to Congress
to make all laws necessary and proper to carry into execution the constitution,
and the laws made under it, enabled them to make laws of such a nature as
might infringe the rights of conscience, and establish a national religion ....
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 758 (Aug. 15, 1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). To be sure, a church
may not capture the state or an office thereof and put the civil power to the service of the
church. In such an event, there is state action. The state action is in the state permitting
itself to be captured by the church and pressed into her service. See, e.g., Larkin v.
Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 116 (1982) (holding that an ordinance granting local
churches veto power over issuance of a liquor license to a nearby tavern violates the
Establishment Clause).
472 See supra text accompanying notes 87-92. Article 1, Section 9 expressly denies
certain powers to the national government, as well as vests certain rights in the people
against the national government. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX, § 9.
473 WILLIAM R. ESTEP, REVOLUTION WITHIN THE REVOLUTION: THE FIRST
AMENDMENT IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT, 1612-1789, at 166 (1990) (quoting letter by Joseph
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As a general matter, such concerns about fundamental rights were not thought
fanciful. They were shared by noted statesmen such as George Mason who
opposed the ratification of the 1787 Constitution because it did not have a bill of
rights.474 Mason's model for such a comprehensive list was Virginia's Declaration
of Rights adopted in late 1776, section 16 of which addressed the free exercise of
religion. Mason is credited with the initial'draft of Virginia's Declaration, albeit
the free exercise language came from Madison.475
James Madison worked assiduously to ratify the 1787 Constitution by joining
with other Federalists in arguing that the Constitution did not need a bill of
rights.476 He argued that the powers delegated to the new central government were
sufficiently defined and limited such that they did not permit transgressing on
fundamental rights. Madison also worried that acquiescing in the need for a bill of
rights would alarm Americans. By denying powers never granted, the proposed
amendments might suggest to the people that the new government did indeed have
such implied powers in the original document.47 7 Further, he was concerned that
compiling a list of fundamental rights risked omitting others that would later be
claimed to be unprotected because they were not among those explicitly listed.478
Madison was also concerned that in compiling a list of rights, progressives would
have to share the task with those having illiberal views on the scope of certain
rights such as religious freedom, and thus the end product would be a description
of rights too crabbed for his liking. 479 Finally, Madison thought a bill of rights
would be ineffective or a "parchment barrier" to legislative excesses, whereas the
surer way to safeguard liberties was to widely diffuse governmental power and to
enable factions to check power with power. 4 8 0
Over the course of 1788-1789, Madison became of a different mind.4 8 1
Several state ratifying conventions expressed dismay at the absence of a bill of
Spencer to James Madison). Some Antifederalists had the same concern. See STORING,
supra note 60, at 64.
474 See LABUNSKI, supra note 178, at 65; 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 49496.
475 See Esbeck, Virginia Disestablishment,supranote 5, at 66-70.
476 See LABUNSKI, supra note 178, at 61-63.
477 Alexander Hamilton warned of such a danger

in the Federalist Papers. See THE

No. 84, reprintedin 1 FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION, supra note 39, at 468.
LABUNSKI, supra note 178, at 62. This concern was ultimately resolved by the

FEDERALIST
478

Ninth Amendment, which provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. IX.
479 WALDMAN, supra note 26, at 139. In a prior letter, Madison had been urged by
Thomas Jefferson to reconsider his opposition to a bill of rights. Madison wrote back
revealing some of his concerns including "that a positive declaration of some of the most
essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite latitude. I am sure that the rights of
Conscience in particular, if submitted to public definition would be narrowed.. . ." 11 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 186, at 295, 297.
480

481

Id. at 135-36, 138-39.

See ESTEP, supra note 473, at 164-71; LABUNSKl, supranote 178, at 62-63.
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rights, and five of the eleven states to ratify did so only after adopting a nonbinding
resolution that certain amendments be added to the Constitution.482 As a candidate
to join the Virginia delegation to the U.S. House of Representatives, Madison is
thought to have promised voters, in particular the Reverend George Eve, a leader
of the Baptists in Madison's congressional district, that if Madison was elected he
would introduce a bill of rights.483 Baptists had fought hard for religious freedom
in Virginia, and they were keen on securing similar safeguards for religious
freedom from potential national abuses.484 Finally, there was a serious effort
underway by Patrick Henry and other hard-shell Antifederalists to call for a second
constitutional convention.485 At a second convention, the likely result would have
been to increase the powers of the states and thereby decrease those of the central
government. However, the most popular feature to Henry's call for a second
convention was to add a bill of rights. That popular appeal would have been
neutralized if the First Congress were to promptly introduce a bill of rights for
ratification by the states. Madison aimed to do just that.
On May 4, 1789, James Madison, now a newly seated member of the U.S.
House of Representatives, announced on the House floor that he would be
proposing a set of amendments.486 On June 8th, Madison submitted a list of
nineteen amendments to the 1787 Constitution.487 Remarking generally on his
proposed list, Madison stated on the House floor that the overall purpose of the
amendments was "to limit and qualify the powers of Government, by excepting out
of the grant of power those cases in which the Government ought not to act, or to
act only in a particular mode.A88
The First Congress stayed true to this limited purpose to the very end. The
final draft of the Bill of Rights, as the Senate concurred in the House Resolution on
September 25, 1789, contained a Preamble that read:

482 LABUNSKI,

supra note 178, at 58-59, 113-14. The five states were Massachusetts,

South Carolina, New Hampshire, Virginia, and New York. See supra Part III. North
Carolina voted down ratification, but did recommend a set of amendments. James Madison
would have had before him all six sets of proposed amendments as he formulated his own
list of amendments for introduction at the First Federal Congress. MILLER, supra note 22,
at 252-53.
483 ESTEP, supra note 473, at 167-68; see also MILLER, supra note 22, at 248-49;
WALDMAN, supra note 26, at 142-44.

See supra notes 99, 494 and accompanying text. Indeed, Virginia Baptists wrote
President Washington in the spring of 1789 expressing concern that the national
484

government become the object of "religious oppression, should any religious society
predominate over the rest." EDWARD FRANK HUMPHREY, NATIONALISM AND RELIGION IN
AMERICA, 1774-1789, at 507 (1924) (reissued 1966).
485 LABuNsKI, supra note 178, at 187-95; WALDMAN, supra note 26, at 142-44.
See supra note 165-166 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 182-183 and accompanying text. Madison also submitted changes
to the Preamble suggestive of popular sovereignty as a basis for the nation's founding.
LABUNSKI, supra note 178, at 198-99; see also MILLER, supra note 22, at 251-53.
488 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 454 (June 8, 1789) (Joseph Gales
ed., 1834).
486
487
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The Conventions of a Number of the States having, at the Time of their
adopting the Constitution, expressed a Desire, in order to prevent
misconsttuction or abuse of its Powers, that further declaratory and
restrictive Clauses should be added: And as extending the Ground of
public Confidence in the Government, will best insure the beneficent
ends of its Institution .

...

Stated differently, the purpose of the proposed amendments was not to declare a
comprehensive list of positive fundamental rights, but to deny to the new national
government the ability to later claim certain powers implied from the original 1787
Constitution. 4 90 By passing the amendments, Congress sought to calm the fears of
concerned Americans, blunt the force of Henry's call for a second constitutional
convention, and instill citizen confidence in the new central government.
On the other hand, the Federalists throughout the ratification debate over the
1787 Constitution had insisted that a bill of rights was unnecessary and that
Antifederalist fears were overblown. As James Wilson argued early on, the central
government simply was not delegated the power in the first instance to disturb
fundamental rights. 49 ' That was still the view of many Federalists assembled in
Congress, and Federalists now held substantial majorities in both the House and
Senate.4 92
Madison's position had shifted ever so subtlety. He still did not argue that a
bill of rights was needed to thwart potential abuses by the national government. On
the other hand, he now urged the adoption of a bill of rights to assuage the fears of
common Americans,4 93 to blunt the Antifederalist's call for a second convention, to
fulfill the demands of those five states that ratified the Constitution because
amendments were promised including a bill of rights, to entice North Carolina and
Rhode Island to ratify and thus join the Union, and to fulfill his campaign promise
to Baptists in his congressional district. 494
This new tack by Madison is further borne out by his seeking to interlineate
the amendments into Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution, which is where
express restraints on national power are cataloged. Therefore, although still
difficult, the task of getting a bill of rights was made easier. The task was not to
agree on a comprehensive list of positive fundamental human rights, but to agree
on what powers were not vested (the Federalists said "were never vested") by the
1787 Constitution in the new central government.495
It follows that the Establishment Clause (as well as the Free Exercise Clause,
Free Speech Clause, Free Press Clause, etc.) cannot be a source of new power
489
490

S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 163 (Sept. 25, 1789).
See LABUNSKJ, supranote 178, at 178-255.

See supranotes 87-88 and accompanying text.
See GOLDWIN, supra note 157, at 82, 144; THORNTON ANDERSON, CREATING THE
CONSTITUTION: THE CONVENTION OF 1787 AND THE FIRST CONGRESS 176 (1993).
493 See MILLER, supra note 22, at 252-53.
491

492

494
495

See supra notes 87-88, 135-182, 493 and accompanying text.
See CURRY, supra note 7, at 193-94.
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delegated to the national government, but must be regarded as a further limitation
on such power. Or, as the Federalists saw the matter, a bill of rights would serve as
a harmless denial of national powers that were never conferred in the first place by
the 1787 Constitution. For many nonpartisan Americans, the amendments were a
prudent hedge against possible future abuses.
This has direct implications for correcting a present-day misunderstanding
that is alarmingly widespread. It is common to find individuals who believe that
the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses are in unavoidable "tension" and
often in "conflict," as if the Free Exercise Clause is proreligion and the
Establishment Clause holds religion in check.496 This reading of the text presumes
that the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause run in opposing
directions, and hence will often clash. If this were so, it would then become the
Supreme Court's task to determine if the constitutionally questionable legislation
is rightly "balanced" so as to be neither too proreligion nor too hostile to the free
exercise of religion. Not only is this contrary to the text and logic, 4 97 but it
concedes too much power to the judiciary.
A conceptual framework in which the no-establishment and free exercise texts
are in frequent "tension," and at times are in outright contradiction, is quite
impossible given the underlying nature of the Bill of Rights. It is undisputed that
each provision in the first eight amendments comprising was designed to anticipate
and negate a power wrongly imputed to the national government and that the
national government is one of limited, enumerated powers. If a power is not
delegated to the national government, then the power resides with the states or with
the people-a rule implicit in the 1787 Constitution and made explicit by the Tenth

Amendment. 4 9 8
Consider the Free Speech and Free Press Clauses. These two clauses negating
federal power over speech and press, respectively, overlap and thus reinforce one
another, but they cannot conflict. Simply put, while the government can
496

A typical example is as follows:

There can be a natural antagonism between a command not to establish religion
and a command not to inhibit its practice. This tension between the clauses often
leaves the Court with having to choose between competing values in religion
cases. The general guide here is the concept of neutrality. The opposing values
require that the government act to achieve only secular goals and that it achieve
them in a religiously neutral manner. Unfortunately, situations arise where the
government may have no choice but to incidentally help or hinder religious
groups or practices.
E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 764-65
(3d ed. 2007).
JOHN

497

See supra note 440 and accompanying text.

U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.").
498

HeinOnline -- 2011 Utah L. Rev. 606 2011

2011]

ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE INTERPRETATION

607

simultaneously violate both clauses, it is logically impossible for these two
overlapping negatives on the government's power to be in conflict. Similarly, the
Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause overlap and thereby doubly
restrict the field of permissible action by the national government concerning
religion, but they cannot conflict. Again, it is impossible for two overlapping
negatives on the government's power to conflict. 499 To be sure, the religion
clauses, each in its own way, work to protect religious freedom. But when
circumstances are such that the scope of the clauses overlap, they necessarily
complement, rather than conflict with, each other.
By way of illustration, consider a fourth-grade public school teacher who has
thirty students in her classroom. Assume the teacher requires the students to recite
in unison the Lord's Prayer to begin the school day. A Muslim student sues under
the Free Exercise Clause claiming that her rights are violated and offers evidence
that reciting the Christian prayer is a violation of conscience because its content
contradicts several beliefs of Islam. The student will prevail, but the remedy will
be that our Muslim fourth-grader may now opt out of the prayer while her
classmates continue the daily recitation.5 00 A second suit is filed, this time
invoking the Establishment Clause. Once again our Muslim student will prevail,
but this time the remedy will be to enjoin the recitation of the classroom prayer
altogether.5 0' Both clauses are violated by the required prayer. So, the two clauses
complement each other; they do not conflict.
Finally, assume that a third lawsuit is filed invoking the Free Exercise Clause.
This claim is brought by three Christian students in the classroom who ask that the
joint recitation of the Lord's Prayer be allowed to continue on a voluntary basis.
With reference to the limits on the government's power embodied in the modern
Establishment Clause, the Court will deny relief to these three students. There is no
right under the Free Exercise Clause to capture the levers of government and put

499 The proposition that the Federal Congress of 1789 intentionally placed side by side
two constitutional clauses that contradict and work against one another is too implausible
to take seriously.
500

See W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). In Barnette, the

Court struck down a state public school requirement that all students begin the school day
by saluting the United States flag and reciting the Pledge of Allegiance based on a
challenge by a group of Jehovah's Witnesses, who regard the flag salute and pledge as
worship of a graven image. Id. at 628-29, 642. The basis of the ruling was the Free Speech
Clause, and that clause protects, inter alia, freedom of religious belief. Id. at 634-36, 64042. The remedy permitted the Jehovah's Witnesses was to remain quietly seated at their
desks while the remainder of the students continued the exercise. Id. at 628-30, 642.
5o' Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224-27 (1962) (holding
that public school practice of daily classroom prayer and devotional Bible reading was
support for religion in violation of the Establishment Clause; the remedy was to enjoin the
prayer and Bible reading altogether); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 421-24 (1962)
(holding that public school practice of daily classroom prayer was support for religion in
violation of the Establishment Clause; the remedy was to enjoin the prayer altogether).
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its machinery behind the advancement of Christianity.502 If the Christian faith is to
be advanced, it must rely on the voluntary acts of Christians. In this third lawsuit
there is once again no conflict in the clauses. Only the Establishment Clause is
applicable.
To be sure, it is possible to transgress both the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clause. When the clauses overlap, they are compatible. If they appear to
be in conflict, then at least one of the clauses is being judicially misapplied.
Imagining these two denials of government power as frequently in "tension" and
having to be judicially "balanced" is deeply at odds with the central reason that
Americans demanded the addition of a bill of rights to the 1787 Constitution.
C. The FirstAmendment Restrains Government, Not the PrivateSector
The Constitution sets forth a governmental structure which delegates certain
enumerated powers and diffuses these powers among the three federal branches.
All powers not delegated are presumed to be denied. For clarity, however, the
framers expressly disclaim national power with respect to limited subject matters.
Article I, Section 9 has a list of such disclaimers. The vesting of rights in
individuals (including groups of individuals) also works to deny government
power. That is, the government has no legitimate power to violate a person's
rights. But the 1787 Constitution and the 1789-91 Bill of Rights were designed to
restrain only the national government, not the private sector.50 3 We call this the
"government action" doctrine.
While the Establishment Clause restrains the government's power, it does not
restrain the actions of wholly private actors. Stated differently, the Establishment
Clause does not run against private persons acting in their private capacity, nor
does it run against private groups such as churches. It runs only against the
government. However, there is frequently loose thinking about how one of the
purposes of the Establishment Clause is to protect the state from the church.
Consider this passage from the Court's opinion in Everson:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: . . . Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or

secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups
and vice versa.504
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 226 ("While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the
use of state action to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a
majority could use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs.").
5 To be sure, a church may not capture the state or an office thereof and put the civil
power to the service of the church. In such an event, there is state action. The state action is
in the government permitting itself to be captured by the church and pressed into her
service. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 116 (1982) (holding that an
ordinance granting local churches veto power over issuance of a liquor license to a nearby
tavern violates the Establishment Clause).
s0 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
502
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The "vice versa" is most certainly not true.505 Religious organizations may
participate in governmental affairs and seek to shape governmental policy the same
as any other organization. Indeed, such activities are protected as a matter of free
speech and associational rights generally. This sort of careless thinking usually
issues from the Enlightenment concern with the manner by which religion can
divide political debates along religious lines and have other disabling effects on
republican government. One is free to be of that persuasion, of course,o 6 but one is
not free to enlist the Establishment Clause as an ally in bringing into fruition the
Enlightenment project of emptying the public square of religion and religious
thought.
The principle that the Establishment Clause restrains only government is
frequently applied to the distinction between government speech about religion and
private speech about religion. It makes no sense to invoke the Establishment
Clause to restrain private speech about religion because there is no "government
action." Indeed, such private religious speech is likely protected by the Free
Speech Clause from any attempted government action to suppress it.
Government sponsorship of religious speech is a very different matter,507 and
official sponsorship of speech with explicitly religious content is in many instances
prohibited by the Establishment Clause. 0 s The Free Speech Clause does not, of
course, protect speech attributable -to the government. 509 The government has no
constitutional rights; it only has constitutional powers and duties. Rights are to
protect people from the government, not the other way around. Depending on the
505 See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Progressives,the Religion Clauses, and the Limits
of Secularism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN2020, at 231, 232, 234-35 (2009) (presuming that

the Establishment Clause protects the government from harm).
506

See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980)

(maintaining that citizens and officials in a liberal democracy should avoid religious
arguments to undergird policy judgments and limit themselves to methods of factual
determination accessible to the general public); see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971). The acceptance of Rawls' theory necessarily would exclude religious
percepts from consideration within the public sphere of debate. A proposition that public
discourse in which citizens refrained from bringing particular religious beliefs into the
marketplace of ideas is a world that would have been rejected by the Americans of 17871791.
507 On the importance of distinguishing between government speech and private
speech, as well as suggestions with respect to government's considerable powers of
expression, see Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460.(2009).
508 One also has to be mindful of the difference between the government's
sponsorship of religion qua religion and the government's sponsorship of religious
freedom. See supra Part V.C.
509 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000) (' [T]here is a crucial
difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause
forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise
Clauses protect."' (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (plurality
opinion) (emphasis in original))).
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facts, however, it can be a close call whether the speech in question is private or is
fairly attributable to the government. An example of a close call is student-initiated
prayer at the opening of a public high school football game. In Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe,sio a divided Supreme Court attributed a
student's prayer to the government." That seems rightly decided given the fact
that the public school was heavily involved in selecting the student speaker, along
with this high school's history of prayer at its games.
The Supreme Court took a wrong turn, however, with the "government
action" doctrine in Widmar v. Vincent.512 Widmar was correctly decided but for the
wrong reason. The case involved a state university that allowed student
organizations to use classroom buildings after hours to hold their meetings. 513
When a religious student organization sought to schedule space to conduct
meetings that included worship, the university balked, citing the need for strict
separation of church and state as required by the Establishment Clause as well as
the state constitution.514 The Court, relying on a long line of precedent that
prohibited the government from discriminating in providing access to a public
forum based on the content of one's speech, had little trouble ordering the state
university to give equal access to student organizations without regard to the nature
of the group's religious expression-worship or otherwise.5 15
If only the justices had stopped there. It would have been sufficient to explain
the
no-establishment principle did not justify the university's exclusion of a
that
religious message because the Establishment Clause runs only against the
government and not private speakers. Alas, the Court fatefully went on to leave
open the possibility that on a different set of facts the need to comply with the
Establishment Clause could conflict with and override the students' rights under
the Free Speech Clause.516 Once again, this is logically impossible: two
overlapping denials of government power-speech and no-establishment-can
complement each other but they cannot conflict.517 What the Widmar Court should
5"0

530 U.S. 290 (2000).

Id. at 315-17.
512 454 U.S. 263 (1981). One could attribute this slip to an earlier case in which the
Court wrote that it "has struggled to find a neutral course between the two Religion
Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a
logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
668-69 (1970). But Walz stopped short of saying that there was an actual "clash" and that
the solution, in the event of a conflict, was that one clause should trump the other. Widmar
took that fatal step.
13 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 264-65.
514 Id. at 265-67, 275-76.
511

" Id. at 276-77.
516 Id at 270-75. The Court explained: "Neither do we reach the questions that would
arise if state accommodation of free exercise and free speech rights should, in a particular
case, conflict with the prohibitions of the Establishment Clause." Id. at 273 n.13.
51 To further illustrate the folly in the Supreme Court's thinking, one might crowd the
Court with this line of inquiry: When two First Amendment provisions conflict, why do the
justices choose no-establishment to override free speech and free exercise rather than vice
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have said-had it been attentive to the "government action" doctrine-is that the
Court deems pivotal its finding that the speech 'in question was private speech not
government speech. When the expression is private speech, then there is no
"government action" so the Establishment Clause cannot apply. Moreover, these
private speakers have rights under the Free Speech Clause. In Widmar, the Court
ruled for the students based on the Free Speech Clause.' 8 That.is the correct result.
If we alter the facts, however, and the worship service had been conducted at the
behest of the university (hence government speech), then no-establishment, rather
than free speech, would have been the relevant restraint on the university as a
government speaker. That would have been the straightforward result, and it is also
the correct rationale given the "government action" doctrine. Instead, the Widmar
Court asked if the Establishment Clause conflicted with, and thus "on balance"
overrode, the Free Speech Clause. Taking that wrong path has made all. the
difference.
Failing to strictly attend to the distinction between government speech and
private speech because of the "government action" doctrine can lead to all sorts of
mischief. For example, in Good News Club v. Milford Central School,5 19 the
dissent worried that impressionable elementary school students might wrongly
think that public school authorities were sponsoring a Bible Club that was seeking
equal access to classroom space to hold its meetings after school hours. 52 0 As the
majority pointed out, the same elementary school students might get the distinct
impression that school authorities were hostile to Christianity (or to religion in
general) if the Bible Club were excluded from the school when all the other
students groups like Girl Scouts and 4-H Clubs were allowed to use the
classrooms. 2' It makes no sense to hold that one private speaker loses her free
speech rights because of the mistaken impression of other private actors. More to
the point, however, once it was determined that the Bible Club is a private speaker
(a matter agreed to by all parties), then the Establishment Clause simply cannot
apply to limit the Club's speech because of the absence of "government action."
And, indeed, the private speech of the Bible Club is protected by the Free Speech
Clause from viewpoint discrimination, and thus the Club cannot rightfully be
excluded from the limited public forum on account of its speech being religious in
its perspective.
The Supreme Court has reached the correct result on most of the equal-access
cases to come before it,5 22 but the justices have made the cases seem far more
versa? Is there a sliding scale of rights in the Constitution, some more valuable than others?
What is the basis for that assertion? Where are we to find this hierarchy of constitutional
rights, or is that also to be trusted to the balancing of nine unelected justices?
' See id. at 273.
533 U.S. 98 (2001).

59
520

521
522

Id. at 141-44 (Souter, J., dissenting).

Id. at 118-19.
In addition to Widmar and Good News Club, see Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors

of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding the Establishment Clause did not justify a
state university denying to a student religious newspaper equal access to a limited forum
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difficult than was necessary. It is a categorical mistake to invoke the Establishment
Clause to suppress private religious speech. It is a double wrong: the Establishment
Clause does not restrain speech in the absence of "government action," and it
violates the Free Speech Clause to not require equal access for private speech
without regard to its religious viewpoint.
VII. EARLY APPLICATIONS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
BY FEDERAL OFFICIALS

This Part briefly examines how the first generation of federal officials who
were bound by the Establishment Clause applied its strictures. In cases where the
text is ambiguous, their behavior may be of some guidance with respect to the
clause's original meaning. We have previously looked at the plain text of the
Establishment Clause, as well as debates within the First Federal Congress over its
various drafts in the House and Senate. 5 23 These debates ultimately turned on the
scope of the power being denied to the national government. We have noted how
the text of the clause does not prohibit making a law about religion but, more
narrowly, prohibits making a law about "an establishment" of religion. The search
for original meaning still leaves us with a major question: What was meant by
"establishment" when drafting the constitution in 1789-1791?
At a minimum, "establishment" meant that the new national government
could not establish a single national church or combination of churches. 524 But it
almost certainly meant more than this minimalist reading. Common sense tells us
the government could not maneuver to create an establishment in all but name. Nor
could it legislate bits and pieces of laws which, when added up, were tantamount to
an establishment. But less clear is whether the Establishment Clause prohibits
enacting into law just some of the elements, which when all elements are taken
defined in part by a university subsidy); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette,
515 U.S. 753 (1995) (plurality opinion in part) (holding that the Establishment Clause did
not justify the state denying a religious symbol equal access to a limited public forum);
Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moricheg Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (holding that
the Establishment Clause did not justify a public school denying a religious speaker equal
access to a limited public forum after school hours); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226
(1990) (plurality opinion in part) (upholding the federal Equal Access Act of 1983, which
provided that the Establishment Clause did not justify a public secondary school denying
equal access to a high school religious club). The one equal-access case to rule against free.
speech is Christian Legal Soc 'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v.

Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). In Martinez, a state law school had a policy that all
school-recognized student organizations were compelled to open positions of membership
and leadership to every student enrolled in the school. Id. at 2979. The law school denied
recognition to a religious student organization that required belief in a statement of faith
and that entailed adherence to rules of moral conduct by all officers and voting members.
Viewed as a reasonable speaker classification in a limited public forum, the school was
found not to violate the organization's right of free speech. Id. at 2984-95.
523 See supra Part IV (drafts in Congress) and Part V (plain text).
524 See supra notes 238-239, 305-306 and accompanying text.
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together comprise a fully developed establishment of religion, such as the Church
of England well known to the founders.525
To learn more about what was meant by "establishment," we examine here
how the actions of the first generation of national officials, including presidents
and Congresses of the early republic, applied the restraints of the Establishment
Clause. Let it be said at the outset that this method of supplementing our
understanding of the original meaning of the Establishment Clause has been
frustrating and contentious, in part because the actions of early presidents and
Congresses are inconsistent. Whatever the definition of "establishment," reliance
on the contradictory actions of these early officials ends up proving too much or
too little. Indeed, some of these actions appear to unabashedly confuse the role of
the nation-state with the role of the church. When trying to manage a story as large
as the new American republic, it is well to remember that the disciplined scholar
will not go floating in the eddies and tributaries of that which are a part of every
big river, winding in unexpected directions, but he will stay to the main channel
that inexorably bends to the south and to the sea.
A threshold question is which actions should count toward original meaning.
First, it is best to confine the examination of events to official actions by the
executive and legislative branches in the early republic. Evidence of a founder's
life of faith (or lack thereof) should have no bearing.526 Second, it is best to confine
See supra note 185. Professors Witte and McConnell each set forth a list of the
multiple elements that comprised the Church of England establishment. By way of
example, two such elements were requiring the licensure of meeting houses of dissenter
sects and the denial of licensure to dissenting clergy so that they could not perform
marriages that civil authorities would recognize. See Daniel L. Dreisbach, George Mason 's
525

PursuitofReligious Liberty in Revolutionary Virginia, 108 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY
5, 19 n.46 (2000) (quoting The Petition of Sundry Inhabitants of Prince Edward County

dated October 11, 1776, which was a stronghold of Presbyterian dissenters in Virginia).
The petition calls for, inter alia, the repeal of the licensure of dissenting clergy and the state
approval of meeting houses for worship by nonconformists. This petition and several other
petitions opposing the Anglican establishment in Virginia are reproduced in CHARLES G.
JAMES, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN VIRGINIA
68-75 (1900). During the period from late 1776 through 1778, dissenters continued to

petition the Virginia General Assembly against various regulations, such as the restriction
on clergy able to perform marriages. THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN
REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA, 1776-1787, at 38-45 (1977); see JAMES, supra, at 225-27
(reproducing such a petition of April 25, 1777, from the Hanover Presbytery). A Baptist
petition dated October 16, 1780, complained of various discriminations including that their
ministers could not perform marriages. The bar on performing marriages was finally lifted
by legislation. JAMES, supra, at 219-21 (reproducing petition and repealing legislation); see
also CURRY, supra note 7, at 135, 140.
526 An executive or congressional official's personal religious beliefs or acts of piety
do not necessarily translate into that same official's thinking on church-government
matters. It is disparaging to assume that religious persons are bent on imposing their
personal religious beliefs through the government's official actions and lawmaking.
Officials who also happen to be religious are quite capable of refraining from using the law
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the examination of events to official actions in which the boundaries set by the
Establishment Clause were actually considered. Even more revealing is where
there was some clash between factions over the clause's application. When
officials were inattentive, their actions are of reduced interpretative value. Third,
public remarks of general religious content (whether oral or written) by presidents
are best tied to the person and beliefs of the particular president rather than said to
be controlled by the strictures of the Establishment Clause.527 Like a professor's
academic freedom to publish the results of her research without having those
results imputed to the university that employs her, the law understands that the
president can issue a declaration (or otherwise refer to God in speeches) without
the content being understood as a legal mandate or the speech being attributed to
the government.528 An officeholder has a right to exercise his own religion.
Moreover, many voters want to know all sorts of things about a candidate for
elective office, including his religious faith or lack thereof. For many voters,
religious affiliation and practice gives them a quick read on the candidate's
character, all of which becomes part of the mix for how that voter casts her ballot.
Another threshold query is into the basis for agreement by the
disestablishmentarians in the states on which the Everson Court relied. Certainly
the religious disestablishmentarians believed that government aid to a church was
corrupting organized religion and thus bad for religious freedom.5 2 9 They argued
for any formal relationship to be severed and for all churches to become

to impose their religion because to do so is contrary to their belief in the protection of
conscience. Moreover, officials who are not religious are quite capable of seeking to
advance religion because to do so will advance some secular goal. Further, the reality is
that many prominent figures such as James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, George
Washington, and John Adams, and many in the early Congresses disagreed in material
respects when it came to church-government relations, and none of these individuals were
consistent during his own public life on religious freedom questions. See VINCENT PHILLIP
MUioz, GOD AND THE FOUNDERS: MADISON, WASHINGTON, AND JEFFERSON 4 (2009)

(explaining that it is misguided to attempt to form a generalized "consensus" of churchgovernment relations based on what the founders believed because they held such differing
views on the subject). Additionally, the constituents the officials served-Baptists,
Presbyterians, Mennonites, German Brethren, Quakers, Deists, and other dissentersexerted influence on their representatives irrespective of whether the official was
personally religious. Finally, a given official may have had a more lofty vision of churchgovernment relations, but in a clash settled for less because it was the best he could get
under the circumstances.
527 See WALDMAN, supra note 26, at
159-8 1.
528 "[W]hen public officials deliver public speeches, we recognize that their words are
not exclusively a transmission from the government because those oratories have
embedded within them the inherently personal views of the speaker as an individual
member of the polity.'" Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 724 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
. 529 -See Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment, supra note 8, at 1448-1540; Esbeck,
Virginia Disestablishment,supra note 5, at 77-78, 84, 92-96.
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voluntarily supported. 53 0 But many of these same disestablishmentarians continued
.to believe that a republic could be sustained only if citizens were self-disciplined
and virtuous.53 ' And they continued to believe that religion had an indispensable
role in forming a virtuous citizen, and indeed that Protestant Christianity was best
to unify and maintain the mores of the American political culture. 5 32 Accordingly,
while disestablishment of a church was good for religious freedom, many
disestablishmentarians thought it would be disastrous to separate the private
religious teaching of those virtues required of "we the people" comprising and
governing a popular republic.533 Finally, looking back over 220 years, it is
sometimes difficult to differentiate when an official's act was seemingly in
contradiction to the church-state severance brought about by disestablishment as
opposed to an official's act in support of Protestantism's unofficial role in the
teaching of civic virtues in aid of republican government.
With these threshold parameters -in mind, we now take up specific acts of
national officials. In September 1789, the House provided for the appointment of
534
chaplains and set an annual salary of $500 paid out of the U.S. treasury. This
occurred before the Establishment Clause was ratified, but Congress continued the
practice unabated after being notified in early 1792 that the Bill of Rights had been
successfully ratified. The selection and payment of chaplains is part of the internal
operations of the House and Senate, thus these decisions are not subject to the
approval of the president.53 5 No contemporaneous objection was made that the
chaplaincies violated the Establishment Clause,536 although in the years following
530 Esbeck, Virginia Disestablishment, supra note 5, at 61, 92-96; see also Esbeck,
Dissent and Disestablishment,supra note 8, at 1395-96.
s3 Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment,supra note 8, at 1431; Esbeck, Virginia
Disestablishment,supra note 5, at 59.
532 See Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment,supra note 8, at 1431; Esbeck, Virginia
Disestablishment,supra note 5, at 59.
5 See Esbeck, Dissent andDisestablishment,supra note 8, at 1396.

534 ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND
CURRENT FICTION 23-24, 53-55 (1982). See generally Christopher C. Lund, The
CongressionalChaplaincies, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1171 (2009) (discussing the

constitutionality of congressional chaplaincies, focusing on the history of chaplaincies);
Andy G. Olree, James Madison and Legislative Chaplains, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 145 (2008)
(discussing James Madison's views on the establishment of the congressional chaplaincy in
light of the disestablishmentarian principles embodied in the First Amendment).
5 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, §5, cl. 2.
536 A committee appointed for the purpose "brought in a bill for allowing a
compensation to the members of both Houses, and to their respective officers." 1 ANNALS
OF CONG. 701 (Aug. 4, 1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); see id. at 701-14 (Aug. 4-7,
1789). While there was disagreement on the amount to be paid to members of Congress
and certain officers, there was no debate or objection to the compensation of chaplains. Id.
at 701-14. On September 11, 1789, without objection, an act passed "allowing
Compensation to the Members of the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States, and to the Officers of both Houses." Id. at 926. This act included a salary for the
chaplains.
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his presidency James Madison wrote in an unpublished document that he thought
the practice unconstitutional.
President Washington issued a Thanksgiving Day Proclamation.5 38 The House
had passed a resolution urging Washington to issue the proclamation on September
25, 1789. This was one day after the House adopted the final draft of what became
the Bill of Rights for ratification by the states. 3 While the Establishment Clause
was not yet law, one Antifederalist did object to the proclamation as being
religious and thus not within the authority of Congress.54 0 Madison was a member
of the House committee that reported out the resolution but he remained silent.54 1
President Adams also issued similar proclamations. 54 2 President Jefferson thought
such proclamations unconstitutional and refused to issue them.543 President
Madison sought to follow Jefferson's example, but during the War of 1812,
Congress requested that Madison issue such proclamations. He issued four
proclamations, but Madison was careful to note he was only complying with
Congress' requests and he phrased the documents as recommendatory only with
respect to any actual religious observance by citizens.'4" Once again, in his later
years Madison wrote that he thought the practice unconstitutional.s4 s
Presidents Washington and Adams issued proclamations declaring a national
day of fasting and prayer, but President Jefferson declined to do so because he
thought them prohibited by the First and Tenth Amendments.54 6 Jefferson took
pains to note that fasting and prayer, being religious observances, were practices
within the province of each church and thus was not to be the object of
intermeddling by the government. Jefferson thus couched his abstinence in terms
of safeguarding the autonomy of churches.
537

Notes and Documents: Madison's "DetachedMemoranda," 3 WM. & MARY

Q.

534, 559 (1946) [hereinafter Detached Memoranda]. Madison went on to say he also
opposed military chaplains. Id. at 559-60. Military chaplaincies are different because duty
assignments for members of the armed forces often prevent attendance at a house of
worship of one's choice. That is not the case with members of Congress.
538 CORD, supra note 534, at 51.
s39 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 948 (Sept. 24, 1789).
540 Id. at 950 (Thomas Tudor Tucker of South Carolina objecting).
541 From Madison's perspective, the final no-establishment text was

better than the
language he had started with in June 1789. Perhaps Madison maintained his silence so as to
not undo this favorable development, but we simply do not know.
542 HUTSON, supra note 35, at 81-82.
543 A treatise author and contemporary of these events during the Jefferson presidency
agreed with Jefferson that the Proclamations issued by Washington and Adams were
contrary to the Establishment Clause. See 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES app. at 347 n.* (The Lawbook Exchange Ltd., 1996) (1803). Some
contemporaries sought to explain away the conflict by arguing the proclamations were
merely advisory, but Tucker notes that the proclamations were issued under the seal of the
United States and attested to by the Secretary of State. Id
54 CORD, supra note 534, at 31.
545 Detached Memoranda,supra note 537, at 560-62.
546

CORD, supra note 534, at 40.
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In February 1811, President Madison vetoed a bill incorporating the
Protestant Episcopal Church of Alexandria, then in the District of Columbia. 54 7 in
the absence of the now common statutory acts under which corporations are
formed by administrative action, a separate bill in the legislature was then required
to form a new corporate body. Madison objected that the bill violated the
Establishment Clause. Madison's veto message said the bill detailed the polity and
internal administration of the church, even down to how a minister was to be
appointed and removed. Such matters of internal church administration were not
subject to the government's jurisdiction, wrote Madison, but lie within the sole
power of the church. Madison also wrote that a matter of internal church
administration should be alterable only by the bylaws and canons of the
denomination of which this local church was a part. The details of this bill,
however, would require a congressional amendment to permit compliance with the
instructions of the central denomination of the local church. Finally, the grant of
authority to support and educate the poor through a ministry of the church could be
taken as vesting an agency in the church to assume a civic duty. Madison was thus
sensitive to church autonomy and also careful not be seen as delegating
governmental functions to a religious body.
Also in February 1811, Madison vetoed a bill reserving public land for the use
548
of a Baptist Church in the Mississippi territory. Madison's veto message said
that transfer of a parcel of land with no apparent consideration would set a
precedent for funding religious societies in violation of the Establishment Clause.
The bill sought to resolve various disputed land claims, one of which was by a
church that had erected a building on the land in question. Madison obviously
thought the resolution of the church's land dispute with the government should be
by the payment of fair consideration that turned on the merits of the dispute.
In January 1795, President Washington signed treaties with the Oneida,
Tuscarora, and Stockbridge Indian tribes which included a $1,000 payment toward
building a church to replace the one burned by the British during the Revolutionary
War. 54 9 In June 1796, Congress passed a land statute entitled "An Act regulating
the grants of land appropriated for Military services and for the Society of the
United Brethren, for propagating the Gospel among the Heathen." 5 o Section Two
provided for the issuance of land titles at no cost to the Society of United Brethren,
said land to be held in trust for the benefit of Christian Indians living in a
designated area. Some of the trust resources were used by the United Brethren to
promote Christianity among these Native Americans.5 5' Extensions of the act were
passed during the Jefferson Administration.55 2 In October 1803, President Jefferson
asked the Senate to ratify a treaty with the Kaskaskia tribe. In return for a transfer
54 7
548

1d. at 33.

549
550

5
552

Id. at 34.

Id. at 58.
Act of June 1, 1796, ch. 46, 1 Stat. 490.
CORD, supra note 534, at 42-43.
Id. at 44-45.
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of tribal land to the federal government, the United States agreed to provide funds
to build a Catholic church and to pay an annual stipend to a Catholic priest to
perform his priestly duties.5 53 The Senate ratified the treaty in December 1803.554
In January 1819, President Monroe negotiated a treaty with the Wyandot Indian
tribe which included a transfer of federal land for the erection of a Catholic
church. 5 Later presidents provided federal funds to build churches on Native
American land, as well as to provide aid to educate Native American children
through Christian mission societies.s56 None of these treaties and other dealings
with Indian tribes was challenged as being in violation of the Establishment
Clause. Accordingly, we do not have the benefit of how officials would have
responded had an objection been raised.
Some of the actions described above are not at odds with how we presently
think about the Establishment Clause, such as Madison's two vetoes in February
1811. Moreover, some actions which Madison successfully vetoed are near
opposites of other actions- by officials which drew no objection under the
Establishment Clause. In such cases of diametrically opposite (or near opposite)
actions, the vetoes by Madison ought to trump the inattentive actions by others as
guides to interpretation.
There are various scholarly attempts to explain the uneven and inconsistent
actions by early national officials.5 57 Professor Steven Smith suggests that the
Establishment Clause disempowered the federal government from supporting a
church or churches, but that the government can still act favorably with respect to
religion more generally.558 Often this distinction will match the facts, such as with
Thanksgiving Day Proclamations and congressional chaplains. But there is no fit
with some of the actions by officials recounted above, such as those directly
funding a church building or funding a Catholic priest in performing his priestly
duties in a church.559 Professor Douglas Laycock suggests explaining these official
actions by drawing a line at financial support for religion. 6 o In his view the
553

Id. at 38.

Id. at 38-39.
Id. at 59.
556 Id. at 59-60, 63-73.
554
1s5

5s7

See Esbeck, Establishment Clause as Structural, supra note 404, at 18-21

(collecting scholarly authorities).
558

Steven D. Smith, The Establishment Clause and the "Problem of the Church"

13-14 (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research
Paper No. 09-024, 2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=
1444606. Smith uses this distinction to permit government speech that has historically
acknowledged God and endorsed religion in general. Id. at 17-18. However, his distinction
would also allow such official actions as public school prayer or blasphemy laws.
ss9 These actions cannot be explained away as government funding for a religious
organization that is not a church to provide education or a social service. On the other hand,
these are not actions that were contemporaneously challenged as violative of the
Establishment Clause. So inattentiveness to the Establishment Clause by the federal
officials involved might explain the variance from Professor Smith's distinction.
s6o Laycock, supra note 224, at 913-19.
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Establishment Clause does its most important work in preventing monetary
support for religion. But a fair number of the early actions by officials did involve
aid to religion using tax funds, most notably the payments for missionary efforts to
Native Americans. It is true that this financial aid to missionaries and mission
schools was using a religious means (inculcating Christian morality) to achieving a
secular end ("civilizing" the tribes). But the overt use of religion as an instrument
of civic policy has never been thought to circumvent the no-establishment
principle.561
Context can be helpful. Disestablishment in the South came much earlier than
in Puritan New England, and New England establishments were still strong in the
1790s and beyond.562 Accordingly, nonconformity was a live controversy in New
England in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and Congregational
Church establishments were a cause of major agitation, whereas churches in the
middle and southern states had moved563 beyond the question of disestablishment
to focus on events that later came to be called the Second Great Awakening.
Additionally, Federalists were strongest in New England whereas Republicans had
their base in the South. 565 Thus, some of the. variance between an original
understanding of the Establishment Clause and early actions by national officials
can be explained by looking to see if the clause was being applied by an official
sympathetic to the Federalist or the Republican Party.566 Republicans had a greater
sensitivity to church-government separation than did New England Federalists.
Also helpful-at least when it comes to the government's adoption of certain
religious expression-is to acknowledge that the founding generation was steeped
in a pervasive culture of Protestant Christianity, and that officials in the new
republic were sometimes indiscriminate in mixing their Protestant mores with the
"
Pi
need for civic unity.567 As Professor
Philip Hamburger has pointed out, Christian
disestablishmentarians initially avoided terminology like "separation of church and
state" because they feared the term might be misunderstood as preventing religion
from informally instilling the civic virtues needed to sustain a republic.56 8 This
explains the government's adoption of religious events, symbols, and other
expressions such as Thanksgiving Day, but it does not satisfactorily explain
monetary support for Protestant missionary activities to Native Americans.
Moreover, some of this missionary support was for Catholic missions as well.
561

James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance protests the use of religion as an

engine of civic policy. See Esbeck, Virginia'sDisestablishment,supranote 5, at 83-84, 96.
562 Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment,supra note 8,
at 1501-55.
565

Id. at 1457-1501.
Id. at 1454-56, 1540-55.

LARSON, supra note 158, at 31 (showing that in the 1796 election Adams and the

Federalists held New England, whereas Jefferson and the Republicans held the South and
West).
566 This can be helpful in comparing the proclamations and actions of Presidents
Washington and Adams, on the one hand, with those of Presidents Jefferson and Madison.
567 See Laycock, supranote 224, at 918.
568 See HAMBURGER, supra note 6, at 107, 110, 193.
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A distinction with superficial explanatory power is that many of the actions
that are referenced above were on territorial land or involved Indian tribes.
Congress has power to regulate territorial affairs169 and to oversee Indian tribes. 7 O
In the new republic, national officials generally took more care to not interfere
with the states and how each state dealt with its church-state affairs. That same
federalist tendency would not apply out in the territories or in dealing with tribal
Native Americans. Professor Akhil Amar suggests when it came to the territories
the national government may have envisioned itself as in a role similar to a state
when it came to overseeing internal religious affairs. 71 However, once the Bill of
Rights was ratified the national government's enumerated powers, whether
expressed or implied, were subject to the full restraint of the Establishment Clause.
The plain text makes that conclusion inescapable.572 So any assertion that national
action involving the territories or Indian tribes was less subject to the clause is
illusory.
In the final analysis, the record concerning official acts in the early republic
fails to clarify the original meaning of "establishment" in the First Amendment.
Most difficult to reconcile with our present understanding of the clause are the
missionary dealings with certain Indian tribes, but those transactions did not have
the benefit of contemporaneous debate where someone raised a timely objection
under the Establishment Clause. So just what this inattention by the two political
branches teaches us about original meaning is not at all conclusive.
With respect to official actions bearing on church-government relations by the
judicial branch, we have little information. In the early republic, the judiciary was
a nonplayer with respect to giving meaning to the Establishment Clause. Indeed,
for over a century the Supreme Court ignored the clause.573 It was not that cases
involving religious freedom did not come before the Court in the nation's first 110
years. 574 Rather, the Court, for reasons of its own, 575 resolved those cases under
576
other provisions of the Constitution or by resort to federal common law.
"The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
570 "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce ... with the Indian
Tribes . . ." Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3.
571 See AMAR, supra note 321, at 247-49.
569

572

See supra notes 458-460, and accompanying text.

5 The first Supreme Court case to explicitly apply the Establishment Clause (rather
than merely giving the clause passing mention) is Bradfield v. Roberts. 175 U.S. 291
(1899) (holding that use of federal funds to assist in the construction of a Catholic hospital
in the District of Columbia did not violate the Establishment Clause); see also Jay S.

Bybee, Taking Liberties with the FirstAmendment: Congress, Section 5, and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1539, 1571 (1995) (noting that between
ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791 and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in
1868, there were few decisions in the Supreme Court that even mention the First

Amendment).
574 See generally 1 JAMES HITCHCOCK, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION IN
AMERICAN LIFE: THE ODYSSEY OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 3-42 (2004) (surveying the
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The record of the debate by the First Federal Congress, along with the final
text of the clause, demonstrate that neither the House nor the Senate had in mind
either nonpreferentialism 5n or specific federalism, 78 nor did the First Congress
limit the Establishment Clause to instances where liberty of conscience alone is
violated. 7 Careful attention to the text and original understanding cannot answer
all contemporary questions with respect to the correct application of the
Establishment Clause, but the discipline does eliminate all three of these false
paths. While the text and original understanding may not reveal clearly the
meaning of "establishment," they do much to discredit misguided theories
concerning what the religion clauses supposedly mean. Avoiding these wrong
turns will go far to remedy the uneven character of the much maligned
Establishment Clause jurisprudence in our federal courts.
The focus in the First Federal Congress was on the scope of the power to deny
Congress with respect to "an establishment" of religion. The plain text of the
clause permits congressional legislation to touch on religion generally, provided
that the government does not legislate more narrowly on a matter about "an
establishment" of religion.580 One clear implication of this scope of the noestablishment restraint is that statutory exemptions to accommodate religion are
generally constitutional because they work not to expand religion, but to expand
religious freedom by leaving religion alone.58 Further, the drafters wrote the
amendment that became the Bill of Rights to clarify those powers the national
government was being denied.5 82 Accordingly, the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses are negatives on government power. Both thereby expand
religious freedom. As such, the clauses cannot be in "tension" or otherwise cancel
one another out such that courts have to balance religious freedom against some
Such balancing leaves in the
undefined interest in holding religion in check.
Supreme Court's religious freedom cases up to World War II); Michael W. McConnell,
The Supreme Court's Earliest Church-State Cases: Windows on Religious-CulturalPoliticalConflict in the Early Republic, 37 TULSA L. REv. 7 (2001).
5 It is possible that the Supreme Court's early avoidance of the Establishment Clause
was partly due to the Federalist Party leanings of Chief Justice John Marshall.
576 See generally HAMBURGER, supra note 6 (describing political action in the
executive and legislative branches in the nineteenth century rather than the deployment of
disestablishmentarian principles by the judicial branch).
sn See supra notes 171, 184-185, 224, 275, 279-283, 297-300 and accompanying
text.
578 See supra notes 173, 275, 297-300, 309-331 and accompanying text; supra Part

IV.H.

579

See supra Part V.B.
See supra Part V.C.
581 Id.

5so

582

See supra notes 7, 180-181, 318-319, 488-490 and accompanying text.

583

id
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judiciary far too much unguided discretion that was never conferred. When the text
and its intent are so clear, the Court is without authority to arrogate the power to
balance. Balancing the clauses also fails to recognize that the Establishment Clause
is a restraint only on the government, not the private sector.58 4 Both clauses, each
in their own way, are protective of voluntary religious observance.
Finally, the text demonstrates that the Free Exercise Clause sought to
acknowledge a pre-existing right, whereas the Establishment Clause imposed an
original structural limit on the federal government's power.8 This understanding
not only harmonizes the clauses, but also confirms that the Establishment Clause
was intended to define the jurisdictional limits between government and organized
religion. And, in the main, that is how it has been applied by the post-Everson
Supreme Court. 5 86
As a structural or power-limiting clause, the modern Establishment Clause
polices the boundary between church and government. The scope of the limitations
this clause imposes is broader than just a ban on establishing a national church or
combination of churches. 8 The ban likely applies as well to the various elements
that were historically associated with a fully developed establishment, such as the
Church of England familiar to the founders. It seems proper to also extend the ban
to governmental actions that bring about the sorts of evils the founders associated
with religious establishments, even if the particular actions in question were
unknown in 1789.588 It is, after all, "a constitution we are expounding."s8 9
The behavior of the legislative and executive branches in the period shortly
after ratification of the First Amendment was mixed and inconsistent. 590 There are
instances during the early republic when the president and Congress acted counter
to rules that since Everson most of us take for granted as logical implications of the
Establishment Clause. However, some harmony can be brought to the historical
record by looking only at those actions in which national officials actually
considered the Establishment Clause as limiting national power. Further, it is well
known that those early officials with Republican leanings where far more attuned
to church-government matters than were Federalists, especially New England

5
8See supra Part VI.C.

585 See supra Part V.A.
586See generally Esbeck, Establishment Clause as Structural,supra note
404.
587 See supra notes 238-239, 305-306 and accompanying
text.
588 See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 441-42 (1961) (stating that

the
Establishment Clause prohibits not just a national church establishment but also laws which
-bring about "the evils it was designed forever to suppress" (quoting Everson v. Bd. of

Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14-15)); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 236
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that it was proper to inquire "whether the practices
... challenged threaten those consequences which the Framers deeply feared").
589 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819). By way of example, the "sorts
of evils" which brought down the Virginia establishment are systematically cataloged in
Esbeck, Virginia Disestablishment,supranote 5; at 92-98.
590 See supra Part VII.
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Federalists, where local church establishments remained well into the nineteenth
century.
In popular vernacular, the Establishment Clause is now about the separation
of church and state. Unlike revolutionary France, in America that separation has
never meant a separation of religion from public life and political debate. Rather,
the principle has its roots in the Western legal tradition dating back to the fourth
century. 591 For well over a millennium there evolved a dual-authority pattern
where both church and nation-state had its own center of power. While the line
dividing authority between them has shifted through the centuries, the existence of
this line has not been a subject of doubt. This separation has proven to be good for
both the body politic and for organized religion. It liberates the civil polity to
practice religion (or not) as citizens see fit and it secures the integrity of religious
organizations by preventing government interference in the internal matters of
organized religion. Accordingly, citizen support for religion is a voluntary act.
In America, disestablishment took place from 1776 to 1833 at the state
level,592 not at the national level. So the modern Supreme Court in Everson looked
to the dual-authority pattern as it developed during Virginia's disestablishment and
that of other states to give substantive meaning to "an establishment" of religion.5 93
Everson, of course, also extended the Establishment Clause to apply to and bind
the states and no longer just the national government. Whether that discrete act of
"selective incorporation" was properly within the authority of the Supreme Court, I
leave for the reader to decide.594 But there can be no doubt that a reliance on the
disestablishment experience in Virginia and other states is an accurate description
of what the Court did in Everson and in its post-Everson cases. While Everson
used the rhetoric of the Jeffersonian "wall of separation," the metaphor was too
vague to really guide the Court in arriving at its decisions. Accordingly, given that
there never was a national disestablishment experience, the post-Everson Court
acted properly when it looked to the states' experiences to inform its knowledge of
the sorts of evils disestablishment was meant to remedy.

591 See Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment,supra note 8, at 1391-1448; see also

supra note 432 (collecting authorities).
5

Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment,supra note 8, at 1448-1540.
See supranotes 4-5 and accompanying text.

594

See supranote 457 and accompanying text.

592
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